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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN APPLIED ECONOMICS
Daniel W. Sacks
Uli Doraszelski
Katja Seim
Essay 1 studies physician agency problems, which arise whenever physicians fail to max-
imize their patients’ preferences, given available information. These agency problems are
well documented, but the magnitude of their welfare consequences for patients—the losses
from suboptimal treatment choice induced by agency—are unclear. I infer patient drug
preference from their compliance decisions. I begin by showing that initial prescriptions re-
spond to physician financial incentives to control costs and to pharmaceutical detailing, but
compliance does not, pointing to agency problems. I then develop and estimate a model
of physician-patient interactions where physician write initial prescriptions, but patients
choose whether to comply. Fully eliminating agency problems increases compliance by 6.5
percentage points, and raises patient welfare by 22% of drug spending. Contracts that bet-
ter align doctor and patient preferences can improve patient welfare, but attain only half
the gains from eliminating agency completely. Although physician agency problems reduce
patient welfare, eliminating them is thus likely difficult.
Essay 2, co-authored with Alexander M. Gelber and Damon Jones, studies frictions in
adjusting earnings to changes in the Social Security Annual Earnings Test (AET) using a
panel of Social Security Administration microdata on one percent of the U.S. population
from 1961 to 2006. Individuals continue to ”bunch” at the convex kink the AET creates
even when they are no longer subject to the AET, consistent with the existence of earnings
adjustment frictions in the U.S. We develop a novel estimation framework and estimate in
a baseline case that the earnings elasticity with respect to the implicit net-of-tax share is
iv
0.23, and the fixed cost of adjustment is $152.08.
Essay 3 studies the impact of health expenditure risk on annuitization. Theoretical research
suggests that such risk can have an ambiguous influence on the annuitization decisions of
the elderly. I provide empirical evidence on this linkage, by estimating the impact of supple-
mental Medicare insurance (Medigap) coverage on the annuity demand of older Americans.
Medigap coverage has a strong impact on annuitization: the extensive margin elasticity is
0.39, the overall elasticity of private annuity income with respect to Medigap coverage is
0.56. These results are robust to controls for health, wealth, and preferences, as well as
other robustness tests. They suggest that medical expenditure risk has a large impact on
underannuitization.
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CHAPTER 1 : Physician Agency, Compliance, and Patient Welfare: Evidence from
Anti-Cholesterol Drugs
1.1. Introduction
Imperfect physician agency arises whenever physicians fail to maximize their patients’ pref-
erences, given available information. Because doctors face myriad financial incentives, ex-
plicit and implicit, to provide some treatments but not others, there are many opportunities
for imperfect agency, with broad consequences. Physician incentives affect the quantity and
type of care provided (Gruber and Owings, 1996; Yip, 1998; Stern and Trajtenberg, 1998;
Hellerstein, 1998; Coscelli, 2000; Iizuka, 2007; Liu et al., 2009; Limbrock, 2011; Epstein and
Ketcham, 2012; Clemens and Gottlieb, 2013; Engelberg et al., 2013), the amount spent by
private and public insurers (Iizuka, 2012; Dickstein, 2012), and even patient health (Johnson
and Rehavi, 2013; Jacobson et al., 2013).1
Despite the many studies documenting physician agency problems, there exists little work
quantifying its welfare losses for patients or exploring whether alternative physician con-
tracts could correct it. The welfare losses include not only worse health, but also more
expensive or less desirable treatment. Quantifying the welfare losses from agency therefore
requires learning patient preferences for different treatments. This is difficult since patients
have few ways to reveal their preferences over medical treatment. Indeed, the existing
literature on the demand for healthcare does not distinguish between doctor and patient
preferences, and the resulting demand estimates recover some combination of the two.
To avoid this problem, I follow a suggestion by Ellickson et al. (2001), and focus on a unique
aspect of the prescription drug market: although patients cannot purchase drugs without
a prescription from a doctor, once they have a prescription they are free to comply with it
or not. My premise in this paper is that compliance decisions reveal patient preferences.
By separating initial prescriptions and compliance decisions, I learn doctors’ and patients’
1For recent surveys of the large literature on physician agency, see McGuire (2000), McClellan (2011),
and Chandra et al. (2012).
1
preferences from two separate demand curves. I first provide descriptive evidence on agency
problems, then develop and estimate a structural model of doctor-patient interactions,
and use the model to quantify the welfare consequences of eliminating agency entirely or
developing contracts to better align doctor and patient preferences.
I study the market for anti-cholesterol drugs. Anti-cholesterol drugs, with $20 billion in
sales, are a large segment of the prescription drug market, itself a $320 billion sector (IMS,
2011). These drugs are important for health, reducing mortality, stroke and heart disease
(Baigent et al., 2005). Attaining these benefits requires actually taking these drugs, so
compliance is a medically important outcome in its own right.
There are several potential sources of agency problems in this market. Pharmaceutical
companies spent nearly $650 million in 2004 on promotional activity targeting physicians—
called detailing—that is intended to persuade them to prescribe new, expensive drugs.
While some of this advertising is no doubt informative, critics of detailing allege that it
skews prescriptions away from the patient’s ideal.2 Moreover, insurance companies provide
incentives, implicit or explicit, for doctors to control costs, in part by prescribing drugs that
are cheap for the insurance plan to procure. A final source of agency problems is legitimate
disagreement between doctor and patient about which drugs are medically appropriate; in
such cases, the doctor’s views may trump the patient’s wishes.
Using a large insurance claims database which features rich information on health and
healthcare utilization, I study how initial prescriptions and compliance respond to detailing
expenditures, out-of-pocket prices, and plan prices, i.e. the cost to the insurance plan of
procuring the drug. To identify patient and doctor price sensitivity, I exploit the consid-
erable variation across insurance plans in out-of-pocket prices and plan prices charged for
a given drug in a given year. To avoid the problem that patients may select plans with
generous coverage for their drug, I limit my sample to patients new to taking these drugs.
2The advocacy group No Free Lunch believes that “drug companies, by means of samples, gifts, and
food, exert significant influence on provider behavior,” and their “promotional materials and presentations
are often biased and non-informative.” See nofreelunch.org.
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Thus the price variation I exploit for identification is plausibly exogenous to patient drug
preferences.
I show that the drug the doctor initially prescribes depends on out-of-pocket prices, on
detailing expenditures, and on plan prices. Of these variables, however, only out-of-pocket
prices affect the compliance decision. These results, which survive extensive robustness
tests, provide clear evidence of agency problems. A perfect agent would only respond to
variables that affect a patient’s utility, but because detailing and plan prices do not directly
affect compliance, they likely do not directly affect patient welfare.
To quantify the consumer welfare consequences of these agency problems, I must address two
challenges. First, the doctor’s initial prescription decision depends on her preferences and
her patient’s, and these two factors need to be separated. Second, the initial prescription
also likely depends on patient-drug match quality, observed by doctors but unobserved by
the econometrician. The doctor only prescribes an expensive drug if her patient has a high
match quality for it—for example, a patient with a more severe cholesterol disorder will likely
be matched to a more powerful drug. This selection problem may bias estimates of patient
preferences. My next step, therefore, is to implement a structural model that separately
identifies doctor and patient preferences, allowing for this heterogeneous, unobserved match
quality.
The model formalizes the notion that doctors write initial prescriptions but patients choose
whether to comply, and these separate decisions can be used to separately identify doctor
and patient preferences. In the model, the patient derives utility from drug consumption.
Drug utility depends on drug and patient characteristics as well as unobserved patient-drug
match quality. The patient cannot choose his preferred drug; instead, the doctor chooses
an initial prescription for him. The doctor cares about the patient’s utility but her choice
may also depend on detailing and financial incentives, as well as differential evaluation of
drug quality, and idiosyncratic factors. Physician agency is imperfect to the extent that the
doctor cares about more than just the patient’s utility. After filling the initial prescription,
3
the patient is free to quit treatment, to comply with the prescribed drug, or to return to
the doctor to demand a different prescription.
Since doctors make discrete choices for the initial prescription, the model resembles the
discrete choice demand models used in a growing literature that explores the industrial
organization of prescription drug markets (Stern, 1996; Ellison et al., 1997; Cleanthous,
2002; Branstetter et al., 2011; Bokhari and Fournier, 2012; Arcidiacono et al., 2012; Dunn,
2012). This literature uses standard demand estimation techniques to recover preferences
and uses the estimated demand systems to study counterfactual policies. With physician
agency problems, however, market demand data do not necessarily reveal either patient or
doctor preferences, and so these estimated parameters cannot be interpreted as preferences.
As Dunn (2012) notes, to the extent that agency problems affect choice, “the model [he
estimates] will only be an approximation to individual utility, and may be more appropri-
ately viewed as a market demand function” (p. 173). This concern applies to estimates of
patient utility in the prescription drug context, so the model I develop may be useful more
broadly by providing a way to separate doctor and patient preferences.
I estimate the model via maximum likelihood. Estimation requires integrating over the
high-dimensional match quality distribution, so I use sparse grid integration to make the
problem computationally tractable (Heiss and Winschel, 2008). To solve the identification
problem that the prescribed drug’s match quality is correlated with the drug’s character-
istics, I rely on exclusion restrictions. The characteristics of other drugs serve as natural
excluded variables, since they affect the probability of a receiving a prescription for a given
drug, but not the utility from filling it. To see how excluded variables help identification,
consider increasing the price of one drug (say, Lipitor). This increases the share of peo-
ple prescribed another drug (say, Zocor) but also changes their composition: in particular,
people who switch to Zocor because of Lipitor’s price increase have a relatively low match
quality for Zocor (or else they would been prescribed it to begin with), and so average com-
pliance for Zocor falls. The rate at which Zocor’s compliance falls as Lipitor’s price rises
4
identifies the density of Zocor’s match quality distribution. Once this density is known, it
is straightforward to parametrically correct for the selection bias.
The point estimates, consistent with the descriptive results, indicate that doctors value not
only patient utility but also plan prices and detailing. For example, doctors are roughly
indifferent between a $1 increase in the monetized utility patients receive from a given drug,
and a $2.41 decrease in plan prices for that drug. Doctors also evaluate the health benefits
of drugs differently than do patients. The model therefore clearly points to imperfect
physician agency. Accounting for match quality is important; ignoring it biases patient
price sensitivity downward, by nearly half. The model fits the data well, both in sample
and in a random hold out sample.
I use the estimated model to quantify the welfare losses from agency problems. Shutting
down all agency problems, by requiring doctors to prescribe the utility-maximizing pre-
scription, increases patient utility by about 22% of total anti-cholesterol drug spending.
Compliance also rises, from 53.1% to 59.6%.3 Plan spending changes only slightly, and
so the overall impact on efficiency of eliminating agency is large and positive. Physician
agency therefore has important consequences for patient welfare, compliance, and overall
efficiency. Eliminating individual aspects of agency, however, has markedly different ef-
fects. Removing doctor’s cost-containment incentives, for example, increases plan spending
by $48 per patient per year but has only a small impact on patient welfare, so overall it
reduces efficiency. This result implies that insurance companies are setting incentives fairly
effectively: they are able to control costs without overly harming patient welfare.
Fully eliminating agency problems is likely difficult, because prescribing the patient’s utility
maximizing drug requires observing match quality. Instead, I consider easily implementable
alternative contracts to better align doctor and patient preferences. First I consider paying
3In these calculations, I assume that the patient’s revealed preferences are relevant for welfare calculations.
As I discuss in more detail below, however, it could be that non-compliance reflects mistake by patients due
to misperception of drug benefits, myopia, or other factors (Baicker et al., 2013). In that case, the impact
of agency on compliance itself may be more relevant for welfare.
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doctors a bonus for prescribing the drug with the highest average quality net of price. This
contract encourages doctors to prescribe drugs that work well for the average patient. One
danger of such a contract is that it may encourage doctors to prescribe drugs that they
know to be a poor match, simply because they are attractive to the average patient. To
avoid this problem, I also consider contracts that pay doctors a bonus based on the ex
post compliance of their patients. Since doctors use unobserved match quality to forecast
compliance, these contracts take advantage of doctors’ private information.
Both contracts increase compliance and patient utility. Paying for compliance, by taking
advantage of the doctor’s private information, produces bigger gains for patients than pay-
ing for average quality; with strong enough incentives, it can increase compliance to over
58%, close to the agency-free level. The contracts attain only about half of the gain in con-
sumer surplus of moving to the agency-free level, however. Realizing the full gains requires
changing the prescriptions of inframarginal patients, who would comply with their current
drug but would nonetheless prefer a different one. Such patients are hard to identify and
so it is difficult to design contracts to help them. Overall, therefore, I find that agency
problems have a substantial impact on patient welfare and compliance, but fully solving
these problems is difficult with feasible contracts.
The remainder of the paper is structured as followed. Section 1.2 provides background on the
market for anti-cholesterol drugs, and Section 1.3 describes the data sources and the creation
of key variables, and contains summary statistics. Section 1.4 shows the basic evidence for
physician agency. Section 1.5 introduces the model and estimation procedure, and section
1.6 presents the point estimates, quality of fit, and impact of eliminating agency. Section
1.7 explores the impact of alternative contracts, and Section 1.8 concludes and discusses
possible directions for future work.
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1.2. Background on anti-cholesterol drugs
Anti-cholesterol drugs help regulate the level of cholesterol in the body.4 The most popular
class of anti-cholesterol drugs is statins, which are both effective in reducing cholesterol and
widely tolerated. The statin class contains six different molecules during my sample period.
In addition to statins, several other classes of drugs reduce cholesterol, although non-statins
are not as effective and often have worse side effects than statins. Drugs from these classes
are indicated when patients are statin-intolerant or have particular cholesterol disorders
for which statins are ineffective. Some classes can also be prescribed in combination, and
combination products may be more powerful in reducing cholesterol or targeting multiple
cholesterol problems than statins alone.
The National Cholesterol Education Program offers clear guidelines on when to prescribe
anti-cholesterol drug (Gundry et al., 2001): if a patient has high cholesterol given his
risk factors and if lifestyle intervention fails. The risk factors include cigarette smoking,
hypertension, low HDL cholesterol, family history of chronic heart disease, age (greater
than 45 for men and 55 for women), and diabetes and heart disease. The more risk factors
a patient has, the lower the cholesterol threshold at which to prescribe. Once drug therapy
begins, the report recommend that it continue indefinitely; anti-cholesterol drugs do not
permanently cure cholesterol disorders. Cholesterol drugs are therefore purely maintenance
medications: once they are prescribed, patients must keep taking them in order to realize
their benefits. This fact is critical for my interpretation of non-compliance: failing to comply
with the medication—ceasing treatment—actually indicates dissatisfaction, and not a cure.
Despite these guidelines, the report offers doctors less guidance about which drug to pre-
scribe. Talbert (2008) suggests statins as a first line therapy, but does not recommend
a particular statin. Doctors apparently have a great deal of flexibility on this margin,
especially among statins.
4This section is based on Gundry et al. (2001), the report of the National Cholesterol Education Program
Expert Panel on Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Cholesterol in Adults, and Talbert
(2008)’s textbook treatment.
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1.3. Data
I study a sample drawn from the Thompson-Reuters Marketscan databases. These databases
contain inpatient, outpatient, and prescription drug insurance claims from about 100 large,
self-insured companies. These claims include all drugs purchased and procedures performed,
as well as the prices paid, by the patient and by the insurer. The data are limited, however:
they contain very little demographic information and no information on income. Although
I observe which insurance plan each patient belongs to, I have no information on the set
of insurance plans available to him, making it impossible to model plan choice. A further
limitation is that Marketscan defines a “plan” by the benefits offered, so that if a plan
changes its benefits from year to year, the plan’s identifier changes; this rules out exploiting
within-plan, over-time variation in benefits.
I supplement the Marketscan databases with drug-by-year information on total expenditures
on direct to consumer advertising (DTCA) and detailing, from IMS health. These data are
only available for 2001-2005 and 2008-2009 so I limit the Marketscan data to these years as
well. In this section, I provide a description of the key aspects of the data. Appendix A.1
contains a more detailed description of the data, including definitions of all variables and
products.
1.3.1. Drug price imputation
From the claims data, I observe two prices in each transaction: the out of pocket price paid
by the patient, and the total amount paid to the pharmacy by the insurer and the patient,
less the out of pocket payment. I call the first price the out-of-pocket price and the second
price the plan price. The out-of-pocket price represents the actual cost to the patient of
obtaining the drug. The plan price is related to but not exactly the cost to the plan of
procuring the drug; the true cost accounts for the rebates that many insurance companies
have negotiated with pharmaceutical companies. As in all empirical work on drugs, I do
not observe these rebates and so I assume that the plan price is the true price. Nonetheless,
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plan prices’ impact on prescribing behavior is likely mitigated by rebates, and this affects
the interpretation of my results.5
I only observe prices paid, but demand estimation requires the full menu of prices faced,
by the patient and by the plan. I therefore impute out-of-pocket and plan prices as the
average price per days supplied at the plan-year-molecule level. Some small plan-years have
zero sales for a given molecule; for these plan-year-molecules, I impute the price as the
maximum of the other prices, and in all specifications I control for an indicator for this kind
of imputation.
This imputation aggregates over three sources of price heterogeneity. First, some plans offer
discounts for bulk purchases of 90 days supplied; the imputation reflects these discounts,
yielding lower prices for plans with more generous discounts.6 Second, identical molecules
in a given plan can transact at different prices because of differences in dosage and in
branding. I average over the differences in dosage. In practice the differences in branding
are not important because when a molecule faces generic competition, branded sales are a
trivial fraction of all sales (for example, two percent for simvastatin/Zocor; see Appendix
A.1.1 for further discussion). Third, for plans which have a coinsurance or deductible for
drug coverage, the out-of-pocket price will depend on local pharmacy prices and on spending
throughout the year, and the average price will be a poor proxy for the price a given patient
faces.
The procedure therefore works best in insurance plans with formularies, in which only a
small number of out-of-pocket prices are charged. For example, a plan might charge $10 for
generic drugs, $20 for preferred branded drugs, and $40 for all other drugs. Although the
5Arcidiacono et al. (2012), however, infer rebates from pricing and demand data as well as institutional
details of the drug market. Their procedure relies on an equilibrium pricing model for pharmaceutical
companies; incorporating the drug supply side with physician agency, while an interesting topic for future
research, is substantially beyond the scope of this paper.
6In principle this procedure generates a mechanical relationship between compliance and out-of-pocket
price, since patients who purchase 90 days supplied are much more likely to comply and also face lower
prices. I experimented with imputing prices for small cells with fewer than 500 claims, where this problem
is likely to be most important, and found the results were extremely similar.
9
Marketscan databases do not contain any indicators for formulary plans, it is easy to identify
such plans from the distribution of prices paid: in formulary plans this distribution will have
very limited support, while non-formulary plans will have a dispersed price distribution.
Appendix Figure A.5 shows the empirical distribution of prices for the 24 largest plans in
2001. As the figure shows, some plans have an empirically obvious formulary: essentially
all of the claims occur at three prices. Other plans have much more dispersed prices. I
therefore define “formulary plans” as plans in which at least 80% of claims are at the top
four modal prices (since many plans have a small mass of claims with zero price), and I
limit the sample to formulary plans only. Appendix Table A.5 shows that the imputation
procedure is much more accurate for formulary than non-formulary plans.
1.3.2. Sample creation
Starting with the full dataset, I limit the sample in several ways, intended to improve data
quality and reduce endogeneity concerns. Appendix Table A.5 shows how these restrictions
affect the size and composition of the sample. To avoid off-label use, my analysis sample
consists of people with at least one chronic heart disease risk factor (as discussed in Section
1.2), who fill one or more prescriptions for a cholesterol drug, with their first fill at least six
months after entering the data. These criteria follow Dunn (2012). I further exclude people
with heart disease risk factors who fill no prescriptions for anti-cholesterol drugs because
it is impossible for me to learn about their drug preferences, since I never observe them
making a compliance decision, and this group is likely to be different in unobservable ways
from people who fill at least one prescription (since the large majority of people with no
fills are people who never received a prescription to begin with).
I limit the sample in three further ways. First, I require that people be continuously enrolled
in the Marketscan data (but possibly with different plans) for at least 12 months after their
first prescription, so if a patient’s first prescription occurs in February, I require that he be
enrolled through the following January.7 By focusing on patients with new prescriptions
7I observe enrollment directly; I do not infer it from claims; so attrition from the sample is due to changing
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and following them for a year only, I avoid the concern that people are selecting their drug
insurance plan based on their medication mix. Second, I require that people belong to
formulary-based insurance plans, as defined in Section 1.3.1. This restriction improves the
accuracy of imputed prices. Third, I exclude people older than 65, because in later years
these people have access to drug insurance through Medicare Part D, so the ones who retain
employer provided insurance are likely to be very different from the rest of my sample.
The final dataset consists of 296,760 people in 383 plans. Appendix Table A.5 offers a
snapshot of the sample at the time of the first prescription fill. The sample is relatively old
and male, all reflecting the characteristics of people at risk for heart disease. About two-
thirds of the sample have a claim with a diagnosis for a cholesterol disorder; the other risk
factors—diabetes, heart disease, and hypertension—are all prevalent, but not overwhelm-
ingly so.
On average people in my sample spend about $140 on cholesterol drugs per year, but $425 on
other drugs, and almost $600 on inpatient and outpatient procedures. These figures provide
further evidence that people are unlikely to choose their insurance plan based on the price
of particular anti-cholesterol drugs (conditional on plan generosity), since cholesterol drug
spending represents a small share of out-of-pocket spending.
People belong to large plans, with over 92,000 claims per plan; the median plan has 4,482
claims. For the most part, prices paid are close to the modal prices defined in Section 1.3.1.
98% of claims in these plans are at one of the top four modes, suggesting that prices are
accurately imputed. About 25% of patients belong to capitated plans, comparable than
the national average of about 22% during this time period (Kaiser Family Foundation and
Health Research and Educational Trust, 2012). Statins are the clear majority of drugs
prescribed, with a market share of about 80%.
Patients comply with their initial prescription—the first drug the doctor prescribes—about
52% of the time. Here compliance is defined as refilling at least 180 days supplied of the
jobs, not non-compliance.
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initial prescription in the first 330 days, with no fills of another anti-cholesterol drug. If the
patient fills a prescription for another drug, but still has at least 180 days supplied, I say
that he has switched; on average patients switch 12% of the time.8
1.3.3. Molecule-level summary statistics
Table 1.8 shows molecule-level summary statistics, pooling all years of data. The table
reveals large differences across molecules in their initial prescription probabilities. The
blockbuster Lipitor captures nearly 40% of the market, and Zocor takes almost a quarter;
no other molecule has even 10% market share. Despite its popularity, Lipitor is far from
the most expensive drug, to plans or patients, ranking behind Zocor, Pravachol, and the
Bile Acid Resins (BARs). The non-statins, Fibrate, Niacin, and BARs, have fairly low
market shares, individually and collectively. Zetia/Vytorin, a relatively new product meant
to complement statins, also has a fairly low market share.
It is natural to think that the most heavily prescribed drugs are the best drugs, as viewed
by patients and as reflected in compliance. If so, then Lipitor and Zocor should have the
highest compliance rates. While compliance for these molecules is high, they rank behind
Mevacor, the third most popular drug by initial prescription rate. In general there is much
more compression in the compliance rates than in the initial prescription rates, and only
Mevacor stands out as having especially high compliance. Patients are also unlikely to
switch away from Mevacor, although Zocor and Lipitor’s switch rates are not far behind.
The next three columns of the table provide a hint about Lipitor and Zocor’s high initial
prescription rates but unexceptional compliance rates. Lipitor was under patent protection
for the entirety of my sample period, and Zocor for the first half (until 2006); the paten-
tholders Pfizer and Merck spent heavily on promotion for these products. But their patent
protection yielded high prices, both to plans and especially to patients. Mevacor’s patent,
8I define compliance as 180 days supplied out of 330 because I follow patients for a year after they first
fill a prescription for an anti-cholesterol drug. All patients, by construction, have at least 30 days supplied,
so I look at the next 11 months and require for compliance that patients fill at least half the possible days
supplied. The precise definition of compliance is not important for the results, as Appendix Table A.5 shows.
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also held by Merck, expired in 2001, so Mevacor’s price, to patients and to plans, was much
lower throughout the sample period.
These descriptive statistics therefore suggest that doctors face a trade-off between drugs
patients like (including low cost drugs), and drugs that are heavily detailed. Working
against this effect is the fact that heavily detailed drugs are expensive for insurance plans
to procure, and plans may provide incentives for doctors to prescribe cheaper drugs.
In the rest of the paper, I move beyond these descriptive statistics in two ways. First, I
use a regression framework to tease apart the impact of patient prices, plan prices, and
advertising on initial prescriptions and refill rates. Because prices and advertising likely
depend on drug quality, these regressions include molecule-specific means that account for
most of the differences in quality across drugs. Second, I develop a structural model of
doctors’ prescription decisions and patients’ compliance, switch, and quit decisions. The
model accounts for the fact that doctors do not match patients to drugs randomly. In
particular, although patients on Mevacor are more compliant than patients on Lipitor, it
does not necessarily follow that switching patients from Lipitor to Mevacor would increase
compliance; perhaps Lipitor is the best match available for patients who are prescribed it.
1.4. Initial evidence on the impact of prices and advertising
In this section, I present empirical evidence testing a specific hypothesis about imperfect
agency: that doctors but not patients value detailing and plan prices. Under this hypothesis,
these variables will affect initial prescription decisions but not compliance. To investigate
these hypotheses, I estimate the following models of the initial prescription and compliance
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decisions:
Pr(d prescribed) = (1.1)
exp
(
αIpoopitd +Adtdγ
I + pplanitm θ
I +Xiβ
I + µId
)
∑
j exp
(
αIpoopitj +Adtjγ
I + pplanitj θ
I +XiβI + µIj
) ,
P r(Complyid|d prescribed) = (1.2)
exp
(
αCpoopitd +Adtdγ
C + pplanitd θ
C +Xiβ
C + µCd
)
1 + exp
(
αCpitd +AdtdγC + p
plan
itd θ
C +XiβC + µCd
) ,
where poopitd is the out of pocket price to individual i in year t of molecule d, Adtd a vector
of molecule-year level advertising characteristics, and pplanitd the price to the plan. The
additional controls, Xi, are person-level characteristics including health status and plan
generosity, and µd is a drug-specific mean. Note that the person-level characteristics Xi
drop out of the initial prescription regressions.
These equations do not account for the interdependence between compliance and initial
prescriptions, but they offer a transparent look at the major patterns in the data, i.e. the
relationship between compliance probabilities or initial prescriptions, and drug prices and
advertising. Ultimately these relationships will be critical for identifying the full model.
A strong and robust relationship among prices, compliance, advertising, and prescriptions
indicates that features of the data, and not primarily the modelling choices, drive the model.
1.4.1. Sources of price and advertising variation
Equations (1.1) and (1.2) are essentially demand equations, and the usual concerns about
identification of demand systems apply here. In particular, pricing and marketing variables
may be correlated with product quality. In the insurance context, this is less of a problem,
especially for out-of-pocket prices, which are not set to maximize profits from drug sales.
Indeed, there is considerable variation in both out-of-pocket prices and plan prices for a
given drug and year, as Figure 1.8 shows. The figure shows out-of-pocket and plan prices
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for two generic drugs (Zocor and Mevacor) and two on-patent drugs (Lipitor and Crestor)
for each plan in 2008. Drug prices differ widely, as do relative prices and even the relative
rankings of prices in plans (indicated by prices being on both sides of the 45-degree line).
The plan price variation represents idiosyncratic differences in pharmacy prices and in deals
negotiated between pharmacies and insurance companies. This out-of-pocket price variation
reflects differences in formulary placement—some plans place Lipitor on the middle tier
and others on the top tier. Although patients may select plans with generous coverage
for their preferred drugs, this is unlikely in my sample of patients who are new to taking
anti-cholesterol drugs.
A second source of out-of-pocket price variation represents a threat to identification: overall
plan generosity. Patients who are more likely to comply with their medication may select
into more generous plans, which would bias my estimated price sensitivities. In my preferred
specifications, I therefore control for plan generosity, defined as the average price of branded
anti-cholesterol drugs in the plan. Alternatively I control for plan fixed effects, which absorb
all aspects of plan generosity.9
Although there is considerable price variation in the data, and this price variation may
be uncorrelated with patient or doctor preferences, the advertising variation is much more
limited, only at the molecule-year level. Much of the advertising variation is related to
patent status: Zocor, Mevacor, and Pravachol all experience a decline in advertising as they
go off patent. Crestor and Zetia’s advertising, however, likely reflects perceived product
quality: initial clinical trials showed that these drugs had a large impact on cholesterol,
but later research suggested that these cholesterol gains did not translate into reductions
in mortality, heart attack, or stroke, Advertising expenditures on these drugs initially rises
and then falls, following this pattern of clinical results. Overall, I cannot separate easily
separate these sources of variation—driven by quality or by market structure—and so the
advertising coefficients should be interpreted with caution.
9Since plan generosity varies across people but not across drugs for a given person, it drops out of the
initial prescription specifications.
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A separate identification issue arises in the compliance regressions. Because doctors may
match patients to drugs on the basis of (unobserved) match quality, patients who are pre-
scribed a relatively high price drug are likely to have a relatively high match quality (or
else the doctor would have prescribed a cheaper drug). Thus by conditioning on drug selec-
tion, I end up with a biased sample. The model developed in Section 1.5 below explicitly
addresses this selection problem. Despite the bias, the reduced form estimates here are still
informative, since the bias is towards zero. The point estimates reported here can be viewed
as lower bounds (in absolute value).
1.4.2. Results for initial prescription choice
The results for the initial prescription regressions are in Table 1.8. The main specification,
presented in column (1), shows that patient prices, plan prices, and detailing all affect the
initial prescription decision, even conditional on molecule fixed effects. The standard errors,
here and throughout the paper, are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered on insurance
plan, the level of variation for most of the independent variables.10 The coefficient on patient
price is about twice as large as on plan price, but because patient prices are typically much
less than half plan prices, the elasticity of initial prescriptions with respect to plan prices,
-1.189, is about fifty percent larger than the elasticity with respect to out-of-pocket price,
-0.757. Nonetheless the results clearly indicate that both prices affect the initial prescription
decision.
Both DTCA and detailing have a clear impact on initial prescriptions, although the impact
of detailing is about twice as large as DTCA’s, comparable to the impact of plan price. The
coefficient on detailing, 0.761, gives the impact on drug utility of a one standard-deviation
increase, about $110 million. Pharmacies dispensed 52.7 million prescriptions for Lipitor
in 2009, implying that increasing advertising by about $1 per prescription has a similar
10This clustering is somewhat conservative. Individual prices vary across drugs, within plan-year, and
menus of drug prices vary across years, within plans, for the handful of plans that span multiple years.
Nonetheless because the entire menu of prices determines choices in the discrete choice context, and the
menu varies much less within plan over time than across plans, I cluster at the plan level.
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impact on prescription probabilities to reducing price by $0.61 per prescription.
These results rely on the identification assumption that prices and advertising are uncorre-
lated with quality. Molecule fixed effects are intended to control for quality, so in column
(2) I gauge their importance by removing them from the specification. The results are
strikingly different. The coefficient on plan price falls to -0.057, a statistically insignificant
tenth of its original level. The coefficients on DTCA is much larger, and the coefficient on
detailing slightly smaller. These changes are consistent with the endogeneity of prices and
advertising: higher quality drugs are more expensive to plans and more heavily advertised.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, the coefficient on out of pocket price becomes more negative,
not less, and about twice as large in absolute value. But out of pocket prices are set by
insurance companies, not drug companies, so they need not be positively correlated with
quality. The regression results suggest that out-of-pocket prices are negatively correlated
with average drug quality, consistent with the possibility that insurance companies place
“best-in-class” branded drugs such as Lipitor (which has a relatively low price) in a preferred
position on their formulary, while placing less effective drugs on higher tiers.
The results in column (2) suggest that the molecule fixed effects control for important
aspects of drug quality, but to the extent that drug quality is changing over time, they
may be inadequate. In column (3) I therefore include molecule-by-year fixed effect, which
control for all within-year aspects of drug quality. Because advertising is measured at the
molecule-year level, it is collinear with these fixed effects, so this specification drops the
advertising variables. While adding molecule fixed effects has a very large impact on out-
of-pocket and plan price sensitivity, the impact of the molecule-year fixed effects is small,
suggesting that the molecule fixed effects account for most of the endogeneity problems. In
the context of prescription drugs, this is perhaps not surprising, since drug characteristics
essentially do not change over time, although clinical knowledge evolves.
The final columns further test the robustness of the relationship between initial prescription
choice and patient prices, plan prices, and advertising. The multinomial logit specification
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implicitly controls for all factors that vary across people but not across drugs within person,
so it is not necessary to control, for example, for type of insurance plan, health status, or
plan generosity. Nonetheless if patients in different insurance plans have different tastes for
drugs, and face different drug prices, then the coefficients on the price variables could be
picking up this taste heterogeneity. In column (4) I include a full set of molecule-by-health
status fixed effects (i.e. all the interactions between molecule fixed effects and sex, age risk,
cholesterol, diabetes, hypertension, and heart disease) as well as a full set of interactions
between molecule fixed effects and plan generosity, allowing people in more generous plans
to have differential tastes for each drug. These additional fixed effects do not meaningfully
change the point estimates.
1.4.3. Results for the compliance decision
The estimates in Table 1.8 are difficult to interpret because a positive coefficient on a
variable could arise for two reasons: doctors have a direct taste for prescribing cheaper
or more heavily advertised drugs, or patients prefer such drugs, and doctors take patient
preferences into account in prescribing drugs. To help distinguish between these hypotheses,
Table 1.8 shows the analogous results for patients’ compliance decision, estimated via logits.
Since it is unlikely that patients comply with their prescriptions out of regard for their
doctor’s utility, I interpret these specifications as reflecting patient preferences over drug
characteristics.
The main specification in column (1) includes the price and advertising variables, as well as
molecule fixed effects, plan generosity, and an indicator for imputed price. The results show
clear and statistically significant out-of-pocket price sensitivity. The coefficient, -0.498, im-
plies an elasticity of -0.141. Aside from out-of-pocket price, however, the coefficients look
qualitatively unlike the initial prescription results: plan prices and detailing have essentially
no impact on patients’ compliance decisions, and even DCTA has a small and insignificant
effect. These results therefore suggest that plan prices and detailing affect doctor’s prescrip-
tion directly through doctors’ taste for them, not indirectly through patients’ preferences.
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It is especially interesting that plan price is uncorrelated with the compliance decision. If
plan prices were highly correlated with quality and did not otherwise affect compliance,
then we would expect a positive coefficient on them. Instead, the zero coefficient suggests
that these prices are not terribly endogenous.
The identifying assumption behind these regressions is that the price and advertising varia-
tion is uncorrelated with patients’ underlying compliance propensities. Two main threats to
identification are that patients with higher utilization tendencies select more generous plans,
with lower prices, and that better drugs have higher prices and more advertising, Both of
these threats would bias the price coefficient towards positive values. I attempt to address
them by controlling for molecule fixed effects and average plan generosity. In column (2)
I remove the controls for plan generosity, and in column (3) I remove the molecule fixed
effects. As expected, plan generosity is correlated with compliance propensity, so removing
the plan generosity controls increases the coefficient on out of pocket price. Removing the
molecule fixed effects, however, has a dramatic effect. It nearly doubles price sensitivity,
and makes the advertising variables change sign. It also makes the plan price coefficient
significantly negative. These results suggest that while advertising is highly correlated with
quality (as patients perceive it), out of pocket prices are negatively correlated with it. This
negative correlation could arise if insurance companies put the consensus best drug (e.g.
Lipitor and Zocor) on the first or middle tier of the formulary, but put lower quality branded
drugs on the top tiers.
In column (4) I add richer controls for plan generosity by controlling for plan fixed effects.11
Controlling for plan fixed effects increases out-of-pocket price sensitivity considerably (and
also increases the coefficient on detailing, although it remains insignificant). These results
suggest that out-of-pocket prices are correlated with plan compliance propensity, in ways
not captured by my generosity measure. Somewhat surprisingly, the results here imply that
people in plans with low prices have low compliance tendencies. The results continue to
11This necessitates dropping 60 people in 39 plans in which every person either complied or did not comply.
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shiw the basic story, however, that compliance responds to out-of-pocket prices but not to
plan prices or detailing. Adding molecule×year fixed effects in column (5) or a full set of
interactions between molecule fixed effects and health and molecule fixed effects and plan
generosity, in column (6) does not alter this conclusion.
1.4.4. Further robustness
The results in Tables 1.8 and 1.8 show robustness to alternative and increasingly detailed
controls. It is possible, however, that my results are driven by my sample selection pro-
cedure, my price imputation procedure, or the definition of compliance (requiring at least
180 days supplied). In Appendix A.2, I present additional robustness tests to address these
issues. The basic patterns are robust to looking at people in non-formulary plans; to looking
at people in plans in which all available drugs have at least 10, 25, or 50 claims; to using
actual rather than imputed prices in the compliance decision; and to defining compliance as
requiring 90, 120, 150, 210, 240, 270, 300, or 330 days supplied. Finally, the initial prescrip-
tion equation estimates are similar if I include an outside option—i.e., no prescription—in
the choice set.
1.4.5. Differential effects by capitation status
The results suggest that doctors but not patients respond to plan price. I do not observe
any details about doctors’ contracts with insurance companies, so it is difficult for me to
explore the mechanisms that might generate this response. I do, however, observe plan
capitation status. Doctors of patients in capitated plans are the residual claimants for
medical expenditures, so they likely face true financial incentives to control costs. I therefore
reestimate equations (1.1) and (1.2), but looking separately at doctors in capitated and
uncapitated plans.
The results in Table 1.8 confirm that capitated doctors respond to plan prices, providing
suggestive evidence that plan prices reflect doctor’s incentives to control costs. These results
should be interpreted with caution, however, as capitated and uncapitated plans are clearly
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different: out-of-pocket price sensitivity is much higher, and the detailing response different
between these plans.
1.4.6. Agency or Information?
My preferred interpretation of the results so far is that they point to two physician agency
problems. Doctors are more likely to prescribe heavily detailed drugs, but patients are
no more likely to comply with prescriptions for these drugs. Doctors also shy away from
prescribing drugs that are expensive to procure (even conditional on the price to the patient),
but patients have no particular aversion to such drugs. These distortions imply that doctors
do not prescribe the compliance maximizing or patient utility maximizing drug.
This view of the facts suggests that preferences change between the initial prescription and
the compliance decision. An alternative interpretation, however, is that information has
changed: at the time of the initial prescription, it is unclear how the patient will react to
a certain drug, and plan prices and advertising contain information useful for forecasting
that reaction. After the patient fills an initial prescription, though, there is no longer useful
information in advertising or prices, and so they do not predict choice.
While I cannot rule out this interpretation entirely, two considerations make it unlikely.
First, as Figure 1.8 shows, the plan prices vary at a very fine level—within drug and year,
across plans. If they contained meaningful information about match quality, then this
information would also have to vary across plans. This could happen if plans worked out
lower prices for drugs that they thought their patients would be especially likely to use.
But I focus on patients new to taking these drugs, and in some specifications I control
for health×molecule fixed effects (so that the information would have to be orthogonal
to observable health status). Thus it is unlikely that information drives the relationship
between initial prescriptions and plan prices.
Detailing, on the other hand, undoubtedly does contain useful information. Indeed, a great
deal of the content of detailing is publicity for positive clinical trials. In Table 1.8, I attempt
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to control, in a blunt way, for new information: I control for the number of times each drug
is mentioned in publications indexed by PubMed in each year, as well as the lag number of
mentions.12 Controlling for each drug’s publication count and its lags does not meaningfully
affect the coefficient on detailing, suggesting that the response to detailing corresponds to
more than just information.
Finally, in a recent paper, Carrera et al. (2013) argue that doctors are imperfectly informed
about patient preferences and the prices patients face. Although such information problems
are likely present, it is unlikely that they could explain my results, since they would suggest
that doctors respond too little to out-of-pocket prices, whereas I find that doctors respond
too much to other variables. I conclude that these results provide initial evidence for agency
problems in the market for anti-cholesterol drugs.
1.5. A model of doctor-patient interactions
In this section I develop a model of doctor-patient interactions in the market for anti-
cholesterol drugs. The model will let me study how compliance and welfare change in
counterfactuals as I shut down all or some agency problems, or implement alternative con-
tracts to more closely align doctor and patient preferences.
The model formalizes the notion that compliance decisions reveal patient preferences, as
initial prescriptions do for doctors. The model builds on the reduced form regressions in
two ways. First, the model allows for doctors matching patients with drugs on the basis of
unobserved match quality. This matching can induce a correlation between match quality
and prices that might bias the estimated price sensitivity; the model corrects for this bias.
Second, the model allows patients to switch drugs as well as comply or not. The patient
switches if the doctor prescribes him a drug that he dislikes, when there are better options
12pubmed.org provides machine-searchable bibliographic information for 22 million citations for biomed-
ical literature. For the 6 statins, I counted all publications mentioning the underlying molecule. For Ze-
tia/Vytorin I searched for mentions of “ezetimbie,” for Niacin-statins, I searched for “Niacin and simvastatin
or Niacin and lovastatin.” For Fibrates and BARs, I searched for mention of any of the underlying molecules.
For Niacin, I searched for “Niacin and cholesterol” and excluded the combination articles.
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available. Switching lets patients veto a very poor initial prescription, and provides some
protection against agency. Accounting for switching is therefore important for measuring
the welfare consequences of physician agency correct. The model builds on the work of
Ellickson et al. (2001), who develop but do not estimate a model of doctor-patients conflicts
of interest in which compliance decisions identify patient preferences. I extend their model
to allow for patient switching, and take it to the data.
The model is meant to capture physician agency in a simple way that nonetheless lets
me study welfare in counterfactuals. It abstracts from several rich features of the market,
including uncertainty and learning about match quality, the process of patients matching to
doctors, and decision making by pharmaceutical companies, insurers, and pharmacies (and
therefore treats all prices and product offerings as endogenous). Exploring these aspects of
the market is beyond the scope of this paper, but an important and interesting avenue for
future work.
1.5.1. Model details
Timing I model doctor patient interactions as a two-period game. In the first period,
the patient (he) visits the doctor (she) for the first time, she writes a prescription, and
he fills it. In the second period, the patient decides whether to comply, visit the doctor
to switch drugs, or quit. If he visits the doctor, she must write a prescription for a new
drug, which the patient must fill. The periods are unequal length: the first period action
reflects a single month’s purchase, but the second period reflects 11 months of purchase and
non-purchase. The second period decision in the model can be viewed as a reduced form
for a more complete dynamic model in which the patient decides every month whether to
fill his prescription, visit the doctor, or not take the drug.
Drug preferences Doctor’s and patient’s action-specific utilities derive from the patient’s
utility from drug consumption. Patient i obtains utility from consuming drug d as follows:
ud(ξid) = −αpid +XPidβP + µPd + ξid. (1.3)
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α measures price sensitivity, pid is the price to patient i of drug d, and X
P
id is a vector of
patient or drug characteristics affecting utility from consumption, including for example
patient’s health status or direct to consumer advertising. µPd is average drug quality as
patients perceive it and ξid is a patient-drug specific match term. µ
P
d is meant to reflect
the average benefit of taking an anti-cholesterol drug, so it includes both average side ef-
fects/tolerability and effectiveness. People differ, however, in both how well they tolerate
drugs and in how they value the health benefits of anti-cholesterol drugs. The idiosyncratic
aspect of match quality, ξid, reflects these patient-drug interactions. I assume that ξid is
normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2d, independent across drugs. Indepen-
dence imposes many restrictions on substitution patterns, but these substitution patterns
are not the focus of my counterfactuals (as they would be if I were interested in changes in
competition or market structure).
Compliance The patient’s utility from complying with his prescription consists of the drug
utility plus an idiosyncratic shock:
uPc (ξi, d, εic) = ud(ξid) + εic, (1.4)
where εc is a type I extreme value shock. εc reflects the many factors affecting compliance
not included in drug utility. For example, it includes the convenience cost of filling a pre-
scription. While I assume that εic is part of people’s utility, an alternative interpretation
is that εic reflects whether patients remember to fill their prescription. This interpreta-
tion is consistent with the view, articulated forcefully by Baicker et al. (2013), that most
non-compliance is a mistake. So long as these mistakes are uncorrelated with drug char-
acteristics, however, they do not affect my empirical analysis. In the welfare calculation, I
calculate consumer surplus both treating εic as part of patient utility and not.
Switching and quitting If the patient visits the doctor to switch, the doctor writes a new
prescription which the patient fills. The patient does not know what drug the doctor will
prescribe and only has subjective expectations, P˜ r(d′|ξi, d), that the doctor will prescribe
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drug d′ when the initial prescription is d and match quality ξ. Visiting the doctor to switch
yields a net benefit or cost θs, an idiosyncratic type I extreme value shock εs, as well as the
expected utility of the new prescription, with the expectation taken over the prescription:
uPs (ξi, d, εis) = θs +
(∑
d′
P˜ r(d′|ξi, d)ud′(ξid′)
)
+ εis = u¯s(ξd, d) + εis (1.5)
Mean utility from quitting is normalized to zero, and quit utility consists only of a type I
extreme value shock.
uPq (ξi, d, εiq) = εiq. (1.6)
As with the compliance error εic, εis and εiq can be interpreted either as idiosyncratic
convenience shocks or as mistakes, and I provide welfare calculations below for both inter-
pretations.
Initial prescription and second drug choice The doctor’s utility from prescribing drug
d, as an initial prescription or a second drug choice, is
uMDd (ξd) = wud(ξid) +X
MD
id β
MD + αMDfinid + µ
MD
d + ε
MD
dt . (1.7)
The doctor places a weight w on the patient’s utility from consuming the drug, ud, but
she also values other drug characteristics, XMDid (e.g. detailing) and financial incentives
finid, which may be explicit or implicit. Finally the doctor may disagree with her patient
about average match quality, for example because doctors may disagree with patients about
the relative importance of side effects and efficacy. µMDd is a drug-specific intercept in the
doctor’s utility function to reflect such disagreements. εMDdt is a type I extreme value shock,
and the t subscript indicates that the first and second prescription are governed by different
draws.
I do not directly observe finid. Instead I observe plan prices, the prices to plans of procuring
drugs. I assume that plans set incentives to encourage doctors to prescribe cheap drugs, so
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that finid and priceplan are closely correlated. In particular, I assume that
finid = (β0 + β1capitated)priceplan,
so that priceplan enters the doctor’s utility function with a coefficient of α
MDβ0+α
MDβ1capitated.
I cannot separately identify β and αMD, so I normalize αMD = 1. This normalization mat-
ters in the counterfactuals because I explicitly vary doctor incentives. I return to it below.
Information All covariates are common knowledge. The choice-specific errors, the εs, are
unknown by either the doctor or the patient until each decision is made. Match quality ξ
is known by the doctor and the patient at the first prescription and is time invariant.
1.5.2. Choice probabilities
To solve this game by backwards induction, I first find the doctor’s probability of prescribing
each drug if the patient requests a switch with an initial prescription for d1. The logit errors
imply that
Pr(d2|d1, ξi) =
exp
(
wud2(ξid2) +Xd2β
MD
)∑
d 6=d1 exp (wud(ξid) +Xdβ
MD)
. (1.8)
In equilibrium, subjective probabilities are correct, so P˜ r(d′|ξi, d) = Pr(d2|d1, ξi). The
patient choice probabilities are therefore
Pr(comply|d1, ξi) = exp(ud1(ξid1))
1 + exp(ud1(ξid1)) + exp
(
θs +
∑
d2
Pr(d2|ξi, d1)ud2(ξid2)
) (1.9)
Pr(switch|d1, ξi) = exp (θs +
∑
d′ Pr(d2|ξi, d1)ud1(ξid2))
1 + exp(ud1(ξid1)) + exp
(
θs +
∑
d2
Pr(d2|ξi, d1)ud2(ξid2)
) (1.10)
Pr(quit|d1, ξi) = 1
1 + exp(ud1(ξid1)) + exp
(
θs +
∑
d2
Pr(d2|ξi, d1)ud2(ξid2)
) . (1.11)
Note that even in the absence of agency problems, patients may not comply with their
prescription, if the best option (i.e. the maximal ud(ξ)) nonetheless provides low utility.
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And finally the doctor’s initial prescription choice probabilities are
Pr(d1|ξi) =
exp
(
wud1(ξid1) +Xd1β
MD
)∑
d exp (wud(ξid) +Xdβ
MD)
. (1.12)
These choice probabilities depend on match quality ξ, which the patient and doctor know
but the econometrician does not. The likelihood is obtained by integrating over the distri-
bution of ξ.
1.5.3. Consumer surplus, social surplus, and health
Consumer surplus Expected consumer surplus, before all shocks are known, is
1
−α
∫
ξ
∑
d
Pr(d1 = d|ξ)× ud1(ξ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility from first fill
+ δEε[max
{
uPc (ξ, d1, εc), u
P
s (ξ, d1, εs), u
P
q (ξ, d1, εq)
}
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility from second period option
 dF (ξ).
To understand this expression, work from the inside out. The first term in the large paren-
theses is the utility from filling the initial prescription. The second term is the option value
in the second period associated with having that prescription. The expression in parenthe-
ses, therefore, is the patient’s overall utility from having a prescription for d1. The initial
prescription is uncertain from the patient’s perspective, so to find utility we must integrate
over the initial prescription choice. Finally, I calculate ex ante expected utility by also
integrating over patient heterogeneity, ξ. The 1−α term converts utility into dollars. In
practice I set δ = 11 since the first period corresponds to 1 month but the second period to
11 months.
To operationalize this expression for consumer surplus, I need to calculate the option value
of having a prescription for drug d1 at the beginning of the second period. I consider two
approaches. First, I take the traditional view that the utility errors, εc, εs, and εq, are part
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of the patient’s utility, and so the usual log-sum formula applies:
max
{
uPc (ξ, d1, εc), u
P
s (ξ, d1, εs), u
P
q (ξ, d1, εq)
}
] = log (1 + exp(ud1(ξ)) + exp(u¯s(ξ, d1))) .
One interpretation of εc, εs and εq, however, is that they reflect mistakes in decision making,
in which case they do not belong in the patients’ utility function. Under this view, the
expected utility at the beginning of period 2 is
max
{
uPc (ξ, d1, εc), u
P
s (ξ, d1, εs), u
P
q (ξ, d1, εq)
}
] = Pr(c|ξ, d1)ud1(ξ) + Pr(s|ξ, d1)u¯s(ξ, d1).
In the counterfactuals below, I report both measures of consumer surplus.
Net surplus Consumers are not the only actors in this market. A full accounting of
welfare includes spending by insurance plans, insurance premiums, consumer gains from
risk protection, and drug production costs (including advertising costs). These responses,
though important, are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead I focus on consumer surplus
and “net surplus” in the market, defined as consumer surplus less plan drug spending. This
measure of surplus is interesting in its own right, because it represents the most money
a profit-maximizing insurance plan could extract with a two-part tariff (i.e. an insurance
contract with a premium and a copay; see Gaynor et al. (2000)). Thus the loss of surplus
due to agency can be interpreted as the most money a profit-maximizing insurer could gain
if it could unilaterally eliminate agency, holding fixed all prices.
Health These welfare measures do not directly reflect the health gains from taking anti-
cholesterol drugs. They indirectly reflect health gains because higher quality drugs, mea-
sured by µd + ξid, are likely to have higher health benefits, and also confer higher utility.
Nonetheless, health is an interesting and important outcome in its own right. To include
health in the model, suppose that the health benefit of complying with a drug (or switching
to it) is given by hd. This health benefit is constant across people—it does not depend on
observed health status or match quality; Appendix A.3 summarizes evidence from clinical
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studies roughly consistent with this view, and provides more detail on how I calculate hd
from FDA labels.
A consumer’s expected health benefit is
E[H] =
∫
ξ
∑
d
Pr(d1 = d|ξ)
Pr(c|d1, ξ)hd1 + Pr(s|d1, ξ)
 ∑
d2 6=d1
Pr(d2|d1, ξ)hd2
 dF (ξ).
This expression is the expected value of hd, weighted by the probability that the patient
complies with or switches to drug d. Implementing this health gain requires knowledge
of hd. In practice I use the reduction in LDL cholesterol estimated in clinical trials and
measured in mmol/L. Cholesterol reduction is not a direct measure of drug-specific health
gains (such as reductions in stroke or heart attack), but it is available separately for each
drug in my data. Moreover, Baigent et al. (2005) show that in a meta-analysis of 14 clinical
trials of statins, the reduction in stroke and heart attack caused by statin use is linear in
the LDL cholesterol reduction of that statin: each mmol/L reduction in LDL cholesterol
reduces the risk of heart attack or stroke by 20 percent. Cholesterol reduction is therefore
a meaningful health outcome with precise, drug-specific measurements.
One limitation of using reductions in LDL cholesterol, however, is that non-statins primarily
target other kinds of cholesterol; Niacin, for example, does very little for LDL cholesterol
but increases HDL (good) cholesterol. These measures focus on a narrow aspect of health,
and therefore complement the standard welfare metrics, which in principle reflect patient’s
overall assessment of drug quality.
Role of agency Physician agency in the model arises because doctors may choose drugs to
maximize their patients’ utility. The model has four sources of physician agency: Detailing
and other drug characteristics, the Xdβ
MD terms in the doctor’s utility function; financial
incentives as embodied by plan drug prices, finid; disagreement about average drug quality,
µMDd ; and idiosyncratic choice errors, ε
MD
dt . These distortions affect patient welfare and
health through two channels. First, they make it less likely that patients receive their
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preferred drug. This mechanically reduces the patient’s expected utility. Second, by leading
to lower drug utility on average, they also reduce compliance, which reduces patients’ health.
But if doctors have a relative taste for potent drugs, then eliminating agency causes doctors
to substitute towards weaker drugs. The overall effect of agency on health is ambiguous: if
the compliance effects dominates, then health rises, but if the substitution effect dominates,
then it falls. In the counterfactuals I quantify the sum of these effects but also show how
the strength of the initial prescription changes, highlighting the substitution effect.
1.5.4. Discussion of modeling choices
This model contains several nonstandard aspects and simplifications which I now discuss.
Error structure The error structure is a logit-normal mixture. I use type I extreme value
errors to facilitate computation, as they lead to smooth, closed form choice probabilities
conditional on the normally distributed quality. Many other studies use normal mixtures,
especially interacted with product characteristics, to obtain realistic substitution patterns
(Berry et al., 1995). The normal errors serve a very different role in my context: they
provide an explicit link between the initial prescription decision and the comply/switch/quit
decision. This link is how I account for the non-random matching of patients to drugs.
No first period decision for patients Unfortunately, my data do not contain informa-
tion on unfilled prescriptions, so I must assume that patients fill the first prescription. In
principle, of course, patients could refuse to comply even at this point, and with sufficient
data I could extend the model to allow for this margin as well. In that case the doctor must
weight her utility by the probability that the patient fills his prescription.
No outside option The model has no outside option of “no prescription.” This is, poten-
tially, a further source of agency problems: doctors might not prescribe a drug to patients
who in fact want one. Following the literature, I abstract from this element of agency.
Including an outside option is particularly difficult because I infer patient preferences from
their compliance decision, but patients who are not prescribed have no option to comply,
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and are likely to be different from patients with a prescription. In Appendix Table A.5
I show that the initial prescription regression results are robust to including an outside
option in the doctor’s initial choice set, suggesting that ignoring the outside option does
not overwhelming change the point estimates.
No dynamics The model abstracts from dynamics in two ways. Doctors and patients
do not learn about the patient’s match quality from his experience with the drugs, and
doctors are myopic in deciding which drug to prescribe; they do not consider the patient’s
future compliance probability and switch probabilities. A forward looking doctor values
compliance because the doctor only realizes Xdβ
MD if the patient complies. Since patients
are more likely to comply with high-utility drugs, the myopic model conflates doctor altruism
(measured by w) with forward-looking behavior. Thus w should be viewed as a reduced
form object, reflecting both forward-looking behavior and altruism per se. In future versions
of this paper, I expect to allow for forward-looking doctors, however.
Crawford and Shum (2005) have shown that learning about match quality is an important
part of prescription drug demand. Including these rich dynamics, however, would vastly
increase the computational requirements of the model. My interest is in agency problems
on the prescription choice margin, and in alternative contract structures that might fix
them. For this question, the dynamics do not seem central, so I exclude them. Nonetheless,
exploring the trade-off between physician knowledge and physician agency, and how patient
learning might ameliorate it, is an interesting topic for future work.
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1.5.5. Maximum Likelihood Estimation via Sparse Grid Integration
I estimate the model via maximum likelihood. Letting θ be the vector of parameters, the
contribution of individual i to the likelihood is
Li(θ|X) =
∫
ξ
Pr(d1i|ξi)×
Pr(comply|ξi, d1i)complyiPr(switch|ξi, d1i)switchiPr(d2i|ξi, d1i)switchi×
Pr(quit|ξi, d1i)quitidF (ξ).
(1.13)
This integral is a multivariate normal integral and does not have a closed form solution. I
approximate it using sparse grid integration (SGI; see Heiss and Winschel (2008)), a type
of quadrature. Appendix A.4 provides further computational details and an explanation of
SGI. Let ξk be a quadrature node and ωk its weight. The approximated likelihood is
Li(θ) =
∑
k
ωkPr(d1i|ξki )Pr(c|ξki , d1i)ciPr(v|ξki , d1i)viPr(d2i|ξki , d1i)vi . (1.14)
I compute all standard errors using the heteroskedasticity- and cluster-robust procedure
suggested by Wooldridge (2002); the resulting standard errors are robust to arbitrary within-
plan autocorrelation.
1.5.6. Identification
Although the model is straightforwardly parametrically identified, I discuss informally the
features of the data that help identify the key parameters of the model.
Identification of Σ The variance of the match quality distribution is the hardest set of
parameters to identify. Its identification relies on a kind of exclusion restriction: variables
Zd that affect the probability that drug d is chosen but are known not to affect the patient’s
utility from consuming d. In this context, the prices and characteristics of the other drugs
satisfy this restriction.13
13This identification argument is similar to the identification of the Roy Model with covariates (Heckman
and Honore´, 1990).
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To see how these exclusions identify match quality, consider what happens to the compliance
rate of drug d when the price of d′ increases. Increasing a drug’s own price affects compliance
in two ways: first, it has a direct effect, making the drug less appealing. But second, because
the drug is now more expensive, doctors will prescribe it only to patients with higher match
quality, who are more likely to comply. But when the price of d′ changes, only the second
effect is present.14 The rate at which compliance changes as Zd changes identifies the density
of the match quality distribution. In my application I normalize the variance of Lipitor’s
match quality to unity, since I found it difficult to identify the scale of the match quality
distribution (in simulations and in the actual data).
Identification of µp, θv, and µMD Conditional on the match quality variance, patient
mean drug utility µp is identified by average compliance rates and average rate of switching
away for a given drug. θv is identified by the overall average switch rate. The doctor’s
quality, µMD, is identified by matching the initial prescription and second prescription rate
(conditional on switching from the initial prescription). Note that µMD and µp are in a sense
overidentified, because the same fixed effect is used to match two moments. Because the
location of doctor’s utility is not identified, I normalize Lipitor’s mean quality to doctors,
µMD1 , to zero. (On the patient side, Lipitor’s quality is identified by the normalization that
mean utility from quitting is equal to zero.)
Identification of preference parameters and w Patient preferences are identified by
the covariance between drug characteristics and compliance probabilities, after correcting
for selection, i.e. the fact that among prescribed drugs, drug characteristics are correlated
with match quality.15 Thus identification of price sensitivities and responses to advertising,
once the match quality distribution is known, relies on the same variation as the descriptives
results. Once patient preferences are known, so is ud, and so the covariance among initial
prescription choice probabilities, ud, and X
MD identifies w and βMD. However, ud is a linear
14There is an additional effect: patients are differentially likely to switch. But this effect does not influence
the quit/comply margin.
15For a given match quality distribution, however, the correlation takes a known form and so can be
corrected. See Ellickson et al. (2001), proposition 2.
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function of drug characteristics, as is XMD. Identification of w therefore requires at least
one variable in patient utility that is not in doctor utility. Out-of-pocket price, its interaction
with capitation, and direct-to-consumer advertising serves as the primary excluded variables
(although I also include dummies for price imputation in the patient’s utility function
but not the doctor’s). The coefficients on these excluded variables in patient’s utility are
identified by both the compliance and the initial prescription response to them.
1.6. Estimation results
To minimize the computational burden, I estimate the model on a 5% random sample of the
data, stratifying on insurance plans (so as not to lose price variation), resulting in a sample
of 15,053 people.16 I include only a limited number of controls in the model. In the drug
utility, I include out of pocket price and plan price, both prices interacted with capitation
status, an indicator for imputed price, a main effect for capitation, plan generosity, and
the two advertising measures. I let detailing, plan price, and plan price interacted with
capitation shift the doctor’s utility differentially. The 45 parameters to estimate consist of
12 coefficients on these variables, the weight the doctor places on patient utility, the mean
utility from visiting the doctor, and three parameters for each of the 11 drugs (standard
deviation of match quality, and the mean utility to doctors and to patients), less the two
normalizations.
1.6.1. Point estimates
Table 1.8 shows the estimated parameters of the utility function, and Table 1.8 shows the
parameters of the match quality distribution. The estimated utility functions appear quite
reasonable. Patients are price sensitive, and more so in capitated plans. The average
elasticity of the initial prescription with respect to plan price is 1.00 (0.863 for uncapitated
plans and 1.41 for capitated), and with respect to out-of-pocket price it is 0.79 (0.61 and
1.35). The elasticity of compliance with respect to out-of-pocket price, conditional on the
16The stratification procedure always selects at least one person from each plan, and hence oversamples
people in plans with fewer than 100 people.
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drug prescribed, is 0.22 (0.16 and 0.38).17 This elasticity is about 50% larger than the
reduced form estimates from the compliance decision.
To better understand the coefficients, including the weight doctors put on patient utility,
consider decreasing the patient’s utility from drug consumption by $1, either by increasing
its price or by adjusting its characteristics so that utility falls by the price sensitivity α.
In order to keep an uncapitated doctor’s utility from prescribing that drug unchanged,
its plan price would have to fall by $2.41 (holding patient utility from plan prices fixed).
Alternatively, we could compensate the doctor by holding plan prices fixed but increasing
detailing, which would have to rise by 1.02 standard deviations to keep the doctor indifferent.
The second set of estimates in Table 1.8 shows the estimates when I set the standard devi-
ation of match quality to zero. Ignoring match quality biases the point estimates towards
zero (on the characteristics that vary across drugs), reducing patient price sensitivity by
nearly half, for both capitated and uncapitated patients. Accounting for heterogeneous
match quality is clearly important,
Table 1.8 shows the estimated match quality distribution, i.e. mean quality to doctors,
mean quality to patients, and the standard deviation of match quality. There are clear
differences between doctors and patients in average perceived match quality: µMDd is often
different from zero, although it is imprecisely estimated in many cases. Doctors appear to
over emphasize non-statins and under emphasize combination products. Doctors also place
too little weight on Mevacor. The estimates also imply clear heterogeneity in match quality:
most of the estimated standard deviations of match quality are significant.
1.6.2. Goodness of fit
Table 1.8 provides some information about goodness of fit. The model fits for the initial
prescription and comply decisions are both quite good. The initial prescriptions are all
17The probability of compliance is
∫
ξ
∑
d Pr(d|ξ)Pr(c|d, ξ). To find the compliance elasticity, I differenti-
ated this expression with respect to out-of-pocket price, but holding Pr(d) fixed; this is to keep the elasticity
comparable to the reduced form estimate, which holds fixed the initial prescription.
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within a percentage point, and the compliance decision is also close for all dugs except
BARs (and interestingly, the model estimates here provide better out-of-sample fit than the
raw data). The model has some trouble matching the high compliance rate of Mevacor.
The model does worse on predicting switching away from drugs, especially for the drugs
with low initial prescription rates; since these drugs are rarely prescribed, errors in the rate
of switching away from them does not much affect the likelihood.
The final columns, however, show that the model has a fairly hard time matching the rate
of switching to drugs, conditional on switching. The model struggles here because the drug
fixed effects must match both the switch to rates and the initial prescription rates. The
error is much larger for the switch to rates because switching is relatively rare, so errors in
the conditional probability do decrease the likelihood enormously. Because the same fixed
effects govern the initial prescription and the switch to rates, the model will have a hard
time matching differences between these probabilities. To the extent that switching reflects
either a need for a stronger drug or a general statin intolerance, the model has trouble
picking it up.
To further judge the fit, Figure 1.8 shows the initial prescription, compliance, and switch
from rates, by year, for Lipitor, Zocor, and Mevacor, using the holdout sample (which
comprises 95% of the data). The solid line shows the actual rates in the holdout data, and
the dashed line shows the prediction from the model parameters in the holdout sample data.
The model fits the data reasonably well, although not perfectly. It matches the decline
in Lipitor’s popularity, as well as the rise in Zocor. It also roughly tracks the rise in
Mevacor’s share from 2001 to 2004, although it does not match the magnitude. The fit
for the compliance and switch is also good. Overall, the fit of the model is reasonable,
given that I am looking out of sample, and nothing in the model requires that I match the
yearly patterns—including the large drop for Lipitor’s initial prescription share and rise for
Zocor’s.
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1.6.3. Welfare losses from agency
Given the adequate fit of the model, I use it to quantify the importance of physician agency
for compliance and welfare. The model allows for four sources of agency problems: financial
incentives, detailing, disagreement about mean drug quality (as represented by the doctor
fixed effects), and the idiosyncratic logit errors. In Table 1.8, I shut down each of these
factors, jointly and individually, to see how they affect compliance rates, patient utility,
plan spending, and net surplus, i.e. utility less plan drug spending.18
The first column of Table 1.8 shows baseline compliance, welfare, and spending. Compliance
is 53% and 11% of patients switch. Consumer surplus is just under $1100 per year, while
plans spend $563 (over and above out of pocket spending of about $125), resulting in net
surplus of $530. Interpreting the choice errrors as mistakes, in the row labelled Consumer
surplus (mistakes), implies lower consumer surplus, but does not substantially affect the
counterfactual welfare changes. The final two rows show the direct health consequences
of access to prescription drugs. On average, doctors prescribe drugs which reduce LDL
cholesterol by 1.07 mmol/L. Because patients do not always comply with their prescriptions,
the realized cholesterol reduction is only 0.71 mmol/L. Baigent et al. suggest that each
mmol/L reduction in cholesterol reduces the risk of stroke and heart attack by 20%, so this
implies a 14% baseline reduction in risk.
In column (2) I shut down all agency problems by requiring doctors to prescribe the drug
that maximizes patient utility. Compliance rises by 6.5 percentage points and, although
patients are now better matched to their first choice, the gains from switching are also higher,
so switching rises by 1 percentage point. Eliminating agency has two offsetting effects on
plan spending: increasing compliance mechanically increases spending, but doctors have a
taste for expensive drugs, and so shutting down agency means cheaper drugs are prescribed.
18Shutting down the logit errors implies that the initial choice probabilities are discontinuous functions
of match quality, ξ, and so SGI cannot be used to evaluate the choice probabilities. In all the calculations
underlying Table 1.8, therefore, I use crude Monte Carlo integration with 1000 draws. All counterfactual
outcomes are linear functions of initial drug choice probabilities, however, so the integration, although noisy,
is not biased.
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The net effect is a modest increase in plan spending of $13. Eliminating agency results in
much higher match quality, improving patient welfare: consumer surplus increases by $148,
about 20% of baseline total spending. Because plan spending changes little, net surplus
also increases by $136. Because doctors have a slight preference, relative to patients, for
stronger drugs, the strength of prescribed drugs falls slightly, but because patients are more
likely to stick with their medication, overall cholesterol improvement increases.
Eliminating all agency problems raises compliance, patient welfare, net surplus, and health.
But how do the individual aspects of agency contribute to these gains? In columns (2) and
(3) I shut down financial incentives and advertising, separately, by setting their coefficient in
doctors’ utility to zero. Eliminating these agency problems actually reduces patient utility,
although only slightly; compliance also falls slightly. This may seem surprising, but the
intuition is straightforward. Although advertising and plan price have only a very slight
impact on patient utility, they are correlated with characteristics that patients do value;
patients like drugs that happen to be heavily detailed, and they dislike expensive drugs.
Eliminating this aspect of agency makes the other aspects—the drug fixed effects and the
logit errors—relatively more important in the doctor’s utility function, and so she switches
towards drugs that patients like even less.
Although shutting down financial incentives has a small impact on patient utility and on
health, it has a big effect on plan spending: eliminating them increases spending by $48.
Eliminating detailing has the opposite impact on spending, decreasing it by $42. These
results suggest that patients are close to indifferent between drugs that are expensive and
cheap for plans to procure, and so the financial incentives are effective in controlling costs
without harming patients. The results also suggest that, while doctors are unwilling to
harm patients, they are relatively more open to transferring profits between insurers and
pharmaceutical companies.
In column (5) I set the molecule fixed effects in the doctor’s utility function to zero. These
fixed effects are an important source of disagreement between doctors and patients, so
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eliminating them raises patient welfare. And because doctors, on average, have high taste
for expensive drugs, shutting down the fixed effects also reduces plan spending considerably,
and the net effect is an increase in net surplus of about $80. Finally, column (6) shuts down
the logit errors, which effectively puts more weight in the doctor’s decision on patient utility
and the observable aspects of drug quality. Compliance and utility increase considerably,
but plan spending increases as doctors shift towards higher quality, more heavily advertised
drugs. The net effect, again, is a sizeable increase in consumer surplus and net surplus.
1.7. Can better contracts reduce agency problems?
The results in the previous section indicate that eliminating physician agency can increase
compliance and patient welfare, reduce prescription drug spending, and raise net surplus
between patients and insurers. It is not possible, of course, to simply switch off agency.19
But agency problems ultimately reflect a contract failure: they arise because the doctor’s
incentives are imperfectly aligned with her patient’s interest. A natural solution, therefore,
is an alternative contract that better aligns incentives. In this section, I conduct coun-
terfactual simulations to study the impact of alternative contracts on compliance, patient
welfare, and net surplus.
In studying the welfare implications of these contracts, I ignore the possibility that addi-
tional spending on drugs will be offset by reduced hospital spending in the future. Chandra
et al. (2008, 2010) study these offsets in a particularly clean setting, looking at hospital
spending among Medicare beneficiaries when drug copays rose. Although they find evi-
dence for offsets, in their heterogeneity analysis they find no evidence for offsets among
people with high cholesterol, and they also find much smaller offsets among the relatively
young (65-74 year olds). As these groups are likely closest to my sample, I assume that the
spending offsets are small enough to ignore in my welfare calculations.
19Making all drugs available over-the-counter might be a solution, but it ignores the possibility that doctors
are better informed than patients about the risks and benefits of drugs at the time of the initial prescription.
The counterfactuals hold fixed information.
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1.7.1. The contracts
One challenge in designing these contracts is that the optimal drug choice depends on
the patient’s characteristics (especially his insurance plan), but also on the match quality
between patients and drugs. If match quality is observed, it is trivial to write a “forcing
contract” that imposes an arbitrarily large penalty on doctors for prescribing all but the
best drug. The more interesting, and more realistic, case is when match quality is not
observed. I consider three contracts in this context.
Contract 1: “Quality.” I first consider a contract that pays the doctor a bonus if she
prescribes the drug that is best, based on the average quality drug quality, net of cost.
Average quality is defined as the mean utility of drug consumption, gross of match quality,
but conditional on patient and drug characteristics. This contract is conceptually straight-
forward to design and implement. It encourage doctors to prescribe drugs that are cheap
for patients and that have high average quality, and can therefore improve utility and com-
pliance. The downside of this contract is that it ignores heterogeneity in match quality and,
in an extreme case, can encourage the doctor to prescribe a drug that she knows to be a
poor fit, simply because it ranks first on observables.
Contract 2: “Comply.” The problem with the “Quality” contract is that it does not take
advantage of the physician’s private information about match quality. Contract 2 attempts
to avoid this problem by paying doctors a bonus if, ex post, patients end up complying
with the prescription. Because compliance decisions reflect match quality, these contracts
encourage doctors to prescribe drugs with high match quality.
Contract 3: “Threshold.” The “comply” contract leverages the doctor’s private informa-
tion, but it also rewards inframarginal behavior: more than half of patients comply without
any special incentive, so the “comply” contracts could be expensive to implement. Contract
3 instead pays doctors for achieving a threshold compliance rate, in practice 40%.20
20In actually implementing this contract, I pay the bonus if the expected compliance probability exceeds
the threshold. If doctors have many patients and make each prescription decision in isolation (rather than
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To implement these contracts, I assume they shift doctor utility in the same way that plan
prices do.21 The doctor’s utility from initially prescribing drug d is therefore
uMDd (ξd) =α
MD(β0 + β1capitated)priceplan(−bonusid + priceplanid )
+ wud(ξid) +X
MD
id β
MD + µMDd + ε
MD
dt .
The doctor’s utility if the patient switches to drug d is unchanged. The bonus amounts are
bonusbestd = b× 1
{
u¯d = max
d′
u¯d′
}
bonuscomplyd = b× Pr(c|d, ξd)
bonusthrseholdd = b× 1 {Pr(c|d, ξd) ≥ threshold} ,
where u¯id′ is drug utility exclusive of match quality, a function of observable drug and
patient characteristics only. The compliance probabilities include patient match quality
but they are in principle observable ex post so they can be contracted on.
In the counterfactuals, I vary the size and form of the bonus payment b. Note that the
impact of bonus payments on doctors’ utility is moderated both by their marginal utility
of income, αMD, and by β, the relationship between drug prices and doctor income. These
two parameters are not separately identified. In practice I normalize β0 = 1, but the results
should be understood as relative to the doctor’s marginal utility of income. Because this
is presumably constant across the bonus payments, the counterfactuals show how changes
in bonus translate into changes in prescribing patterns, but it cannot speak to how much
spending is required to achieve a given level of compliance or patient utility. With this
limitation in mind, I do not focus on particular bonus levels; instead I vary bonus amounts
over a wide range and examine the performance of each contract at each bonus amount.
These results are useful for ranking for the contracts and for seeing what can be achieved
at some spending level.
optimizing across all patients at once), then this approach is correct.
21But with an opposite sign, since plan prices are a loss and the bonuses a gain.
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1.7.2. Better contracts increase compliance and consumer surplus
Figure 1.8 shows the results. In Panel A I plot the the compliance rate as I increase the
yearly bonus from $0 to $600.22 All three contracts initially increase compliance. The
“quality” contract eventually decreases compliance as doctors start to prescribe drugs that
they know to be poor matches. The “threshold” contract clearly does best, and with strong
enough incentives it achieves the compliance rate that would obtain absent any agency
problems. These contracts, unsurprisingly, also markedly increase patient welfare, as panel
B shows: consumer surplus rises with all three contracts. With enough incentives, however,
the “quality” contract indeed reduces welfare slightly. Under the other contracts, consumer
surplus is never decreasing in the bonus amount, but it levels off at about $1150. Although
the “threshold” achieves the first-best compliance level, it produces, at best, only about a
third of the welfare gain from eliminating agency. This is because these contracts do not
improve agency problems for inframarginal patients, patients who would comply with their
current prescription but would nonetheless prefer a different one.
The gains in compliance and utility affect plan drug spending in two ways. Increasing
compliance for a given drug mechanically increases spending. Offsetting this effect, however,
is that patients (relative to doctors) have a preference for cheaper drugs. Mitigating agency
encourages doctors to switch patients to cheaper drugs, and this can drive down spending.
This effect is especially pronounced for the “quality” contract, since plan price does not
enter into patient utility. The “comply” contract also reduces drug spending slightly at all
levels, while the “threshold” contract drives it up noticeably (in part because it achieves
the highest level of compliance). The cost of the contracts also includes the direct outlays
to physicians, however, and these are shown in Panel D. More generous bonuses translate
almost linearly into higher compensation.
Whether insurance companies find these new contracts attractive depends on how they
22The units here are dollars per patient per month. A $300 bonus is quite large, but recall that the scale
of the bonus is not identified and is normalized to 1.
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split the surplus with the doctors and patients. Panel E shows consumer surplus less
total plan spending (i.e. drug spending plus the bonus payments), and panel F shows
total surplus (consumer surplus less drug spending). In all cases, utility less total plan
spending (i.e. treating bonuses as a cost) is decreasing with the bonus amount. This result
implies that insurance companies will lose money under the new contracts unless they can
renegotiate contracts with doctors, exchanging higher bonuses for lower base salaries. Such
renegotiation may not be difficult for the “quality” contract as the net losses are quite small
for it.
If plans can renegotiate with doctors, then the bonus payments are just a transfer, and
total surplus—consumer surplus less drug spending—is the relevant welfare metric. Panel
F shows that total surplus is increasing under all contracts, and most strongly for the
“quality” contract. “Comply” and “threshold” produce much weaker gains that do not
increase rapidly with the bonus amount, despite the increase in patient utility they generate.
The problem is that the “comply” and “threshold” contract, despite exploiting doctor’s pri-
vate information about match quality, target the wrong patients. The contracts encourages
doctors to improve compliance for patients just on the margin of complying and not.23 But
for these patients, improving compliance reduces efficiency. Since their drug purchases are
heavily subsidized, their willingness to pay is far below the cost to the plan of procuring
the drug. Encouraging compliance among these patients reduces welfare. Alternative con-
tracts can therefore ameliorate but not fully solve the agency problems in the market for
anti-cholesterol drugs, but optimal contracts—which likely lie outside of the set of contracts
considered here—must encourage compliance only among high-value patients.
1.8. Conclusion and directions for future work
This paper argues that physician agency problems hurt patients, reducing compliance and
welfare in the market for anti-cholesterol drugs. My results provide the first quantification
23This is because compliance is most sensitive to patient utility for patients who are at the margin of
indifference between complying and not, since mean utility from drugs is close to zero.
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of the welfare losses from imperfect physician agency. Counterfactual contracts that better
align physician and patient incentives can raise compliance, but they cannot achieve the
agency-free level of utility. Fundamentally, the agency problem arises because doctors are
much better informed about patient health—in this case match quality between patients
and drugs—than are insurance companies, and it is difficult to write a contract that induces
doctors to reveal this information.
These results relate to the large literature on physician agency, and more specifically conflicts
of interest in the prescription drug market. The previous literature has largely demonstrated
that doctors respond to factors that do not affect the patient’s utility, including financial
incentives. My results build on this literature, establishing physician agency problems by
showing that plan prices and advertising also affect the initial prescription decision, but
have no direct impact on the utility patients receive from filling their prescription. The
model adds to the literature by allowing me to quantify the welfare losses from autonomy
and explore the impact of policies to remedy it.
My results suggest several questions for future research. First, one of the key sources of
conflicts of interest is that physicians but not patients respond to plan prices. These prices
likely reflect a partial solution to a different agency problem: doctors are also imperfect
agents of insurance companies, and insurers set incentives to guide doctors towards cost-
effective treatments. Like other researchers (Limbrock, 2011; Dickstein, 2012), I observe
proxies for these incentives (i.e. plan prices), but not the incentives themselves. Thus, an
important question is how these incentives work in practice.
Second, the model estimates indicate that doctors and patients have very different evalua-
tions of drugs, in terms of both willingness to pay and perceived quality. These differences
are important for determining the value of new drugs. A large literature studies the conse-
quences of FDA policy and new drug entry for welfare, but this literature has not separated
doctor and patient welfare. Thus, an open question is how patients value innovation or
increased competition in drug markets.
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Third, the model focuses on static efficiency as viewed by insurance companies, i.e. con-
sumer utility less plan spending. A more complete view of efficiency recognizes that drugs
are priced well above marginal cost, so that the “moral hazard” I document can actually
be efficient. An interesting direction for future work is to account for these mark-ups in
getting the welfare question right, and to explore in more detail how insurers set incentives
for doctors.
Finally, insurance companies and health care agencies are beginning to encourage prescrip-
tion drug compliance as a goal for doctors. For example, two of the National Quality Forum
endorsed quality measures are compliance with asthma medications and compliance with
anti-depressants (National Commitee for Quality Assurance, 2012). My results suggest that
these policies will not only encourage doctors to follow up with patients and remind them
to take their medication, but may also shift medication towards lower-cost drugs and other
drugs that patients prefer.
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Table 1: Molecule summary statistics, all years
Probability of: Molecule mean:
Initial
Prescription
Comply if
Prescribed
Switch from if
Prescribed
Switch to if
Switch
OOP Price Plan Price Detailing DTCA
Lipitor 38.3 56.4 9.4 19.5 0.58 2.45 125.4 109.7
Zocor 22.2 54.4 10.5 18.1 0.62 3.10 89.7 82.3
Mevacor 7.4 60.7 7.6 6.4 0.35 1.52 24.5 0.2
Pravachol 6.8 45.2 17.6 7.5 0.58 3.03 36.8 24.7
Crestor 6.7 46.3 13.0 9.5 0.78 2.04 100.2 140.7
Lescol 2.0 45.3 17.4 2.3 0.72 1.56 0.1 0.0
Ezetimibe Combo 5.0 51.0 10.4 18.6 0.69 1.95 136.6 57.1
Niacin Combo 0.8 39.2 17.6 1.9 0.67 2.19 21.0 0.0
Fibrate 8.3 42.6 17.8 11.4 0.49 1.62 8.3 1.5
Niacin 2.4 26.6 23.6 6.6 0.58 1.98 0.0 0.0
BAR 2.4 13.7 10.3 2.6 0.59 3.00 2.5 0.0
The sample consists of 296,760 people with a diagnosis of cholesterol-related disorders, and a prescription for a cholesterol drug, first prescribed in
2001-2005 or 2008-2009 and at least six months after entering the data, continuously enrolled for at least 12 months after their first prescription, and
enrolled in formulary-based drug insurance plans. Comply is defined as filling the initial prescription at least 6 times during this time period and no other
anti-cholesterol drug; switching is defined as filling at least 6 prescriptions, including at least one for another drug than the first. OOP price and plan
prices are dollars per day supply; detailing and DTCA are millions of dollars. The percentages do not add up to 100 because all probabilities condition
on the drug being available.
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Table 2: Multinomial logit estimates of the impact of patient price, plan price, and advertising on initial prescription
Specification:
(1)
Main
(2)
No Molecule
Fixed Effects
(3)
Mol×Year
Fixed Effects
(4)
Mol×Health
Mol×Generosity
Out of pocket price −1.382 −2.184 −1.093 −1.478
(0.245) (0.389) (0.305) (0.208)
Plan price −0.590 −0.057 −0.541 −0.580
(0.085) (0.092) (0.196) (0.083)
DTCA 0.359 0.700 0.360
(0.128) (0.066) (0.117)
Detailing 0.761 0.695 0.737
(0.226) (0.079) (0.217)
εOOP −0.757 −1.197 −0.599 −0.810
εplan −1.189 −0.114 −1.091 −1.168
# Plans 383 383 383 383
# People 296, 760 296, 760 296, 760 296, 760
Table shows the coefficients obtained from a multinomial logit regression of initial prescription choice against the indicated variables. All specifications
also include an indicator for imputed price, and all specifications except column (2) and (3) also include molecule fixed effects. Subsequent columns
include additional controls as indicated. Molecule× health fixed effects include a full set of interactions between molecule fixed effects and the health
variables, measured as a set of dummy variables for female, age risk for heart disease, and cholesterol problems, diabetes, heart disease, and hypertension.
Plan generosity is measured as the average price per day supply of drugs in the plan, and molecule× plan generosity includes a full set of interactions
between molecule fixed effects and plan generosity. εOOP and εplan are the average elasticities of initial prescription choice probability with respect to
out-of-pocket and plan price. The sample consists of people with a diagnosis of cholesterol-related disorders and a prescription for a cholesterol drug,
first prescribed in 2001-2005 or 2008-2009 and at least six months after entering the sample, continuously enrolled for at least 12 months after their first
prescription, and enrolled in formulary-based drug insurance plans. Robust standard errors, clustered on plan, are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Logit estimates of the impact of patient price, plan price, and advertising on compliance
Specification:
(1)
Main
(2)
No plan
Generosity
(3)
No Mol
Fixed effects
(4)
Plan
Fixed effects
(5)
Plan FEs
Mol×year FEs
(6)
Plan FEs
Mol×health
Mol× generosity
Out of pocket price −0.498 −0.678 −0.888 −0.877 −0.921 −0.896
(0.125) (0.095) (0.114) (0.066) (0.089) (0.074)
Plan price −0.046 −0.037 −0.113 −0.075 −0.185 −0.072
(0.037) (0.039) (0.031) (0.045) (0.097) (0.043)
DTC 0.047 0.038 0.001 −0.071 −0.067
(0.099) (0.097) (0.070) (0.092) (0.087)
Detailing 0.057 0.089 0.518 0.230 0.222
(0.171) (0.161) (0.054) (0.159) (0.149)
εOOP −0.141 −0.192 −0.252 −0.249 −0.261 −0.254
εPlan −0.051 −0.041 −0.126 −0.084 −0.207 −0.080
# Plans 383 383 383 344 344 344
# People 296, 760 296, 760 296, 760 296, 700 296, 700 296, 700
Table shows the coefficients obtained from a logit regression of compliance against the indicated variables. All columns except (2) and (5) also include
plan generosity (as measured by the average price per day supply of branded drugs), and all columns except (3) and (4) also include molecule fixed
effects. All columns include an indicator for imputed price, and a capitation indicator. The health controls include indicators for female, age-related
heart disease risk, and any history of high cholesterol, diabetes, hypertension, or heart disease. εOOP and εplan are the average elasticities of compliance
probability with respect to out-of-pocket and plan price. The sample consists of people with a diagnosis of cholesterol-related disorders and a prescription
for a cholesterol drug, first prescribed in 2001-2005 or 2008-2009 and at least six months after entering the sample, continuously enrolled for at least 12
months after their first prescription, and enrolled in formulary-based drug insurance plans. Robust standard errors, clustered on plan, are in parentheses.
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Table 4: Differential responses by capitation status
Outcome: Initial Prescription Compliance
Sample:
(1)
Not capitated
(2)
Capitated
(3)
Not capitated
(4)
Capitated
Out of pocket price −1.232 −2.411 −0.500 −0.835
(0.143) (0.745) (0.186) (0.188)
Plan price −0.453 −0.494 0.008 −0.070
(0.033) (0.185) (0.040) (0.048)
DTCA 0.319 0.697 0.091 −0.113
(0.056) (0.195) (0.095) (0.350)
Detailing 0.820 0.544 −0.105 0.353
(0.139) (0.125) (0.202) (0.262)
εOOP −0.669 −1.355 −0.144 −0.228
εplan −0.919 −0.974 0.009 −0.067
# Plans 301 82 301 82
# People 223, 341 73, 419 223, 341 73, 419
Table shows the coefficients obtained from multinomial logit regressions of the
initial prescription choice, and logit regressiosn of compliance, on the indicated
variables, estimated separately by capitation status. Additional controls include
plan generosity (as measured by the average price per day supply of branded
drugs), molecule fixed effects, and an indicator for imputed price. εOOP and εplan
are the elasticities of initial choice and compliance probabilities with respect to
out-of-pocket and plan price. The sample consists of people with a diagnosis
of cholesterol-related disorders and a prescription for a cholesterol drug, first
prescribed at least six months after entering the sample, continuously enrolled
for at least 12 months after their first prescription, and enrolled in formulary-
based drug insurance plans. Robust standard errors, clustered on plan, are in
parentheses.
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Table 5: Robustness to informational content of advertising
Specification: No lags Three lags
Outcome:
Initial
Prescription
Compliance
Initial
Prescription
Compliance
Out of pocket price −1.370 −0.572 −1.334 −0.598
(0.250) (0.112) (0.264) (0.114)
Plan Price −0.599 −0.095 −0.588 −0.107
(0.083) (0.034) (0.091) (0.033)
DTCA 0.416 0.047 0.418 0.029
(0.144) (0.096) (0.158) (0.073)
Detailing 0.741 0.026 0.654 0.036
(0.231) (0.161) (0.277) (0.150)
Pubs −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Pubst−1 0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Pubst−2 −0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Pubst−3 −0.002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
p-value 0.202 0.000 0.003 0.000
# Plans 383 383 383 383
# People 296, 760 296, 760 296, 760 296, 760
Table shows the coefficients obtained from multinomial logit regressions of the
initial prescription choice, and logit regressions of compliance, on the indicated
variables, estimated separately by capitation status. Additional controls include
plan generosity (as measured by the average price per day supply of branded
drugs), molecule fixed effects, and an indicator for imputed price. The p-value
is of the likelihood ratio test that the coefficients on PubMed mentions and its
lags are jointly equal to zero. The sample consists of people with a diagnosis
of cholesterol-related disorders and a prescription for a cholesterol drug, first
prescribed at least six months after entering the sample, continuously enrolled
for at least 12 months after their first prescription, and enrolled in formulary-
based drug insurance plans. Robust standard errors, clustered on plan, are in
parentheses.
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Table 6: Parameters of doctor’s and patient’s utility function
Full Model No Match Quality
Patient utility function:
Out of pocket price −0.459 (0.089) −0.267 (0.116)
Out of pocket price × capitated −0.526 (0.146) −0.334 (0.105)
Capitated 0.249 (0.169) 0.299 (0.136)
Plan generosity −0.403 (0.139) −0.382 (0.147)
Imputed price 0.115 (0.237) 0.106 (0.127)
DTCA 0.144 (0.066) 0.067 (0.049)
Plan price −0.032 (0.049) 0.045 (0.048)
Plan price × capitated −0.093 (0.072) −0.075 (0.067)
Detailing −0.126 (0.172) −0.088 (0.141)
Visit utility −1.240 (0.062) −1.315 (0.039)
Doctor utility function:
Weight on patient utility 2.431 (0.231) 3.402 (1.276)
Plan price −0.459 (0.116) −0.564 (0.195)
Plan price × capitated −0.189 (0.168) −0.098 (0.285)
Detailing 1.091 (0.314) 0.947 (0.507)
Table shows the parameters of the doctor’s and patient’s utility function, obtained
from simulated maximum likelihood estimation of the model of doctor-patient
interactions. The “no match quality” specification imposes that σd = 0 for all
drugs. The log likelihood at the solution of the full model is −43, 941. The
sample is a 5% random sample, stratified on plan, drawn from the same sample
described in Table 1.8, and consists of 15,053 people in 383 plans. Standard
errors, in parentheses, allow for arbitrary heteroskadsticity and autocorrelation
within plan.
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Table 7: Match quality distribution
µMD SE µP SE σ SE
Lipitor 0.000 0.652 (0.153) 1
Zocor 0.156 (0.308) 0.747 (0.222) 0.571 (0.162)
Mevacor −1.922 (0.646) 0.871 (0.443) 0.205 (0.476)
Pravachol 1.185 (0.461) −0.268 (0.355) 0.810 (0.119)
Crestor −0.734 (0.386) 0.275 (0.206) 0.535 (0.100)
Lescol −1.365 (0.557) 0.338 (0.337) 0.393 (0.179)
Zetia/Vytorin −2.360 (0.424) 0.864 (0.215) 0.357 (0.145)
Niacin Combo −2.085 (1.025) 0.311 (0.653) 0.447 (0.280)
Fibrates 1.090 (0.368) −0.342 (0.304) 0.762 (0.102)
Niacin 1.564 (0.504) −0.837 (0.298) 0.574 (0.112)
BARs 4.426 (0.899) −1.664 (0.435) 0.403 (0.164)
The table show the estimated parameters of the match quality distribution and their standard errors, obtained from
simulated maximum likelihood estimation of the model of doctor-patient interactions. µMD is the average quality as
doctors perceived, over and above the average quality to patients, µP . σ is the standard deviation of match quality.
Standard errors allow for arbitrary error correlation within plan. Note that µMDLipitor is normalized to zero, and σLipitor
is normalized to 1.
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Table 8: Goodness-of-fit
Pr(Prescribe) Pr(Comply) Pr(Switch from) Pr(Switch to)
Molecule: Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Lipitor 0.380 0.372 0.561 0.569 0.093 0.096 0.190 0.235
Zocor 0.223 0.214 0.553 0.537 0.101 0.116 0.192 0.227
Mevacor 0.073 0.070 0.593 0.560 0.083 0.091 0.075 0.102
Pravachol 0.070 0.072 0.471 0.501 0.184 0.137 0.067 0.080
Crestor 0.050 0.049 0.472 0.463 0.110 0.134 0.095 0.091
Lescol 0.020 0.019 0.464 0.442 0.159 0.128 0.019 0.031
Zetia/Vytorin 0.046 0.056 0.512 0.509 0.097 0.113 0.183 0.087
Niacin Combo 0.007 0.008 0.459 0.456 0.162 0.128 0.019 0.014
Fibrates 0.083 0.088 0.428 0.454 0.169 0.144 0.119 0.093
Niacin 0.025 0.030 0.278 0.283 0.270 0.177 0.064 0.040
BARs 0.023 0.023 0.141 0.100 0.089 0.221 0.022 0.033
Table shows the probability that each molecule is prescribed and patients comply or switch, conditional on having
a prescription for the indicated molecule. The data column gives the raw means from the estimation sample. The
model column shows the prediction implied by the model estimates.
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Table 9: Impact of agency
Scenario:
(1)
Baseline
(2)
No
Agency
(3)
No
Incentives
(4)
No
Detailing
(5)
No Fixed
Effects
(6)
No
logits
Level Change relative to baseline
Comply 53.1 6.5 −0.1 −1.8 1.1 3.3
Switch 11.1 1.1 −0.3 0.1 1.9 1.2
Quit 35.8 −7.6 0.4 1.7 −2.9 −4.5
Plan spending 563 12.8 48.4 −42.1 −33.4 45.9
Out of pocket spending 124.8 0.2 2.4 −7.6 2.7 7.3
Consumer surplus 1094.3 148.4 −5.2 −34.6 45.8 82.1
Consumer surplus (mistakes) 278.1 141.8 −3.7 −29.9 35.7 74.3
Net surplus 531.3 135.5 −53.6 7.5 79.2 36.1
∆ LDL-C, prescribed 1.07 −0.02 0.03 −0.08 −0.06 0.07
∆ LDL-C, realized 0.71 0.05 0.01 −0.05 −0.01 0.07
Column (1) shows the level of the indicated statistic at the baseline parameter estimates, and columns (2)-(6) show
the change relative to baseline as I shut down the indicated aspects of physician agency. LDL cholesterol is measured
in mmol/L, and higher values indicate a greater decrease. Net surplus is consumer surplus less plan spending,
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Figure 1: Out-of-pocket and plan prices, by plan, 2008
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Figure shows the prices of Lipitor, Crestor, Zocor and Mevacor (Panel
B) in 2008.
Figure 2: Out of sample fit for Lipitor, Zocor, and Mevacor
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Figure shows the out-of-sample trends for Lipitor, Zocor, and Mevacor. The data
are the actual means for the random hold out sample.
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Figure 3: Impact of alternative contracts on compliance and patient welfare
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Figure shows several outcomes under counterfactual incentive schemes as I vary the strength of the bonus.
The “quality” contract pays doctors a bonus for prescribing the best drug, based on observables. The
“comply” contract pays the bonus if the patient complies with the prescription. The “threshold” contract
pays the bonus if at least 40% of the doctor’s patients comply. “Total surplus” is equal to patient utility
less plan drug spending.
56
CHAPTER 2 : Earnings Adjustment Frictions: Evidence from the Social Security
Earnings Test
2.1. Introduction
In a traditional model of workers’ earnings or labor supply choices, individuals optimize
their behavior frictionlessly in response to policies that affect their incentives.1 However,
several recent papers have suggested that individuals face frictions in adjusting behavior
to policy (Chetty et al., 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013; Chetty, 2012; Kleven and Waseem, 2013).
Costs of adjusting behavior help to govern the welfare cost of taxation (Chetty et al., 2009),
and they also help to explain heterogeneity across contexts in the observed elasticity of
earnings with respect to the net-of-tax rate (Chetty et al., 2011, 2013; Chetty, 2012).2
This paper develops evidence on the existence, nature and size of frictions in adjusting
earnings in response to policy. The U.S. Social Security Annual Earnings Test (AET)
represents a promising environment for studying these questions. This setting provides a
useful illustration of many issues—such as the development and application of a methodol-
ogy for estimating elasticities and adjustment costs simultaneously—that are applicable to
studying earnings responses to policy more broadly. The AET reduces Social Security Old
Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) claimants’ current OASI benefits as a proportion of
earnings, once an individual earns in excess of an exempt amount. For example, for OASI
claimants aged 62-65 in 2013, current OASI benefits are reduced by 50 cents for every extra
dollar earned above $15,120. The AET may lead to very large effective benefit reduction
rates (BRRs) on earnings above the exempt amount, creating a strong incentive for many
individuals to “bunch” at the convex kink in the budget constraint located at the exempt
amount (Burtless and Moffitt, 1985; Friedberg, 1998, 2000).3 Reductions in current benefits
due to the AET sometimes lead to increases in later benefits; nonetheless, as we discuss in
1This chapter is co-authored with Alexander M. Gelber and Damon Jones.
2The net-of-tax rate is defined as one minus the marginal tax rate (MTR). Literature including Altonji
and Paxson (1988) examines hours constraints in the context of labor supply.
3Other papers on the AET include Gruber and Orszag (2003) and Song and Manchester (2007).
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detail in Section 2.2, several factors may explain why individuals’ earnings still respond to
the AET.
The AET is an appealing context for studying earnings adjustment for at least three reasons.
First, bunching at the AET kink is easily visible on a graph, allowing credible documentation
of behavioral responses.4 Second, the AET represents one of the few known kinks at which
bunching occurs in the U.S.; indeed, our paper represents the first study to find robust
evidence of bunching among the non-self-employed at any kink in the U.S.5 Third, the
AET is important to policy-makers in its own right, as it is a significant factor that affects
the earnings of the elderly in the U.S.
We make three main contributions to understanding adjustment frictions. First, we docu-
ment that earnings adjustment frictions exist in the U.S., by showing that in some contexts
individuals do not adjust immediately to changes in AET. We focus particularly on cases
in which a kink in the effective tax schedule disappears, either because individuals reach an
age at which they are no longer subject to the AET, or because legislative changes remove
the AET for some groups.6 We focus on the disappearance of kinks because in the ab-
sence of adjustment frictions, removal of a convex kink in the effective tax schedule should
immediately lead to a complete lack of bunching at the earnings level associated with the
former kink; thus, any observed delay in reaching zero bunching should reflect adjustment
frictions. We observe clear evidence of delays in some contexts, consistent with the existence
of adjustment frictions. Nonetheless, across several contexts—including both anticipated
and unanticipated changes in policy—the vast majority of individuals’ adjustment occurs
4Other papers have examined bunching in the earnings schedule, including Blundell and Hoynes (2004)
and Saez (2010). Saez shows that the amount of bunching can be related to the elasticity of earnings with
respect to the net-of-tax rate.
5The lack of bunching at other kinks is consistent with the existence of adjustment costs, although this
finding could also be explained by other factors such as a low elasticity of earnings with respect to the
net-of-tax rate. As we discuss in greater detail in Section 2.6, Chetty et al. (2013) do find evidence of more
diffuse earnings responses to the Earned Income Tax Credit among the non-self-employed.
6For consistency with the previous literature on kink points that has focused on the effect of taxation,
we sometimes use ”tax” as shorthand for ”tax-and-transfer,” while recognizing that the AET reduces Social
Security benefits and is not administered through the tax system. The ”effective” marginal tax rate is
affected by the AET BRR, among other factors.
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within at most three years. Adjustment appears even faster in certain contexts.
Second, we assess the mechanisms that underlie the patterns of adjustment we observe, in
order to build a model consistent with these descriptive patterns. We assess the extent to
which employers play a role in coordinating individual responses to the AET by offering
jobs with earnings at the AET exempt amount.7 In our main period of study, we find little
evidence that those too young to claim benefits (and therefore not subject to the AET)
bunch at the kink, suggesting that the primary responses to the AET are mediated by
employees’ choices. We also find evidence that the individuals who respond to the removal
of the AET are primarily those locating at the kink prior to its removal, suggesting that
these individuals are particularly responsive. Others subject to the AET appear to be
unresponsive, suggesting heterogeneity in adjustment costs or elasticities in the population.
Third, we specify a model of earnings adjustment consistent with the descriptive evidence
that allows us to estimate a fixed adjustment cost and the elasticity of earnings with respect
to the effective net-of-tax rate. Recent work demonstrating the importance adjustment
costs has raised the question of how to estimate both the elasticity and adjustment cost
simultaneously. We develop tractable methods that allow estimation of elasticities and
adjustment costs with kinked budget sets. This complements Kleven and Waseem (2013),
who develop a method to estimate related parameters in the presence of a notch in the
budget set. Our method relies on the fact that the amount of bunching at a kink increases
with the elasticity but decreases with the adjustment cost. This prevents estimation of both
parameters using a single cross-section—since a small amount of bunching, for example,
could be consistent with either a low elasticity or a high adjustment cost—but with with
two or more cross-sections of individuals facing different tax rates in the region of the kink,
we can specify two or more equations and find the values of two variables (the elasticity and
the adjustment cost).8 The model Saez (2010) describes how bunching should vary between
7Due to interactions between adjustment costs for workers and hours constraints set by firms, some
individuals may bunch at a kink even though they are not directly subject to the policy that creates the
kink. Chetty et al. (2011) document that employers play such a role in Denmark.
8Under certain approximations that we later specify, this can yield a system of linear equations that can
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two different kinks in a frictionless setting, and the extent to which observed bunching
deviates from this pattern is attributed to the adjustment cost. Intuitively, inertia due to
an adjustment cost leads to an excess amount of bunching after a kink in the budget set
becomes less sharply bent (or disappears altogether). Our primary estimation method uses
the degree of such inertia (in combination with the initial amount of bunching at the kink)
in estimating the size of the adjustment cost (and elasticity).9
We apply our method to data spanning the decrease in the AET benefit reduction rate
from 50 percent to 33.33 percent in 1990 for those aged 66 to 69, as well as two settings
in which the AET no longer applies for certain groups (at age 70 in the 1990-1999 period,
and for ages 66-69 beginning in the year 2000). In a baseline specification examining the
1990 change, we estimate that the fixed adjustment cost is $152.08 (in 2010 dollars)—if
the gains exceed this level, then the individual adjusts earnings—and that the earnings
elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax share is 0.23. This specification examines data on
individuals in 1989 and 1990; thus, our estimated adjustment cost represents the cost of
adjusting earnings in the first year after the policy change. Other empirical strategies show
results in the same range. By contrast, when we constrain the adjustment cost to be zero in
1990, we estimate a statistically significantly higher earnings elasticity of 0.39 in the base-
line specification (69 percent larger than the unconstrained estimate).10 These estimates
suggest that while adjustment costs are modest in our setting, they have the potential to
change elasticity estimates substantially, thus demonstrating that it can be important to
incorporate adjustment costs when estimating elasticities. Nonetheless, our estimates are
specific to our setting, and adjustment costs and elasticities may be substantially different
(larger or smaller) in other contexts.
be solved in closed form. Though we employ a more general framework as our primary estimation strategy,
the intuition in the simplified case helps in understanding the forces that drive our estimation.
9As we describe in detail later, this intuition applies to our primary empirical approach, the ”Sharp
Change” approach.
10In our context, it makes sense that the estimated elasticity is higher when we do not allow for adjustment
costs than when we do, as adjustment costs keep individuals bunching at the kink even though tax rates
have fallen.
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In the course of investigating these issues relating to frictions and earnings adjustment,
we build on previous literature on the AET to provide new evidence that enriches our
understanding of how the AET affects earnings. First, we systematically investigate each of
the major AET policy changes since 1961. Second, we use SSA administrative data with a
full sample of 13,612,313 observations on 619,580 individuals, building on certain previous
studies that use survey data. Third, our study is the first to estimate bunching in the
context of the AET through a method similar to Saez (2010). Fourth, we present evidence
on individuals’ earnings reaction to changes in the Delayed Retirement Credit. Fifth, we
investigate whether mortality expectations help drive individuals’ earnings responses to the
AET by estimating the pattern of life expectancy around the exempt amount. Sixth, we
investigate whether individuals change earnings in response to the AET by changing jobs or
by changing earnings levels within a job, as well as whether employers coordinate employees
on the AET exempt amount. Finally, we show that individuals serially bunch at the exempt
amount.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the policies we
examine. Section 2.3 presents a framework for analyzing the behavioral response to these
policies and describes our empirical strategy for quantifying bunching. Section 2.4 describes
our data. Section 2.5 presents empirical evidence on the earnings response to changes in the
AET. Section 2.6 explores certain mechanisms underlying the behavioral responses. Section
2.7 specifies a tractable model of earnings adjustment and estimates the fixed adjustment
cost and elasticity simultaneously. Section 2.8 concludes with discussion and avenues for
future work.
2.2. Policy Environment
Figure 4 shows key features of the AET rules from 1961 to 2009. The AET became less
stringent over this period. The dashed line and right vertical axis show the benefit reduction
rate. From 1961 to 1989, every dollar of earnings above the exempt amount reduced OASI
61
benefits by 50 cents (until OASI benefits reached zero).11 In 1990 and after, the benefit
reduction rate fell to 33.33 percent for beneficiaries above the Normal Retirement Age
(NRA).12 The figure also shows that the AET applied to a narrower set of ages over time.
In 1961, the AET applied to ages 62-71; starting in 1983, the AET was eliminated for 70-71
year-olds; and starting in 2000, the AET was also eliminated for those NRA and above. The
solid line and left vertical axis show the real exempt amount. Between 1961 and 1971, the
exempt amount rose with price inflation. Beginning in 1972, the exempt amount typically
rose faster than inflation. Starting in 1978, the AET had different rules for beneficiaries
younger than NRA and those at least NRA but younger than the maximum age subject to
the AET. Subsequently, the exempt amount rose much faster on average for beneficiaries
NRA and older than for younger beneficiaries.13
We later model the AET as creating a positive implicit marginal tax rate for some indi-
viduals, consistent with the empirical finding that some individuals bunch at AET kinks,
certain theoretical considerations we describe below, and previous literature. In the empiri-
cal section, we explore evidence relating to certain mechanisms that explain this response.14
11In addition to this threshold, until 1972 there was a second, higher earnings threshold over which the
benefit reduction rate was 100 percent (Social Security Annual Statistical Supplement 2012). The second
threshold is well above the first threshold, ranging from 25 percent to 80 percent higher depending on the
year.
12The NRA, the age at which workers can claim their full OASI benefits, is 65 for those born 1937 and
before, rises by two months a year for cohorts between 1938 and 1943, is constant at age 66 for cohorts
between 1943 and 1954, and rises by two months a year until reaching age 67 for those born in 1960 and
later.
13The exempt amount has not been a ”focal” earnings level—such as $1,000, $5000, or $10,000—that
could lead to bunching at the exempt amount even in the absence of AET. Indeed, in our main period of
study we find no evidence of bunching at the exempt amount among those younger than the ages to which
the AET applies. In 2000 and subsequently, those in the year of attaining NRA face the AET in the months
prior to such attainment, but they are subject to a higher exempt amount and a benefit reduction rate of
33.33 percent.
14In this paper, we focus on the marginal incentives created by the AET and intensive margin responses,
following previous literature based on the technique of Saez (2010). Other important decisions could include
the choice of whether to earn a positive amount, or the decision to claim OASI. We abstract from the claiming
decision by examining a sample of OASI claimants, following previous literature such as Friedberg (1998,
2000); however, it is worth noting that that if the AET affects the claiming decision, there is no a priori
reason that this change in claiming should increase or decrease the magnitude of the bunching responses we
document among claimants. Moreover, we add to previous literature by showing in Appendix Figure 35 that
the hazard of claiming at year t+ 1 is smooth around the exempt amount at year t, indicating no evidence
that claimants come disproportionately from close to or far from the kink. We discuss the claiming decision
further in the Appendix. We examine the extensive margin response in a companion paper (Gelber et al.,
2013). (Cogan (1981) is a classic reference on fixed costs of adjustment in the extensive margin choice.)
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When current OASI benefits are lost to the AET, future scheduled benefits are increased in
some circumstances. This is sometimes called ”benefit enhancement.” Benefit enhancement
can reduce the effective tax rate associated with the AET, in particular for those individuals
considering earning enough to trigger the enhancement in the post-1972 period, as we
describe in detail in Appendix A.7 and briefly in this section.
Prior to 1972, the AET caused a pure loss in benefits for those NRA and above, as there
was no benefit enhancement for these individuals. For beneficiaries subject to the AET
aged NRA and above, a one percent DRC was introduced in 1972, meaning that each year
of benefits foregone led to a one percent increase in future yearly benefits. The DRC was
raised to three percent in 1982 and gradually rose to eight percent for cohorts reaching
NRA from 1990 to 2008 (though the AET was eliminated in 2000 for those above NRA).
A increase in future benefits between seven and eight percent is approximately actuarially
fair on average, meaning that an individual with no liquidity constraints and average life
expectancy should be indifferent between either claiming benefits now or delaying claiming
and receiving higher benefits once she begins to collect OASI (as Diamond and Gruber
(1999) show with respect to the actuarial adjustment).
As we describe further in Appendix A.7, future benefits are only raised due to the DRC
when annual earnings are sufficiently high that the individual loses an entire month’s worth
of OASI benefits due to the reductions associated with the AET (Friedberg, 1998; Social
Security Administration, 2012). In particular, an entire month’s benefits are lost once
the individual earns z∗ +(MB/τ) or higher, where z∗ is the exempt amount, MB is the
monthly benefit, and τ is the AET benefit reduction rate. With a typical monthly benefit
of $1,000 and a benefit reduction rate of 33.33 percent, one month’s benefit enhancement
occurs when the individual’s annual earnings are $3,000 (=$1000/0.3333) above the exempt
amount. For example, if an individual born in 1933-1934 earned at or just above this
amount in years when she was subject to the DRC, future benefits were raised by 0.46
percent (but no increase occurs if the individual earns below this amount). As a result, at
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or just above the AET threshold, earning an extra dollar does not affect subsequent OASI
benefits. Thus, benefit enhancement is only relevant to an individual considering earning
substantially in excess of the exempt amount. Indeed, we later describe suggestive evidence
of both little systematic bunching reaction to changes in the DRC and little relationship
between bunching and life expectancy.15
Thus, the AET could affect the earnings decisions of those NRA and above for a number
of reasons. As we have discussed, for those to whom benefit enhancement is effectively
irrelevant (because they are only considering earning sufficiently near to the AET that they
would not receive benefit enhancement through increasing earnings), the marginal incentives
they face are not affected by benefit enhancement. For those to whom benefit enhancement
is relevant (because they are considering earning in a region well above the AET exempt
amount, thus triggering benefit enhancement), the AET could also affect decisions, for
several reasons. First, the AET was on average roughly actuarially fair only beginning
in the late 1990s. Indeed, prior to 1972, the AET represented a pure loss in benefits for
those NRA and above. Furthermore, those whose expected lifespan is shorter than average
should expect to collect OASI benefits for less long than average, implying that the AET
is more financially punitive (though we ultimately find no evidence consistent with this
hypothesis). Liquidity-constrained individuals or those who discount faster than average
could also reduce work in response to the AET. Finally, many individuals may also not
understand many features of the AET or other aspects of OASI (Liebman and Luttmer,
2011).
For beneficiaries under NRA, the actuarial adjustment raises future benefits whenever an
individual earns any amount over the AET exempt amount.16 Future benefits are raised
by 0.55 percent per month of benefits withheld for the first three years of AET assessment.
15Later, our empirical specification alternatively assumes that benefit enhancement does not (or does)
affect the AET implicit marginal tax rate, and we find similar patterns in both specifications.
16Social Security Administration (2012), Section 728.2; Gruber and Orszag (2003). Formally, the number
of months’ worth of benefit enhancement received by OASI recipients is floor(τ · (z − z∗)/MB) for those
NRA and above, and ceiling(τ · (z − z∗)/MB) for those below NRA. See Appendix A.7 for more details.
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This creates a notch in the budget set at the AET threshold—as opposed to a simple kink,
whose properties we explore in our theory sections. Our discussion of the effects of kinks
therefore does not directly apply to pre-NRA ages. Thus, in our estimates of elasticities
and adjustment costs, we limit the sample to ages NRA and above, for which the budget
set (in the region of the exempt amount) is a kink rather than a notch.
2.3. Initial Bunching Framework
As a preliminary step, we begin with a model with no frictions. This model is well-known
and described in detail elsewhere, but we briefly describe it here and in more detail in
Appendix A.11.17 After we have presented our empirical results, we specify a model with
frictions that is consistent with the descriptive patterns we document.
Appendix Figure 14 shows the budget constraint and incentives created by the AET for
those NRA and above in the frictionless case. Start with a linear tax (Panel A) at a rate
of τ . Now, suppose the AET is introduced (on top of pre-existing taxes), so that the
marginal net-of-tax rate decreases to 1 − τ − dτ for earnings above a threshold z∗ (Panel
B). For small dτ , individuals earning in the neighborhood above z∗ reduce their earnings.
If ability is smoothly distributed, a range of individuals initially locating between z∗ and
z∗+4z (as depicted in the density in Panel C) will instead locate exactly at z∗, due to the
discontinuous jump in the marginal net-of-tax rate at z∗. In fact, we find empirically that
these individuals locate in the neighborhood of z∗, as shown in Panel D.
To measure the amount of bunching, we use a technique similar to Chetty et al. (2011) and
Kleven and Waseem (2013), which we illustrate in Appendix Figure 15 and describe further
in the Appendix. The x-axis measures before-tax income, z, while the y-axis measures
the density of earnings. In Panel A, we show that the ex-post density of earnings in the
presence of a kink is comprised of a number of groups. Those in the region labeled X in
17Saez (2010) describes this model in greater detail. This work follows earlier work on estimation of labor
supply responses on nonlinear budget sets, including Burtless and Hausman (1978) and Hausman (2004).
Moffitt (1990) surveys these methods.
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the figure (”bunchers”) have optimal earnings above z∗ under the lower rate of τ and at
z∗ under the higher rate of τ + dτ . Those in the region labeled Y in the figure consist of
individuals whose optimal earnings are below z∗ under a lower marginal tax rate of τ , as
well as other individuals whose optimal earnings are above z∗ under the higher marginal
tax rate of τ + dτ . Panel B shows that to estimate the size of region X, we must estimate
the ex post density and subtract the mass associated with Group Y.
As described further in Appendix A.8, we divide the data into $800 bins and estimate a
seven-degree polynomial through the densities associated with the bins. In estimating this
polynomial, we control for dummies for being in the seven bins nearest to the kink,18 to cap-
ture the bunching near the kink that we wish to ignore when we estimate the counterfactual
polynomial density. Our estimate of bunching, B, is the difference between the mass in these
seven bins and the area under the polynomial in this $5600-wide region. We estimate confi-
dence intervals through a bootstrap procedure that we describe further in Appendix A.11.8
(and the results are similar under the delta method). We report our bunching amount, B,
normalized by the share of individuals in the neighborhood [z∗ − δ, z∗ + δ] who belong to
Group Y (which we approximate as the area under our polynomial over this range).19
Some apparent limitations of our approach are worth discussion. First, following previous
literature on earnings responses to kinks, we do not take into account other choices that
could affect earnings in the long run, such as human capital accumulation. However, human
capital accumulation is likely to be less important for the older workers we study than it is
for the population as a whole. Second, other programs—such as Medicaid, Supplemental
Security Income, Disability Insurance, or taxes such as unemployment insurance payroll
taxes—create earnings incentives near the bottom of the earnings distribution. While we
18This implies that our estimate of excess bunching is driven by individuals locating within $2800 of the
kink (as the central bin runs from $400 under the kink to $400 above the kink). We discuss this issue further
in the Appendix. As we show in the Appendix, we have also experimented with other bandwidths, which
yield similar results.
19While we show this excess bunching at the kink as arising in a frictionless model here, this technique
is also suited to measuring the excess bunching at the kink arising in a model with frictions (as the key in
either setting is that there is excess bunching at the kink, which this technique can measure in either case).
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acknowledge that other incentives represent a concern in principle—applicable to most of the
literature on bunching at kinks—we also note that the kinks created by these programs are
typically inapplicable or safely far away from the AET convex kink.20 The results show very
clear evidence of bunching at the AET kink and no visible, systematic evidence of bunching
in other regions close to the AET kink. Third, we follow the previous work and largely do
not distinguish among the potential reasons for a response to the AET. Following previous
literature, our bunching framework presumes that consistent with the empirical evidence
documenting clear responses to the incentives created by the AET, certain individuals treat
the AET as creating some effective marginal tax rate above the exempt amount.
Finally, the results are specific to the AET and may not generalize outside of this context.
We estimate the speed of adjustment among those initially bunching at a kink, a group
that our empirical results suggest is more responsive to the AET than other groups. We
therefore believe it is all the more interesting that we still find evidence of modest adjustment
frictions among this group whose initial bunching indicates a substantial degree of flexibility
(enough to locate at the kink initially). Furthermore, our estimation procedure relies on
estimating bunching at more than one kink, and therefore it has the potential to incorporate
information on the responses of individuals across a wide range of the income distribution
(across multiple kinks).
2.4. Data
We primarily rely on the restricted-access Social Security Administration Master Earnings
File (MEF) and Master Beneficiary Record (MBR), described more fully in the Appendix.
The data contain a complete longitudinal earnings history with yearly information on earn-
20We have found that many other incentives, including income tax rates, are smooth on average around the
AET convex kink. The AET also potentially creates other distortions that we discuss further in Appendix
A.7, including: a slight notch for those NRA age and above every time an entire month’s worth of benefits
are lost due to the Delayed Retirement Credit; an additional non-convex kink in the budget constraint at
the point at which OASI benefits are fully phased out; and a notch for those below the NRA for every month
of withheld benefits that triggers the actuarially adjustment described above. However, in the case of those
NRA and above that we focus on, these incentives are not likely to be relevant for potential bunchers and do
not appear to be empirically relevant (as we discuss elsewhere). For these reasons, we abstract from these
additional features but discuss such incentives further when we present our empirical evidence.
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ings since 1951; the type and amount of yearly Social Security benefits an individual receives;
year of birth; the year (if any) that claiming began; and sex (among other variables).21 Sep-
arate information is available on self-employment earnings and non-self-employment earn-
ings. Prior to 1978, the data measure annual Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA)
earnings. Starting in 1978, the measure of earnings in the MEF reflects total wage compen-
sation, as reported on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) forms. Our dataset is a one percent
random sample of all Social Security numbers in the MEF, keeping all available years of
data for each individual sampled.
Several features of the data are worth discussion. First, these administrative data allow large
sample sizes and are subject to little measurement error. Second, earnings (as measured
in the dataset) are the base for FICA taxes and are not subject to manipulation through
tax deductions, credits, or exemptions. Third, because earnings are taken from the W-2
form, they are subject to third-party reporting among the non-self-employed; third-party
reporting has been found in the literature to greatly reduce evasion Kleven et al. (2011). This
limits the degree to which observed bunching among the non-self-employed—to whom we
limit our sample—could reflect reporting issues. Fourth, the data do not contain information
on hours worked or amenities at individuals’ jobs.
Table 10 shows summary statistics for the sample of individuals aged 18-75, and for the
sample that we typically focus on, all those aged 62-69 who claimed by age 65.22 In both
samples, we exclude those with self-employment income. The larger (smaller) sample has
13,612,313 (1,595,139) observations on 619,580 (545,615) individuals. 56 percent (57 per-
cent) of the sample is male. 50 percent (57 percent) of observations have positive earn-
ings. Mean earnings in the sample (conditional on having positive earnings) is $37,492.28
($29,485.08). Excluding those with self-employment income reduces the sample size (rela-
21However, we only use data since 1961; prior to 1961, the AET was substantially different, as an individual
lost all of his OASI benefit when he earned above the exempt amount.
22In our main results, we use this fixed sample to hold the sample constant across ages or years; as we
describe later, we also investigate a number of other samples as robustness checks, including a sample in
which we examine only those who have claimed by the time we observe them.
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tive to the full population) by 18% among 18-75 year olds and by 12% among 62-69 year
olds. Note that median earnings among our main sample of 62-69 year-olds ($17,739.68)
is not far from the AET exempt amount; the population our study examines is in a range
with a thick density of earnings that is not far from the median.
The second dataset we use is the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD)
dataset of the U.S. Census (McKinney and Vilhuber, 2008; Abowd et al., 2009), described
further in the Appendix. The data are based on unemployment insurance earnings records
and longitudinally follow workers’ earnings over time. The data have information on around
nine-tenths of workers in covered states and their employers, though we are only able to use
data on a 20 percent random subsample of these individuals. We use these data primarily
in order to link employees to employers, as the SSA data that we have access to have
no information about individuals’ employers. We secondarily use these data because the
sample size we are able to obtain in the LEHD is much larger than the (large) sample size
we obtain in the SSA data.23
2.5. Earnings Response to Policy
2.5.1. Descriptive Evidence from Policy Variation Across Ages
We first examine the pattern of excess bunching across ages, in order to determine how
quickly individuals respond to changes in policy across ages and whether they face delays
in responding (consistent with the existence of adjustment frictions). Empirical work often
estimates only short-run responses to changes in policy (see Saez et al. (2012), for a review
of literature on earnings responses to taxation). If individuals are able to respond more
(less) in the long run than in the short run, then this large body of work would under-
23The LEHD lacks information on whether a given individual is claiming OASI. Nonetheless, the ultimate
importance of this shortcoming is limited. In our SSA data, 97 percent of people claim by age 69, so it is
a safe assumption that the great majority of the individuals observed in the LEHD data of the ages we are
interested in (primarily ages 69 and 70) have claimed OASI. The magnitude of the bunching we observe
is likely to be slightly understated relative to the magnitude we would measure in the population of OASI
claimants, as the results include non-claimants in the sample. However, our primary interest concerns the
patterns of responses to the AET across ages and over time, which prove to be visually and statistically
clear in the LEHD.
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estimate (over-estimate) long-run responses. Moreover, most empirical specifications have
related an individual’s tax rate in a given year to the individual’s earnings in that year. In
order to choose the appropriate time horizon over which to study behavioral responses to
policy, it is necessary to establish how long it takes to respond to policy changes.
Subsequent to 1982, the AET applies to ages 62-69. The policy changes at ages 62 and 70—
the imposition and removal of the AET—are ”anticipated,” by which we refer to changes
that would be anticipated by those who have knowledge of the relevant policies. We begin
by examining the period 1990-1999. Figure 5 plots earnings histograms for each age from
59 to 73. Earnings are measured along the x-axis, relative to the exempt amount, which is
shown by a vertical line.24
Figure 5 shows clear visual evidence of substantial excess bunching from ages 62-71.25
Figure 6 plots the point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for bunching at each
age. Bunching is statistically significantly different from zero at each age in the 62-71 range
(p < 0.01 at all ages). We find no evidence of adjustment in anticipation of future changes
in policy, as those younger than 62 do not bunch.26
We do find evidence that unbunching takes more than one year, however, as those ages 70
and 71 show modest bunching. Figure 5 shows that the density near the kink is raised at
these ages, and Figure 6 shows that the estimates of bunching are statistically significantly
different from zero. Three other considerations also indicate that this reflects excess bunch-
ing at these ages. First, we show later that the statistically significant positive estimates
are robust to varying the degree of the polynomial, the excluded region, and the bandwidth
used in the estimates. Second, the distributions at other ages not affected by the AET
24For ages younger than 62, we define the (placebo) kink in a given year as the kink that applies to
pre-NRA individuals in that year. For individuals 70 and above, we define the (placebo) kink in a given
year as the kink that applies to post-NRA individuals in that year.
25As discussed above, in this period individuals aged 62 to 64 faced a notch in the budget set (due to the
actuarial adjustment of benefits) at the exempt amount; thus, the incentives they faced were different than
those for individuals aged 65 to 69. However, the histograms show no evidence of a spike in earnings just
above the kink (as one would predict if they respond to the incentives created by this notch).
26If the cost of adjustment in each year rose with the size of adjustment and this relationship were convex,
we would expect anticipatory adjustment.
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that represent reasonable counterfactuals (such as 61 or 73), show nearly perfectly smooth
earnings distributions, suggesting that the excess mass near the kink at ages 70 and 71
would not arise in the absence of the AET. Third, Appendix Figure 16 shows that the
mean percentage change in earnings from age 70 to 71 shows a modest spike near the ex-
empt amount, consistent with continued earnings adjustment from age 70 to age 71 among
those near the kink at age 70. We find it striking that even among the group bunching
prior to age 70—that (the data reveal) are able to adjust earnings to the kink—we still find
evidence of modest adjustment frictions.
Figure 6 shows that excess bunching is substantially lower at age 65 than surrounding
ages. The location of the kink changes substantially from age 64 to age 65; as Figure 4
shows, during this period the exempt amount is much higher for individuals NRA and above
than for individuals below NRA. Individuals may have difficulty adjusting their earnings to
the new, higher kink within one year.27 This suggests that individuals also face delays in
adjusting in this context.28
Similar patterns of adjustment occur when looking at the periods 1972-1982, 1983-1989
and 2000-2006 (Appendix Figures 18 to 20). We find evidence of adjustment delays, as
individuals continue to bunch at the kink at ages older than the highest age to which the
AET applies. However, in no case does adjustment appear to take more than three years.29
27Prior to the divergence of the exempt amount for those below and above NRA in 1978, we find no such
dip in bunching at age 65. This ”placebo” evidence further supports the hypothesis that the dip in bunching
at age 65 arises from delayed adjustment to the increase in the exempt amount from ages 64 to 65 that
emerges after 1978.
28In our context, the only ”appearance” of a new kink that we observe is the appearance of a kink at age
62. The amount of time since the appearance of the kink at age 62 is correlated with age, and elasticities
and adjustment costs could also be correlated with age—thus confounding analysis of the time necessary
to adjust to appearance of a kink. While recognizing these caveats, it is worth noting that the amount
of bunching slowly rises from age 62 to 63, which suggests gradual adjustment. In principle, this could
also relate to the fact that these graphs show the sample of those who have claimed by age 65, and the
probability of claiming at a given age (conditional on claiming by age 65) rises from age 62 to 63. To address
this issue, in Appendix Figure 17 we show the results when the sample at a given age consists of those who
have claimed by that age, which still shows a substantial increase in excess bunching from age 62 to 63.
29It is possible that a small amount of excess bunching occurs at ages 72 or older, but this is statistically
insignificant.
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2.5.2. Descriptive Evidence from Policy Changes Across Time
We next examine adjustment to a legislated change in AET policy. As shown in Figure
4, the AET was eliminated for those NRA and above in 2000. This policy change was
unanticipated prior to the year 2000, as the legislation enacting the policy change was
passed in April 2000 and applied to workers’ earnings in October 2000, and discussions
prior to 2000 did not widely anticipate these changes.30
Figure 7 shows the results for those aged 66-69. Bunching in the earnings distribution
is easily visible in the years prior to 2000. In 2000, however, there is immediately little
bunching visible, and this lack of bunching persists after 2000.31 A very small bump in the
earnings histogram is visible near the kink, but this proves to be insignificant in these data.
Figure 8 also shows the amount of excess bunching estimated by year, along with 95 percent
confidence intervals.32 The amount of bunching is significantly greater than zero in all years
prior to 2000, and estimates for 2000 and subsequent years show no significant bunching.
Because the change was passed in April 2000 and implemented in October 2000—both after
most salaried workers would have learned about their pay that year—the fairly fast reaction
suggests that bunching is driven by workers with substantial flexibility in their earnings.33
30The AET was also eliminated in 1983 for individuals aged 70 and 71. However, our results across ages
show that individuals bunch at ages 70 and 71 in the 1990-99 period, so that persistent bunching at these
ages in the 1983-89 cannot cleanly be interpreted as delayed adjustment to the 1983 change (as opposed to
delayed reaction to the disappearance of the kink at age 70).
31For comparison, Appendix Figure 21 shows that bunching stayed relatively constant for the 62-64 year-
old group that experienced no policy change in 2000. While this group faces a notch at the exempt amount
rather than a kink (as explained above), the relative comparison is instructive and suggests that the fall in
bunching in the 66-69 year-old group in 2000 and subsequent years was due to the removal of the AET for
this group in 2000.
32We have estimated this amount of excess bunching using three ways of calculating ”placebo” kinks in
2000 and after: 1) by adjusting the exempt amount in 1999 using the CPI-U; 2) by adjusting the exempt
amount in 1999 using the Employment Cost Index; 3) by using the exempt amount applicable to individuals
in the year of attaining NRA in a given year (which is the same as the exempt amount that had been
scheduled prior to the 2000 legislation to apply in each year to those NRA and above). Figures 7 and 8
show the first of these methods, but all of these methods show no significant bunching in these years (which
is unsurprising given the lack of bunching visible in the histograms in 2000 and after).
33Due to changes that raised the scheduled exempt amount beginning in 1996, the AET had been scheduled
to increase from $15,500 in 1999 to $30,000 by 2002. In principle, this could have affected the amount of
bunching in 2000, even absent the elimination of the AET in this year. Nonetheless, bunching is unlikely to
have been zero in the absence of the AET elimination, as the quarterly LEHD data discussed above show
substantial evidence of bunching in quarterly earnings data prior to the fourth quarter of 2000, when the
AET was eliminated.
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Appendix Figure 22 shows bunching in 1999, 2000, and 2001 in the LEHD. A spike at
the kink is easily visible in 1999, and a small amount of bunching is visible in 2000 as
the two bins on either side of the exempt amount are raised relative to the rest of the
density (paralleling the small bump in the earnings histogram in 2000 in the MEF). In fact,
excess normalized bunching proves to be significantly different from zero in 2000 in the
LEHD (p < 0.01). By 2001, there is no clear visual evidence of bunching at the kink, and
normalized excess bunching is insignificantly different from zero in the LEHD.34
In 2000, we find weaker evidence of a delay in adjustment—it only appears to occur among a
small number of individuals, and it is only statistically significant in the LEHD. Moreover,
bunching in the LEHD in 2000 is not necessarily immediately apparent in the earnings
density and is therefore substantially less convincing than the residual bunching in the SSA
data at ages 70-71. Thus, we do not wish to rely on the finding of residual bunching in the
year 2000; instead, we consider this evidence to be merely suggestive of a small amount of
residual bunching.
However, a number of facts are clear. First, in at least some contexts—i.e. when aging
out of the AET at age 70, apparently after the policy change in 1990 that we discuss later,
and quite possibly after the policy change in 2000 (though to a smaller extent)—earnings
adjustment frictions prevent some individuals from reacting immediately to the removal of
a kink. Second, both when changes are anticipated (i.e. the changes in policy across age)
and unanticipated (i.e. the policy change in 2000), adjustment occurs fairly rapidly, with
the vast majority occurring within a maximum of three years. It is interesting to note that
adjustment appears to be faster in the case in which the change is unanticipated than in the
34Since the sample size is much larger in the LEHD than in the MEF, it makes sense that we could
estimate a small but statistically significant amount of bunching in the LEHD but not in the MEF in 2000.
In principle, residual bunching in 2000 could also reflect individuals who earned money until their earnings
reached the exempt amount (in a month prior to October). However, we also investigated the speed of
adjustment from quarterly earnings data in the LEHD. (We do not primarily rely on these quarterly data
because the AET is assessed yearly, and thus individuals can appear to bunch at the quarterly kink—defined
as one-quarter of the earnings level associated with the kink in each year—even though their yearly earnings
does not put them at the kink, or vice versa.) These data show a small but significant (p < 0.01) amount
of bunching in each quarter of 2000 and in the first two quarters of 2001 but no significant bunching in
subsequent quarters.
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anticipated case. While this may be surprising, many other differences between the two sets
of changes—including differences in the degree to which the changes are publicized, the ages
affected, the calendar year, and the distribution of individuals’ earnings—could be respon-
sible for the discrepancy in the speed of adjustment. As we observe only a small number
of changes in AET policy and confront several candidate explanations for heterogeneity in
the speed of adjustment, we do not explicitly try to distinguish among these explanations.
2.5.3. Other Evidence Relating to Bunching
Figure 8 shows that there is no sharp change in the amount of bunching around the increases
in the Delayed Retirement Credit in 1972 or 1982. We consider this suggestive—but not
definitive—evidence of little discernable reaction to policy changes in benefit enhancement
(particularly in light of our other results suggesting fast adjustment). A general downward
trend in the amount of excess bunching is discernable in the 1990s—with the notable ex-
ception of a number of years, including 1995—which is coincident in the rise in the DRC
through this period. However, we cannot conclusively attribute this potential trend to the
influence of the DRC, as it could be due to other factors that changed over this period.35
We discuss adjustment to the decrease in the AET marginal tax rate from 50 percent to
33.33 percent in 1990 later.
We also conduct a variety of robustness tests. Appendix Figure 23 uses a bandwidth of
$500 instead of $800, which changes our estimates little (as have other bandwidths we have
chosen). In Appendix Figure 24, we vary the degree of the polynomial we use between 6 and
8, which shows similar results; other sufficiently rich polynomials we have tried have also
shown similar results. In Appendix Figure 25, we vary the region near the kink we exclude
when estimating the amount of excess bunching (from $2,000 to $3,000 to $4,000) and again
estimate similar results. Limiting the sample to those who have substantial benefits (such
35For example, the AET threshold amount rose much faster in the 1996-1999 period than in the previous
period. It is possible that this helps to explain the decrease in the amount of bunching observed in these
years, as individuals may find it difficult to adjust earnings to a rapidly-increasing kink. Meanwhile, as we
discuss later, the fall in excess bunching after 1990 may relate to adjustment to the reduction in the benefit
reduction rate in 1990.
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as those with $1,000 or higher in benefits)—so that they are safely far from the concave
kink in the budget set created when the AET reduces OASI benefits to zero—also yields
very similar results.
Appendix Figure 26 shows that both men and for women bunch at the kink (though in-
terestingly, men show more bunching than women). Previous work has demonstrated very
different patterns of bunching among the self-employed and non-self-employed (Chetty et al.,
2011) and has shown that bunching at the kink in response to the Earned Income Tax Credit
is primarily driven by the self-employed (e.g. Chetty et al. (2013)). Appendix Figure 27
shows histograms for those with self-employment income in 1990-1999—who are excluded
from our main sample—who also show an increase in the earnings density near the kink.
2.6. Mechanisms
This section probes the mechanisms that underlie patterns of adjustment to the AET, exam-
ining which parts of the earnings distribution adjust to AET changes, whether adjustment
relates to age at death, and whether employers or employees drive responses to the AET.
2.6.1. Who Adjusts?
We investigate who adjusts to the AET using the large sample sizes in the LEHD data, which
allow us to estimate parameters precisely in relatively small population groups. Specifically,
we examine how earnings change as the AET is removed from age 69 to age 70 during 1990-
1999, when the AET applied to individuals aged 62-69. As in Appendix Figure 16, Appendix
Figure 28 shows the mean percentage change in earnings from age 69 to age 70 (y-axis),
against earnings at age 69 (x-axis). The graph shows a large spike at the kink: individuals
locating near the kink at age 69 on average increase their earnings substantially from age 69
to age 70.36 Recent literature has documented responses to kinks not captured by bunching,
36The increase near the kink is significantly higher than that in adjacent bins (p < 0.01). This spike in
earnings growth is interesting in part because it directly documents responses to policy along the intensive
margin, which is often found to be very inelastic (e.g. Eissa and Liebman (1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum
(2001)). When we examine earnings growth in year t + 1 by earnings at year t, for ages t younger than 69
we do not observe such a spike at the kink.
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including Chetty et al. (2013) in the context of the EITC and Kline and Tartari (2013) in
the context of the Connecticut Jobs First program. In the context of the AET, our evidence
shows that responses to incentives appear to be concentrated among a group of bunchers at
the kink, with little apparent response among others (though we cannot rule out that such
changes occur in ways we do not capture, such as responses over a longer time frame).37
This finding suggests that individuals locating near the kink at age 69 are different than
other individuals at the same age. Indeed, the AET applies not only to claimants locating
at the kink, but also to claimants initially locating above the kink. Thus, if those initially
locating at the kink had the same elasticity and adjustment cost as others, we might have
expected to see a large increase in earnings in a substantial range of earnings above the
kink, as well. The fact that we do not observe this pattern is suggestive of heterogeneity
in adjustment costs or elasticities.38 For example, those initially locating at the kink may
have low adjustment costs and react to the AET removal quickly, but those who do not
bunch at the kink to begin with may have higher adjustment costs.39
In Appendix Figure 29, we show that individuals at the kink tend to follow the kink from
year to year. We graph the probability of being at the kink in year t + 1, as a function of
earnings in year t. There are clear spikes at the kink for ages 62-63 and ages 65-68, showing
that individuals at the kink in year t are disproportionately likely to be at the kink again
the next year.40 We interpret this as further suggestive evidence that certain individuals are
37We further partially addressed the possibility of bunching over a different range by varying the bandwidth
that we chose for estimating excess bunching.
38The income effect of the AET also rises with income, which would also lead the mean percentage earnings
change to fall as income rises (under the assumption that leisure is a normal good). However, the income
effect rises only gradually, whereas the mean percent earnings increase quickly falls just to the right of the
exempt amount and remains relatively constant at this lower level as earnings rises—consistent with the
hypothesis that those initially locating at the kink are more responsive to the AET. In fact, the data suggest
that income effects (if any) are sufficiently small that they do not cause a noticeable systematic decrease in
the mean percentage change in earnings as we move increasingly far to the right of the kink.
39The observed pattern is also consistent with such heterogeneity in elasticities or income effects.
40The probability of being near the kink in year t+ 1 is significantly higher (p < 0.01) for those near the
kink in year t than in adjacent bins of the year t earnings distribution. For those aged 58-60, who should
not be affected by the incentives to bunch at the kink, no such spike occurs—demonstrating that the spike
at the kink for ages subject to the AET is not simply an artefact of the natural evolution of the earnings
distribution (absent the AET). We define the ”placebo” kink for individual aged 58-60 as the kink affecting
those aged 62-64.
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particularly responsive to the incentives created by the kink, in the sense that they serially
bunch at the kink.
To understand which part of the earnings distribution is affected by the AET, we examine
more closely how the distribution of earnings differs across adjacent ages that face different
AET incentives. Appendix Figure 30 stacks the distributions of earnings at ages 60, 61,
and 62, as well as 69, 70, and 71. The earnings distribution changes modestly from year
to year due to factors unrelated to the AET, as shown in the Figure from ages 60 to 61.
However, the age-62 distribution shows a sharply different pattern than the age-60 or 61
distributions, with a sharp spike at the kink (particularly to the left of the kink), a higher
density immediately to the right of the kink, and generally a lower density at earnings
levels starting several thousand dollars above the kink.41 Similarly, the age-69 earnings
distribution shows a sharply higher earnings density than the age 70 distribution in the
immediate region of the kink (particularly to its left) but shows a lower density than age
70 at higher earnings levels, eventually reaching a similar earnings density starting around
$6,000 above the kink.42 We return to this pattern of adjustment when discussing our model
of fixed adjustment costs below.
Finally, it is possible that those with short expected lifespan could disproportionately bunch
near the kink: the DRC should increase lifetime benefits more for claimants with longer
life expectancy, which could lead the AET to be a larger effective tax on those with shorter
lifespans (though as we note, the DRC only takes effect at earnings substantially above the
exempt amount). In Appendix Figure 31, we show graphs illustrating that life expectancy is
smooth near the kink (not significantly different from adjacent bins), suggesting no evidence
for such a mechanism.
41The age-61 distribution of earnings conditional on locating in the vicinity of the kink at 62, and the
age-70 distribution of earnings conditional on locating in the vicinity of the kink at age 69, show similar
patterns.
42Some adjustment to the removal of the AET continues to occur after age 70; the evolution of the income
distribution from, for example, age 69 to 72 shows similar patterns.
77
2.6.2. Employers and the AET
We use the LEHD data to investigate whether employers play a role in mediating responses
to the AET. Chetty et al. (2011) argue that employers drive a significant share of the
bunching at kink points observed in Denmark. In their context, some individuals bunch at
kinks even though they are not directly subject to the policy that creates the kink. Chetty
et al. conclude that these individuals bunch at the kink because employers create jobs that
have those earnings levels. In other words, some individuals bunch at kinks because their
employers present them a limited equilibrium menu of earnings levels (including the kink
earnings level), and they would face costs of adjusting earnings to a different level.
We explore this possibility by testing for bunching among workers who are too young to
claim OASI benefits and are therefore unaffected by the AET. Above, we have presented
evidence indicating that in 1990-1999, individuals at ages earlier than those subject to
the AET show little evidence of bunching at the AET kink. Thus, during this period,
the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that responses to the AET are driven by
employees’ choices.43
We extend this analysis by estimating bunching over the entire age distribution in the
pre-1972 period, when the DRC did not exist, as Appendix Figure 32 shows. Appendix
Figure 32 shows a small amount of statistically significant excess bunching at some ages
younger than those subject to the AET (though not at other ages), suggesting that some
employers do coordinate employment responses in this way in the pre-1972 period—though
this behavior is small in the aggregate.44
In Appendix Figure 33, we graph the probability that individuals change at least one em-
43It is possible that employers drive some of the bunching at ages older than those subject to the AET,
but we might then expect some degree of employer earnings coordination on the AET exempt amount for
ages younger than 62 (and older than 70, including ages 72 and above).
44Figure 32 bins three adjacent years of ages (e.g. 18 to 20); doing so in the post-1971 period shows no
statistically significant bunching in pre-62 age bins. While individuals could in principle be locating at the
kink prior to age 62 in anticipation of facing the AET later, it seems unlikely that they would do so as early
as their late 30s, when a small amount of statistically significant bunching first appears—around 25 years
before they are first eligible for OASI.
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ployer from age t to age t+ 1, against earnings at age t (during 1990-1999 period). At ages
when people face the AET, the probability that individuals change jobs across employers
is sharply lower for individuals locating near the kink at age t than for individuals with
other initial earnings levels.45 The probability of changing employers is also sharply lower
at the kink when individuals transition from being subject to the AET at age 69 to being
no longer subject at age 70, and this is true when we limit the sample to those who increase
their earnings from age 69 to age 70. Those initially locating at the kink evidently have
sufficiently flexible pay arrangements that they can change their earnings from age 69 to
age 70 while typically staying at the same employer.46
2.7. Estimating Elasticities and Adjustment Costs
The results thus far suggest a role for adjustment frictions in individuals’ earnings choices
in some contexts. As a first step in incorporating frictions into an estimable model of
earnings supply, we build upon the Saez (2010) model (described briefly in the first sections
of Appendix A.11), which uses bunching to identify the elasticity of (taxable) earnings with
respect to the net-of-tax rate.47 We extend this model to allow for a cost of adjusting to
tax changes.48 We first develop the theory graphically to show how adjustment costs affect
bunching. Next, we show that using data on bunching at multiple kinks associated with
different jumps in the net-of-tax rate, we can jointly estimate elasticities and adjustment
costs. As discussed in Chetty et al. (2009), these parameters are jointly sufficient for welfare
calculations in many applications.
45The probability of changing employers near the kink is significantly lower than that in adjacent bins
(p < 0.01).
46Those locating at the kink might be different from other individuals for reasons—such as different
demographics—that lead them to switch across employers less frequently. It is worth emphasizing that we
attempt only to document the descriptive pattern that they change employers less frequently. We have also
found that the graph of the probability of changing employers at age 59-61 against earnings at age 69 is
smooth near the kink, suggesting that absent the AET incentives these individuals do not display noticeably
different behavior in this regard.
47Formally, the elasticity of earnings with respect to the net-of-tax rate is defined as ε ≡
− (∂z/ z)/ (∂τ/ (1− τ)).
48Following recent literature on bunching— Saez (2010); Chetty et al. (2009, 2011, 2012, 2013); Chetty
(2012); Kleven and Waseem (2013)— we specify a static model of earnings choice in each period. As we
discuss further in the Conclusion, dynamic considerations represent an important topic for future research.
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Our model relies on features of the empirical results that we have documented in the previous
two sections. We find evidence of adjustment frictions, which we model through a cost of
adjusting earnings. The empirical results also suggest that employees’ choices are primarily
responsible for patterns of bunching in the main period we study; this motivates a model in
which employees choose their earnings rather than a model in which employers coordinate
responses.
As described further in Appendix A.11, agents maximize utility u (c, z;n) over consumption
and earnings (where greater earnings are associated with greater disutility at the margin),
subject to a budget constraint c = (1− τ) z+R, whereR is virtual income and the parameter
n reflects the tradeoff between consumption and earnings supply.49 We assume that in order
to change earnings from an initial level, individuals must pay a fixed utility cost of φ∗. This
cost could represent the information costs associated with navigating a new tax regime if,
for example, individuals only make the effort to understand their earnings incentives when
the utility gains from doing so are sufficiently large (e.g. Simon (1955); Chetty et al. (2007);
Hoopes et al. (2013)). Alternatively, this cost may represent frictions such as the cost of
negotiating a new contract with an employer or the time and financial cost of job search,
assuming that these costs do not depend on the size of the desired earnings change.
We model a fixed cost in order to build on recent literature that has focused on fixed costs
(e.g. Chetty et al. (2011); Chetty (2012)). The distribution of earnings at ages 62 or 69
is higher in a region surrounding the kink but lower in a region substantially above the
kink than at ages 61 or 70, respectively, which is consistent with a simple model with fixed
adjustment costs that lead to a region of inaction and a region of adjustment.50 In Appendix
49We describe the model in more detail in Appendix A.11.
50However, even with a fixed adjustment cost, the AET could in principle cause some individuals to reduce
their earnings to levels just above the kink, which in principle could lead to a rise in the density to the right
of the kink due to the imposition of the AET. Moreover, the shape of the distribution of earnings at age
70 conditional on locating at the kink at age 69 cannot be predicted a priori, as it should depend among
other things on the correlation of the fixed cost of adjustment with the elasticity of earnings with respect
to the net-of-tax rate. For example, if individuals with low fixed costs of adjustment tend to have low
elasticities, then the conditional earnings distribution at age 70 should be closer to the kink on average than
if individuals with low fixed costs of adjustment tend to have high elasticities. As a result of these factors,
we cannot use the effect of the AET on such moments of the earnings distribution in estimating elasticities
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A.11.6, we extend our model to a case in which the cost of adjustment is linear in the size
of the adjustment.
We develop two different approaches for estimating elasticities and adjustment costs. Our
first approach, which we call the ”Comparative Static” method, relies on comparing bunch-
ing in two separate cross-sections of data. Our second approach, which we call the ”Sharp
Change” method, additionally relies on attenuation (due to adjustment costs) in the change
in bunching among individuals who face a change in the size of the kink over time. As we
explain, the Sharp Change method relates more directly to our observation that bunching
persists among individuals who formerly faced a kink. We begin by describing the Compar-
ative Static approach because it introduces concepts that the Sharp Change method builds
upon.
2.7.1. Estimation: Comparative Static Approach
The Comparative Static approach is best suited to estimating elasticities and adjustment
costs from two cross-sections of different individuals who face different policies. Figure 9
Panel A illustrates how a fixed adjustment cost attenuates the level of bunching. Recall
that our frictionless model predicts that bunchers have initial earnings (i.e. earnings in the
absence of a kink) in the range [z∗, z∗ + ∆z1]. Consider the person with initial earnings z1
(on the linear budget constraint with tax rate τ0). This individual faces a higher marginal
tax rate τ1 after the kink is introduced, which increases the marginal tax rate to τ1 above
earnings level z∗. Because she faces an adjustment cost, she could decide to keep her
earnings at z1 and locate at point 1. Alternatively, with a sufficiently low adjustment cost,
she would like to pay the adjustment cost and reduce her earnings to the kink at z∗ marked
by point 2. We assume that the benefit of relocating to the kink is increasing in distance
from the kink for initial earnings in the range [z∗, z∗ + ∆z1].51 These assumptions imply
and adjustment costs without making more stringent assumptions.
51In general, this requires that the size of the optimal adjustment in earnings increases in n at a rate faster
than the decrease in the marginal utility of consumption. This is true, for example, if utility is quasilinear.
We explore the implications of this assumption in Appendix A.11.5.
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that above a threshold level of initial earnings, z1, individuals adjust their earnings to the
kink, and below this threshold individuals remain inert. We have drawn this individual as
the marginal buncher who is indifferent between staying at the initial level of earnings z1
(at point 1) and moving to the kink earnings level z∗ (point 2) by paying the adjustment
cost φ∗.
In Panel B, we show that the level of bunching is attenutated due to the adjustment cost:
only individuals with initial earnings in the range [z1, z
∗ + ∆z1] bunch at the kink (areas
ii, iii, iv, and v)—whereas in the absence of an adjustment cost, individuals with initial
earnings in the range [z∗, z∗ + ∆z1] bunch (areas i, ii, iii, iv, and v). The amount of bunching
is equal to the integral of the initial earnings density over the range [z1, z
∗ + ∆z1]:
B1(τ 1, z
∗; ε, φ∗) =
∫ z∗+∆z1
z1
h (ζ) dζ. (2.1)
Bunching therefore depends on the preference parameters ε and φ∗, the tax rates below and
above the kink, τ1 = (τ0, τ1), and the exempt amount z
∗. The lower limit of the integral,
z1, is implicitly defined by the indifference condition drawn in Figure 9, Panel A:
φ∗ ≡ u ((1− τ1)z∗ +R1, z∗;n)− u ((1− τ1)z1 +R1, z1;n) (2.2)
where R1 is virtual income, and n is the ”ability” level of this marginal buncher. If the
marginal tax rate above z∗ were instead τ2, where τ0 < τ2 < τ1, then bunchers would
be comprised only of individuals with initial earnings in the range [z2, z
∗ + ∆z2] (area iii),
which is again attenuated relative to bunching under a frictionless model (areas i, ii, and iii).
This generates a second expression for bunching and an indifference condition analogous to
2.1 and 2.2, respectively.
When we later perform our estimates, we make use of a minimum distance estimator de-
scribed in Appendix A.11.8 to solve this nonlinear system of equations. The key assumption
underlying that method is that utility is quasi-linear and isoelastic, which is common in the
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bunching literature (see Saez (2010); Chetty et al. (2011); Kleven et al. (2013); Kleven and
Waseem (2013), for example). 52 If we were to relax the assumption of quasilinearity, we
would need to observe wealth, which is not available in the data.
Intuition and Tractable Approximation
To build intuition regarding our minimum distance estimation procedure, and to derive an
expression relating the elasticity and adjustment cost to the level of bunching that can be
easily solved in closed form, we can use a series of approximations to specify a simple system
of linear equations. Let b ≡ B/h(z∗), i.e. the amount of bunching scaled by the density of
earnings at z∗ when there is no kink. Also assume that h(z) is uniform and equal to h(z∗)
in the range between z and [z∗ + ∆z1]. We show in Appendix A.11.6 that scaled bunching
is approximately:
b1(τ 1, z
∗; ε, φ) = ε
(
z∗
dτ1
1− τ0
)
− φ
(
1
dτ1
)
, (2.3)
where dτ1 = τ1 − τ0 and φ = φ∗/uc is the dollar equivalent of the adjustment cost. This
equation shows intuitive comparative statics: All else equal, bunching is increasing in the
elasticity, decreasing in the adjustment cost, and increasing in the size of the tax change
at the kink. This generalizes and nests the formula developed in Saez (2010), which is
equivalent in the case in which there is no adjustment cost. Because the amount of bunching
is decreasing in the adjustment cost, constraining φ = 0 and using the Saez (2010) will in
general weakly underestimate the elasticity in a single cross-section, since attenuation in
bunching is attributed to a small elasticity rather than to the adjustment cost. Note that the
expository derivation in (2.3) does not impose quasilinearity but uses the uniform density
assumption and a first-order approximation for utility in the neighborhood of the kink.
Equation (2.3) also shows the features of the data that allow us to identify ε and φ. We
need to observe bunching at two or more kinks, with variation in the change in tax rate dτ1.
52As explained in Appendix A.11.8, in a baseline we also assume that the density of initial earnings h (z)
is uniform over the range [z∗, z∗ +4z∗] (as in Chetty et al. (2011) or Kleven and Waseem (2013)), but we
alternatively use a lognormal distribution of earnings based on those aged 61 (who are similarly aged but
do not face the AET) and find similar results.
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If we observe bunching at exactly two kinks of different sizes, then we can solve for ε and φ
exactly, as we then have a system of two equations and two variables. More generally, we
could estimate a regression of b on z∗ (dτ1/ (1− τ0)) and −1/dτ1, with the constant omitted.
The coefficient on the first term is ε, and the coefficient on the second term is φ.
Intuitively, with only a single cross-section of data, the amount of excess bunching increases
in the elasticity and decreases in the adjustment cost, and thus it is not possible to identify
both. Suppose that instead we have two cross-sections of data featuring different changes
in marginal tax rates at the kink. The difference in the amount of bunching from one
cross-section to the other will also depend on the elasticity and adjustment cost.53 Phrased
differently, the Saez (2010) formula describes how bunching should vary between two differ-
ent kinks in a frictionless model, and the extent to which observed bunching deviates from
this pattern is attributed to the adjustment cost. Let K1 and K2 be two kinks that involve
jumps at z∗ in the marginal tax rate of dτ1 = τ1 − τ0 and dτ2 = τ2 − τ0, respectively, and
assume dτ2 < dτ1. Relative to the frictionless case represented by the Saez model, under
the Comparative Static method, the change in bunching from K1 to K2 is larger. In the
frictionless model, bunchers comprise areas i, ii, iii, iv, and v in Figure 38 under K1 and
areas i, ii, iii under K2 (thus decreasing by areas iv and v). Under the Comparative Static
method, bunchers comprise areas ii, iii, iv, and v under K1 and area iii under K2 (thus
decreasing by areas ii, iv, and v, rather than by only areas iv and v in the frictionless case).
Heterogeneity in Elasticities and Fixed Costs of Adjustment
Our empirical results suggest heterogeneity in the elasticity and the fixed cost of adjustment,
as some individuals are more responsive to removal of the AET than others. Let (εi, φi, ni)
be jointly distributed according to a smooth CDF G (·), which translates into a smooth,
joint distribution of elasticities, fixed costs and earnings H˜ (z, ε, φ). As shown in Appendix
A.11.6, assuming that the density of earnings, h˜ (z, ε, φ), is again constant over the interval
53Under the approximations above, (2.3) implies that ∂b
2
∂φ∂(dτ)
= 1
τ2
> 0; as φ increases, the marginal
impact of dτ on b increases.
84
[z, z∗ + ∆z∗], we derive a generalized formula analogus to equation (2.3):
b = ε¯
(
z∗
dτ1
1− τ0
)
− φ¯
(
1
dτ1
)
,
where ε¯ and φ¯ are the average elasticity and adjustment cost for those who bunch at the
kink.54
2.7.2. Estimation: Sharp Change Approach
The Sharp Change approach is best suited to estimating elasticities and adjustment costs
when we are examining a constant population that experiences a change in the marginal
tax rate at a kink (which may involve the kink disappearing), as we observe in our empirical
applications. Suppose we observe a population that moves from facing a more pronounced
K1 to facing a less pronounced kink K2 (as defined above). Adjustment costs prevent some
individuals from ”unbunching” from the kink, even though they would prefer to move away
from the kink in the absence of an adjustment cost. The fixed adjustment cost therefore
attenuates the change in bunching between two cross-sections in response to a reduction in
the size of the kink, relative to the Comparative Static approach.55
The first source of attenuation in the change is driven by individuals in area ii of Panel
B. They bunch under K1 and continue to bunch after transitioning to K2. The reason is
that the frictionless optimum under K2 is z
∗ for everyone initially earning in the range
[z∗, z∗ + ∆z2].
The second source of attenuation in the change is driven by individuals in area iv of Panel B.
Panel C of Figure 9 demonstrates this. At point 0, we show an individual’s initial earnings
z¯0 ∈ [z∗, z∗ + ∆z1] under a constant marginal tax rate of τ0. We now introduce the first
kink, K1. The individual responds by bunching at z
∗ at point 1. Next, we transition to
54We are grateful to Henrik Kleven for suggesting the approach that led to this derivation.
55If dτ2 > dτ1 instead – i.e. the kink becomes larger – then additional individuals will be induced to
bunch, but the change in bunching will in general be attenuated in the Sharp Change approach relative to
the Comparative Static approach (due to the adjustment cost). This is governed by an analogous set of
formulas to the case dτ2 < dτ1 that we explore.
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the muted kink K2. Note that since z¯0 > z
∗ + 4z2, this individual would have chosen
earnings z¯2 > z
∗ (marked as point 2) under τ2, if we had gone directly from no kink to
K2.
56 However, in order to move to point 2, this individual must pay a fixed cost of φ∗.
We have drawn this individual as the marginal buncher who is indifferent between staying
at z∗ and moving to z¯2. All individuals with initial earnings in the range [z∗ + ∆z2, z¯0] will
remain at the kink.
Thus, bunching under K2 is:
B2(τ 2, z
∗; ε, φ∗) =
∫ z¯0
z1
h (ζ) dζ. (2.4)
It follows that the absolute value of the change in bunching from K1 to K2 under the Sharp
Change approach (area v in Panel B) will be smaller than under the Comparative Static
approach (areas ii, iv and v). As discussed in Appendix A.11.7, ε is still identified by
the adjustment of the top-most buncher: ε = z¯0−z¯2z¯2
(1−τ0)
dτ2
. The critical earnings level z¯2 is
defined implicitly by the indifference condition in Panel C:
φ∗ ≡ u ((1− τ2)z¯2 +R2, z¯2; n¯)− u ((1− τ0)z∗ +R0, z∗; n¯) . (2.5)
As before, our estimates use the minimum distance estimator described in Appendix A.11.8
to solve the system of nonlinear equations defined by (2.1), (2.4), and (2.5). Intuitively,
we rely on a before-and-after comparison of bunching at the same kink, once the jump in
marginal tax rates has been reduced. Inertia generates an excess amount of bunching in the
period after the policy change. In the extreme case in which a kink has been eliminated, we
can attribute any residual bunching to adjustment costs. The amount of residual bunching
at the kink, in combination with the amount of bunching prior to the change in the jump in
MTRs at the kink, therefore helps to identify both the elasticity and the adjustment cost.57
56Note that in general z¯2 may be different from z2.
57An approximation explained in the Appendix also helps to build intuition.
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Relative to the frictionless case represented by the Saez model, the change in bunching from
the larger kink K1 to the smaller kink K2 is attenuated under the Sharp Change method by
the adjustment cost (in contrast to the Comparative Static method). As noted above, in the
Saez model, bunching decreases by areas iv and v in Figure 38 when moving from K1 to K2.
Under the Sharp Change method, areas ii, iii, iv, and v bunch under K1, whereas areas ii,
iii, and iv bunch under K2. Thus, bunching decreases only by area v in the Sharp Change
method, rather than both areas iv and v in the frictionless case. The absolute value of the
decrease in bunching from K1 to K2 is decreasing in the adjustment cost—z¯0 is increasing
in the adjustment cost, and therefore area v is decreasing in the adjustment cost—helping
to provide further intuition for our estimation procedure.58
2.7.3. Estimates of Elasticity and Adjustment Cost
To estimate ε and φ, we separately examine several changes in the AET benefit reduction
rate, including a reduction in the rate in 1990; the elimination of the AET from ages 69
to 70; and the elimination of the AET in 2000. Our Sharp Change method is applicable
in all of these contexts, as we observe a group from before to after these changes in policy.
By contrast, the Comparative Static method is more applicable to analyzing changes in
bunching when comparing two different groups each with positive (but different) marginal
tax rates.
Estimating ε and φ requires estimates of the implicit marginal tax rate that individuals
face. This requires estimates of both the ”baseline” marginal tax rate, τ—the rate that
individuals near the AET threshold face in the absence of the AET due to federal and
state taxes—and estimates of the implicit marginal tax rate associated with the AET.
We begin by using a marginal tax rate that incorporates the effects of the AET BRR,
as well as the average marginal income and FICA tax rates (including federal and state
taxes).59 These estimates are predicated on correctly specifying the marginal tax rate (net
58As in the Comparative Static approach, the amount of bunching at K1 is increasing in the elasticity
(ceteris paribus) under the Sharp Change approach.
59Using TAXSIM and the Statistics of Income individual tax return files, we calculated the mean of the
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of benefit enhancement), but recall that Appendix A.7 shows that benefit enhancement is
not relevant to an individual’s marginal incentives for earning an extra dollar near the AET
exempt amount. This assumption is also consistent with the methodology of Friedberg
(1998, 2000), who treats the AET as a pure tax. Moreover, as we have noted, the evidence
shows little systematic bunching reaction to changes in the DRC. We vary these assumptions
in various dimensions, which show similar results to the baseline: we exclude FICA taxes
in the calculation of the baseline tax rate,60 and we alternatively assume that the benefit
enhancement corresponds to a reduction in the effective marginal tax rate.61
Before turning to our empirical estimates, we begin with graphical depictions of the patterns
driving the estimates. Figure 8 shows excess bunching among 66-69 year-olds, for whom the
BRR fell from 50 percent to 33.33 percent in 1990.62 Excess bunching fell slightly from 1989
to 1990 but fell more subsequent to 1990.63 For comparison, Appendix Figure 21 shows
that bunching stayed relatively constant—both in 1990 and subsequently—for the 62-64
year-old group that experienced no policy change in 1990. While this group faces a notch
at the exempt amount rather than a kink (as explained above), the relative comparison is
instructive.
Appendix Figure 34 shows that the elasticity we estimate using the Saez (2010) method—
constraining the adjustment cost to be zero—rises sharply from 1989 to 1990. This relates
directly to our Sharp Change theory, which predicts that following a reduction in the change
in the MTR at the kink, there may be excess bunching due to inertia (corresponding to
area iv in Figure 9, Panel B).64 Once we allow for an adjustment cost, this excess bunching
sum of federal and state marginal income and FICA tax rates for people with positive Social Security benefits
and earnings within $2000 of the kink, in the same years as the data we examine. For example, when we
examine data from 1989 and 1990, we calculate marginal tax rates in these years. The results are not
sensitive to other such choices.
60Liebman et al. (2009) show that labor supply reacts to OASI benefit rules, suggesting that individuals
may not perceive FICA taxes as pure taxes.
61Recall that in 1990, the DRC was not yet actuarially fair.
62The patterns around 1990 are extremely similar for the 67-68 year-old group that we focus on in our
estimates.
63The Delayed Retirement Credit changed from 3 percent to 4 percent over this period, which we take
account of in the specification in which we account for benefit enhancement.
64In the Conclusion, we discuss dynamic considerations that might subsequently cause residual bunching
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is attributed to optimization frictions. Indeed, in the Appendix we explain that the rise
(from just before to just after the policy change) in the elasticity that we estimate using
the Saez (2010) method is a telltale sign that we face an adjustment cost as modeled by the
Sharp Change method.65 In a context in which individuals have not yet had a chance to
adjust (and the effective marginal tax rate has fallen), frictions may lead to larger elasticity
estimates. Interestingly, this is in some sense the opposite of the usual presumption that
adjustment frictions should lead to attenuation of elasticity estimates. Our finding also
contrasts with the usual presumption that in the presence of adjustment frictions, smaller
variation in taxes (i.e. smaller kinks) yield smaller elasticity estimates.
Table 11 presents our results from the Sharp Change method, examining the 1990 change.
We estimate an elasticity of 0.23 in Column (1) and a positive adjustment cost of $152.08 in
Column (2), both significantly different from zero (p < 0.01). This specification examines
data in 1989 and 1990; thus, our estimated adjustment cost represents the cost of adjusting
earnings in the first year after the policy change. When we constrain the adjustment cost
to zero using 1990 data in Column (3), as most previous literature has implicitly done, we
estimate a substantially larger elasticity of 0.39.66 Consistent with our discussion above,
it makes sense that the estimated elasticity is higher when we do not allow for adjustment
costs than when we do, as adjustment costs keep individuals bunching at the kink even
though tax rates have fallen. The difference in the constrained and unconstrained estimates
of the elasticity is substantial (69 percent higher in the constrained case) and statistically
significant (p < 0.01).
We also consider alternative specifications. Using a lognormal earnings density rather than
a uniform density (as described in Appendix A.11.8) changes the results little. Adjusting
to disappear. Our focus in the Sharp Change estimates is limited to the period just after a policy change,
before residual bunching has dissipated.
65Specifically, we show that if we actually face the Sharp Change model but mis-specify the model as a
frictionless (Saez, 2010) model, and we face a decrease in the jump in the marginal tax rate at the kink, the
estimated Saez (2010) elasticity will weakly rise from just before to just after this policy change.
66Friedberg (2000) finds uncompensated elasticity estimates of 0.22 and 0.32 in different samples. However,
differences in the estimation strategies imply that these results are not directly comparable to ours.
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the marginal tax rate to take account of benefit enhancement (applicable to those individu-
als to whom benefit enhancement is relevant to their earnings choices) raises the estimated
elasticity but yields similar qualitative patterns across the constrained and unconstrained
estimates. This makes sense: for the same behavioral response, if we assume a less pro-
nounced percentage change in the net-of-tax rate, we infer a larger elasticity. The next
rows show other specifications: excluding FICA taxes from the baseline tax rate; other
bandwidths; and other years of analysis. Our results are similar under these and other
variations.
In Appendix Table 37, we apply the Sharp Change method to the disappearance of the
kink at age 70 (in which context we find residual bunching in Figure 5) and find similar
(slightly higher) elasticity estimates and somewhat lower adjustment costs (though still in
the same range). The constrained estimate of the elasticity is smaller than the unconstrained
estimate; this makes sense, because we use data from age 69 to perform the constrained
estimate, and adjustment costs attenuate the constrained estimate at those ages because
they reduce bunching.
Appendix Tables 38, 39, and 40 present further specifications. In Appendix Table 38, we
apply the Sharp Change approach to the 1990 policy change but assume that bunching in
1989 is not attenuated by adjustment frictions (under the rationale that bunching could
have reached a ”steady state” in 1989 that is not attenuated by adjustment frictions).67 We
estimate results similar to the baseline. In Appendix Table 39, we use the Sharp Change
approach to estimate elasticities and adjustment costs using the disappearance of the kink
in the year 2000 for those NRA and above. Given our small point estimate of residual
bunching in 2000, it is unsurprising that we find small (though marginally significant)
67The notion that individuals are initially in a steady state in which they have been able to make desired
adjustments to the frictionless level of bunching is consistent with the observation that complete adjustment
occurs within a few years of policy changes—prior to 1990 the AET policy parameters had last changed in
1983—and with the observation that they face frictions in un-bunching despite initially bunching. Thus,
this estimate of the adjustment cost represents the cost of adjustment in the first year after a policy change,
under the assumption that individuals are able to make adjustments within a few years of the previous policy
change in 1983.
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adjustment costs.68
In Appendix Table 40, we apply the Comparative Static to the 1990 policy change. As
noted above, the Comparative Static method is most applicable to performing estimates on
unrelated cross-sections of individuals—rather than just before and just after a change in
policy as in our results on residual bunching.69 We use years 1989 and 1993 to make sure that
none of the 66-69 year-olds in 1993 were observed in 1989 (to avoid the possibility of residual
bunching at the kink among those initially bunching there).70 We again find elasticity
estimates in the same range, though with lower and typically insignificant adjustment costs.
The linear approximation (2.3) shows higher (but still modest) adjustment costs, and higher
elasticities than in the baseline specification (which makes sense because higher elasticities
are needed to reconcile the higher estimated adjustment cost with the observed change in
excess normalized bunching).
2.8. Conclusion
In the context of the Social Security Annual Earnings Test, we investigate the existence,
nature and size of earnings adjustment frictions. We develop several related findings. First,
we examine the speed of adjustment to the disappearance of convex kinks in the effective
tax schedule. We document evidence of delays in adjustment in certain contexts, consistent
with the existence of earnings adjustment frictions in the U.S. Nonetheless, we find that
adjustment to both anticipated and unanticipated policy changes is quite rapid, as the
vast majority of adjustment occurs within at most three years of budget set changes. This
suggests that in this context, long-run elasticities are similar to those estimated in a medium-
68We find smaller elasticities than in the baseline specification in part because normalized bunching was
relatively small (though still positive and significant) in 1999, as shown in Figure 8.
69The Comparative Static approach is inapplicable to years in which we observe residual bunching at a
former kink; in assuming zero marginal tax rate after a kink disappears, the Comparative Static method
effectively cannot explain this residual bunching. Thus, the Sharp Change method is more directly motivated
by our primary empirical observations.
70Because the Comparative Static approach examines separate cross-sections in 1989 and 1993 in our
application, the interpretation of the estimated adjustment cost is different than in the Sharp Change
approach (when it represented the cost of adjusting earnings within one year). Thus, there is no reason the
estimated adjustment cost should be equal in the Comparative Static and Sharp Change applications we
examine.
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run time frame of a few years.
Second, we investigate mechanisms that underlie the patterns of adjustment. Adjustment to
removal of kinks occurs primarily through substantial earnings growth among those initially
locating at the kink, suggesting that they are more responsive than others (due to some
combination of different elasticities or adjustment costs). We additionally investigate the
extent to which firms may help coordinate bunching. The responses appear to be driven
mainly by employees, as those under the minimum age subject to the AET do not bunch
at the AET kink during the primary period we examine. Additionally, the bunchers are
disproportionately likely to remain with the same employer while under the AET and when
responding to the removal of the AET. This combination of evidence suggests that the
bunching primarily results from the choices of certain particularly responsive employees
who choose themselves to vary their earnings, generally within the same firm.
Third, we specify a model of employees’ earnings adjustment consistent with these findings
and use it to estimate the earnings elasticity and the fixed adjustment cost. When we con-
sider the change in bunching associated with the reduction in the AET benefit reduction
rate from 50 percent to 33.33 percent for those above NRA from 1989 to 1990, we estimate
that the elasticity is 0.23 and the adjustment cost is $152.08. The results are typically
similar with other populations, time periods, and methods. When we constrain adjust-
ment costs to zero in the baseline specification, the elasticity we estimate in 1990 (0.39)
is substantially (69 percent) larger, demonstrating the potential importance of taking ac-
count of adjustment costs. Our estimates demonstrate the applicability of the methodology
and the potential importance of allowing for adjustment costs when estimating elasticities.
The modest adjustment cost we estimate parallels our empirical observation that bunching
responds rapidly to changes in policy.
The analysis leaves open a number of avenues of further inquiry. First, it would further
enrich the framework to extend the static analysis here to a dynamic model. We consider
our static framework for estimating elasticities and adjustment costs to be a natural first
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step in understanding estimation of these parameters (in the spirit of other static papers
such as Saez (2010); Chetty et al. (2009, 2011, 2012); Chetty (2012); Chetty et al. (2013);
Kleven and Waseem (2013)), but incorporating dynamic considerations is an important next
step. The speed at which individuals respond to changes in the AET, the nature of income
effects, and the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated changes—all of which we
have begun exploring in this paper—are three of several possible pieces of evidence that
could help in specifying a model of this sort (perhaps including a stochastic wage arrival
process, and incorporating the benefits over time to adjustment at a given time).
Second, further work distinguishing among the possible reasons for reaction to the AET
(such as misperceptions) remains an important issue. Third, further investigation of ex-
tensive margin and claiming responses to the AET would be valuable. Fourth, following
most previous literature, we have treated the adjustment cost as a ”black box,” without
modeling the process that underlies this cost, such as information acquisition or job search.
Future research could model such processes and distinguish these explanations using data.
Finally, the AET policy environment provides a useful illustration of many issues—such as
a methodology for estimating elasticities and adjustment costs simultaneously—that should
be applicable more broadly to studying adjustment to policy. As elasticities and adjust-
ment costs may be substantially different in other contexts, studying earnings adjustment
to other policies is a high priority.
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Figure 4: Key Earnings Test Rules, 1961-2009
Note: The right vertical axis measures the benefit reduction rate in OASI payments for every
dollar earned beyond the exempt amount. The left vertical axis measures the real value of the
exempt amount over time.
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Figure 5: Histograms of Earnings, 59-73-year-olds Claiming OASI by Age 65, 1990-1999
Notes: The bin width is $800. The earnings level zero, shown by the vertical lines, denotes the
kink. ”Claimant” refers to an individual who has claimed by age 65.
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Figure 6: Adjustment Across Ages: Normalized Excess Mass, 59-73-year-olds Claiming
OASI by Age 65, 1990-1999
Note: The figure shows normalized excess bunching from a one percent random sample of SSA
administrative data on Social Security claimants aged 59-73 between 1990 and 1999 (inclusive).
Normalized excess bunching is calculated as described in the text. The vertical lines in Panel B
show the ages at which the AET first applies (62) and the age at which the AET ceases to apply
(70). See other notes to Figure 5.
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Figure 7: Adjustment Across Years: Histograms of Earnings and Normalized Excess Mass,
66-69 year olds Claiming OASI by Age 65, 1996-2004
Note: The figure shows histograms of earnings from a one percent random sample of SSA
administrative data on Social Security claimants aged 66-69 in each year from 1996 to 2004
(inclusive). In 2000 and after, the (placebo) kink is defined as the kink applying to those in the
year of attaining NRA; as we mention in the text, the results are robust to two other ways of
defining this placebo kink. See other notes to Figure 5.
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Figure 8: Normalized Excess Bunching by Year, 1961-2005
Note: The figure shows normalized excess bunching from a one percent random sample of SSA
administrative data on Social Security claimants aged 66-69 in each year between 1961 and 2005.
See other notes to Figure 6.
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Figure 9: Bunching Responses to a Convex Kink, with Fixed Adjustment Costs
Note: See Section 2.7 for an explanation of the figures.
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Table 10: Summary Statistics, Social Security Administration Master Earnings File
(1) (2)
Ages 18-75 Ages 62-69
Mean Earnings 37,492.28 29,485.08
(282,940.03) (783,897.87)
10th Percentile 5,234.74 1,957.78
25th Percentile 15,291.11 7,291.21
50th Percentile 32,982.17 17,739.68
75th Percentile 46,949.86 38,149.90
90th Percentile 66,370.18 58,417.99
Fraction with Positive Earnings 0.50 0.57
Fraction Male 0.56 0.57
Observations 13,612,313 1,595,139
Individuals 619,580 545,615
Note: The data are taken from a one percent random sample of the SSA Master Earnings File and
Master Beneficiary Record. The data for ages 18-75 cover those in 1961-2005 who claim by age 65,
who do not report self-employment earnings, and who have positive earnings. (However, the
fraction with positive earnings is calculated by including those who have zero earnings.) Column 2
covers the same sample but limits the ages to 62-69, the group we examine most often. Earnings
are expressed in 2010 dollars. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. The standard
deviations are large because of very rare, abberrant large values of earnings (as documented in
Utendorf (2001/2)); these do not affect our estimates in the figures or tables because they are far
above the AET exempt amount. These abberant values affect mean earnings far less than they
affect the standard deviation. The results are robust to winsorizing.
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Table 11: Estimates of Elasticity and Adjustment Cost Using Sharp Change Method
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ε φ ε|φ = 0
1990 1989
Baseline 0.23 $152.08 0.39 0.22
[0.20, 0.27] [49.54, 382.94] [0.33, 0.48] [0.18, 0.26]
Lognormal density 0.26 $165.76 0.43 0.24
[0.22, 0.30] [45.57, 473.52] [0.35, 0.54] [0.19, 0.29]
Benefit Enhancement 0.39 81.52 0.59 0.37
[0.33, 0.45] [18.11, 245.88] [0.49, 0.73] [0.30, 0.43]
Excluding FICA 0.32 $129.14 0.50 0.30
[0.27, 0.36] [34.18, 360.97] [0.42, 0.62] [0.25, 0.35]
Bandwidth = $500 0.25 $90.65 0.38 0.24
[0.21, 0.30] [6.04, 319.69] [0.30, 0.50] [0.19, 0.30]
1988 to 1990 0.32 $114.33 0.50 0.31
[0.29, 0.35] [26.49, 307.96] [0.42, 0.62] [0.27, 0.34]
Note: The table shows estimates of the elasticity and adjustment cost using the Sharp Change
method described in the text. We report bootstraped confidence intervals shown in parentheses.
We investigate the 1990 reduction in the AET BRR from 50 percent to 33.33 percent. The baseline
specification assumes a uniform density, calculates the effective MTR by including the effects of
the AET BRR and federal and state income and FICA taxes, and uses data from 1989 and 1990.
Alternative specifications deviate from the baseline as noted. The estimates that include benefit
enhancement use effective marginal tax rates due to the AET based on the authors’ calculations
relying on Coile and Gruber (2008) (assuming that individuals are considering earning just enough
to trigger benefit enhancement). This translates the BRR before and after the 1990 policy change
to 36% and 24%, respectively. Columns (1) and (2) report joint estimates with φ ≥ 0 imposed
(consistent with theory, as described in the Appendix), while Columns (3) and (4) impose the
restriction φ = 0. The constrained estimate in Column (3) only uses data from 1990, whereas that
in Column (4) uses only data from 1989 (except in the row where we investigate data from 1988
and 1990, in which case Column 4 uses data from 1988). *** indicates that the left endpoint of the
99 percent confidence interval is greater than zero; ** indicates that this is true for the 95 percent
confidence interval; and * for the 90 percent confidence interval.
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CHAPTER 3 : Health Expenditure Risk and Annuitization: Evidence from
Medigap Coverage
How does health insurance affect annuitization? An emerging theoretical literature explores
the impact of medical expenditure risk on annuitization, but there is little consensus on the
quantitative importance of this channel. Using an instrumental variables strategy, this
paper measures the impact of supplemental Medicare insurance—Medigap—on the annuity
demand of the elderly.
An annuity is a financial product that provides a guaranteed stream of income for as long
as the purchaser lives; it therefore provides insurance against living too long. Economic
theory suggests strongly that elderly individuals should annuitize much of their wealth
(Yaari (1965); Davidoff et al. (2005)). At least for individuals without bequest motives,
annuities dominate bonds: Annuities provide a high payout while annuitants live, and the
forgone payout after death is irrelevant.
Despite their theoretical attractiveness, people in fact annuitize little (e.g. Brown (2007)).
A recent literature on health expenditure risk and annuity demand attempts to provide an
explanation for this under-annuitization puzzle. Health expenditure risk can help resolve
this puzzle, since health risk decreases the demand for annuities by driving up the value
of liquidity. Feenberg and Skinner (1994) and French and Jones (2004) show that the
elderly face substantial, fat-tailed, and highly autocorrelated medical expenditure risk, and
Palumbo (1999) and De Nardi et al. (2010) has a large impact on precautionary savings
among the elderly.
If health expenditures require large amounts of cash-on-hand, then annuities, with their slow
and steady payouts, would be unattractive relative to more liquid assets. The quantitative
importance of the health risk channel, however, is unclear. Sinclair and Smetters (2004),
Turra and Mitchell (2008) and Peijnenburg et al. (2011b) all find that medical expenditure
risk may decrease the demand for annuities. Pashchenko (2010) and Yogo (2011), however,
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suggest that this channel is quantitatively unimportant, and Peijnenburg et al. (2011a)
argue that full annuitization remains optimal even in the presence of medical expenditure
risk. Pang and Warshawsky (2010) argue that medical expenditure risk actually increases
annuity demand. Theory is therefore ambiguous about the importance of health expenditure
risk for (under-) annuitization.
Much of what we know about the impact of health risk on annuitization comes from cal-
ibrated or estimated structural models. Solving these models requires making untested
assumptions about the functional forms for utility and for the distribution of medical ex-
penditure risk, and especially about the institutional structure of retirement financing. The
impact of health expenditure risk on annuitization, in particular, appears to depend for
example, on the level of the government-provided insurance floor, on the timing of annuity
purchases, and on the link between the mortality credit in the annuity market and the
equity premium. The theoretical results are sensitive to assumptions which prove difficult
to verify, as evidence by the diverse conclusions in this literature.
In this paper, I take an alternative approach to measuring how medical expenditure risk
affects annuitization: I directly estimate the impact of health insurance on annuity demand.
If indeed medical expenditure risks loom large, then health insurance should complement
annuitization. I focus on Medicare Supplemental Insurance, i.e. Medigap insurance, a regu-
lated health insurance product that provides extra coverage beyond Medicare. In principle
health insurance coverage can have two distinct effects on annuity demand. First, it may
reduce the need for liquid assets, encouraging annuity demand. Second, if health insurance
increases access to health care, then it may extend life and therefore also increase the value
of an annuity. While Card et al. (2009) show that Medicare reduces mortality for heart
attack victims, it is unlikely that the supplemental financial coverage provided by Medigap
is life extending. My results are therefore most likely informative about the importance of
liquidity risk for annuity demand.
Estimating the impact of Medigap on annuitization is difficult, however, because health
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insurance is endogenous. The demand for insurance depends on wealth, risk preferences,
and riskiness, and all of these factors also affect savings decisions independently. Indeed,
Fang et al. (2008) show that considerable selection characterizes the Medigap market. To
address this selection, I use an instrumental variables strategy, using the zip-code level price
of Medigap as an instrument for coverage, conditioning on extensive controls for health,
wealth, and preferences.
For this empirical strategy to succeed, I require that Medigap prices, conditional on other
controls, be uncorrelated with underlying determinants of the demand for annuities. As
I argue in Section 3.1, the institutional features of the Medigap market suggest that this
condition may be satisfied. By law, Medigap insurance cannot be medically underwritten
for individuals purchasing it at age 65. Prices in a given year thus may depend only on the
buyer’s location, age, sex, and smoking status. While insurers might charge prices based
on average health in an area, it is plausible to assume that, conditional on an individual’s
own health and sex, the price of health insurance that she faces is uncorrelated with her
underlying annuity demand. The variation in insurance prices underlying my estimates
comes from variation in local spending habits that is plausibly unrelated to the individual’s
demand for health, wealth, or preferences, and therefore unrelated to her annuity demand.
My empirical strategy requires data on both Medigap prices and annuity data. In Section
3.2, I discuss the data used in this study. I merge zip-code level data on Medigap prices with
data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) on annuity holdings as well as health,
wealth, and preferences. The HRS has excellent, detailed information on annuity income
and on health, wealth, and even risk preferences and mortality expectations, making it an
excellent setting for exploring annuity demand.
As I show in Section 3.3, there is a very strong and visually clear first stage relationship
between Medigap prices and Medigap coverage. Across specifications that include increas-
ingly detailed controls, I estimate a stable price elasticity of demand for Medigap coverage
of about -1.4, with large F-statistics that allay weak instrument concerns. The first stage
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is not robust, however, to controlling for state fixed effects, because these controls absorb
almost all the variation in the instrument. An important weakness of this empirical strat-
egy, therefore, is that I cannot control for unobserved state-level factors affecting Medigap
prices and annuity demand. Nonetheless in Section 3.5, I show that the main results are
robust to the inclusion of controls for state-level Medicare spending or Medicaid generosity,
suggesting that neither overall medical spending patterns nor social insurance generosity
drive my results.
As long as the variation in Medigap price is orthogonal to unobserved determinants of
annuity demand, I can use Medigap price variation to estimate the impact of Medigap
coverage on annuitization. I present two pieces of evidence verifying this identification
assumption. First, I show that health insurance prices appear uncorrelated with individual
demographics, health, or preferences, conditional on the pricing variables (age, year, sex,
and smoking). Second, I implement a placebo test on retirees with employer provided
health insurance, and find that their annuity demand is unrelated to the price of Medigap,
suggesting that Medigap prices do not reflect unobserved determinants of annuity demand.
In Section 3.4, I examine the impact of Medigap coverage on three measures of annuity
demand. First I show that the overall elasticity of annuity income—defined as income
from any employer pension or any annuity—with respect to Medigap coverage is about
0.85. Because a large fraction of my sample has zero annuity income, I also examine
the extensive margin response of annuity income to Medigap. I find an extensive margin
elasticity of about 0.5, suggesting that more than half the response of annuity demand
to health insurance occurs through the extensive margin. An alternative interpretation of
these numbers is that the cross price elasticity of demand for annuity income with respect
to the price of Medigap is about -1.3, with an extensive margin cross price elasticity of
about 0.78.
While this measure of annuity income has the virtue of capturing all (non-Social Security)
retirement income sources, including defined contribution pension or 401(k) plan balances
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taken as annuities, it may be too broad. Some pensions and annuities provide a guaranteed
payout for a limited number of years, but do not provide a mortality credit. To see whether
“true” annuities respond to Medigap coverage, I look at whether retirees report any income
from annuities that last until death and then stop. I find that these true annuities are
particularly responsive to Medigap coverage, with an extensive margin elasticity of about
0.9, although this is less precise. These results are all robust to increasingly detailed controls
for wealth, health, and preferences, and in Section 3.5 I show that several alternative sets
of controls or sample definitions do not change the results.
The main contribution of this paper, therefore, is to provide direct empirical evidence on the
relationship between annuity demand and medical expenditure risk. To my knowledge, this
is the first paper to present empirical evidence on this question. It also contributes to the
large literature on precautionary savings among the elderly. Palumbo (1999) and De Nardi
et al. (2010) showed using structural models of retirement savings that medical expenditure
risk has a large impact on the savings among older Americans. Goldman and Maestas
(2012), using an empirical strategy similar to my own, showed that health expenditure risk
increases savings among elderly Americans. Thus this paper provides further evidence on
the importance of medical expenditure risk for the overall savings decisions of the elderly.
3.1. Background on Medigap insurance
Elderly Americans in the United States face several sources of medical expenditure risk.
Medicare does not cover long term care, and this shortcoming represents a serious financial
risk to the elderly (cf. Brown and Finkelstein (2007)). Moreover, the health insurance
provided by Medicare is incomplete because of its cost-sharing provisions. Medicare Part
A, which covers hospitalizations, requires patients to pay for the first day of hospitalization,
and Part B, which covers outpatient services, has a 20 percent coinsurance rate. Medicare
did not cover prescription drugs until the introduction of Part D in 2006, and the standard
benefit in Part D today includes substantial cost sharing with a deductible and a donut
hole with 100 percent coinsurance rate for expenditures above a certain amount.
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Seniors may buy supplemental insurance to fill in the holes in Medicare’s coverage. These
policies are called Medigap plans and they are tightly regulated by the federal government.1
Insurers may offer policies from a menu of 10 standardized plans, denoted by letters A
through J. CMS (2005) provides a detailed overview of the benefits of each plan letter. 2
All plans cover Part A coinsurance and at least part of the Part B coinsurance, but they
differ in their coverage otherwise. Because of this standardization, plans of a given letter
are not differentiated in their risk protection. They also likely offer uniform service quality.
While some health insurance plans might make limit the providers a beneficiary could use,
or make it difficult to submit claims, Medigap coverage applies automatically to Medicare
charges, suggesting no differentiation on this dimension. In this market, prices therefore
likely do not reflect differential quality. 3
A key feature of the Medigap market is that if individuals purchase policies at the time they
claim Medicare coverage, then insurers cannot use medical underwriting, nor can enrollment
be denied or delayed. That is, prices cannot directly depend on health. Prices, however, can
vary with sex, location, and over time.4 Many plans are also priced based on the buyer’s
age of purchase, so that individuals have a strong incentive to purchase a policy at age
65, and the price they face at age 65 is the price they will face for the rest of their life (if
they choose to renew their policies). These plans are called “age-issued.” Plans can also be
“attained-age,” in which case prices vary with age, or “community rated,” in which case
prices do not vary with age, but vary from year to year according to a local risk rating. I
focus on attained-age prices, because these prices at age 65 are likely to have a strong and
lasting influence on Medigap coverage throughout retirement.
1As discussed by Fang et al. (2008), the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, effective 1992, stan-
dardized Medigap plans and established the rules on medical underwriting described here. Individual states
began mandating uniform coverage several years earlier, however, and Finkelstein (2004) explores the impact
of these mandates.
2After my sample period, the menu of plans was expanded to 12.
3Starc (2012), however, argues that brand preferences and aggressive marketing are important features
of this market. If so, then some price differences across areas may reflect differences in brand penetration.
4Plans are also allowed to charge different prices to smokers, although in practice this is rare. I do not
use this price variation since in many zipcodes there are no plans that charge a different price to smokers.
Nonetheless in all results I control for smoking status, so that difference in prices (and hence my results) are
not driven by aggregate smoking tendencies.
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Insurers setting these prices are prohibited from underwriting based on individual health
or mortality expectations. The association between local prices at age 65 and long-term
Medigap coverage, along with the fact that prices cannot depend on individual-specific
health/wealth/mortality, motivates my instrumental variables identification strategy. Prices
in these markets depend instead on the underlying area-level demand for Medical care
(which I assume derive from from risk preferences, health, and wealth), and on competitive
conditions, i.e. differences in administrative costs or the number of active firms. Even
conditional on an individual’s demand for medical care, there is substantial variation in
prices, since insurance companies cannot perfectly risk adjust (or price discriminate). This
variation is plausibly orthogonal to individual annuitization propensities, so it may be useful
as an instrument.
3.2. Data: Weiss Ratings and the Health and Retirement Study
The data for this study come from two sources: the Health and Retirement Study conducted
by the University of Michigan, and a proprietary insurance pricing database created by
Weiss Ratings, Inc. The HRS provides information on demographics, preferences, wealth,
annuitization, and insurance coverage. I merge the HRS data at the zip code level to the
insurance pricing information.
3.2.1. Weiss Ratings Data
I use data from Weiss Ratings, Inc. on the price of Medigap policies. Weiss Ratings is a
market research firm that collects Medigap pricing information from firms in most states.
This dataset contains pricing information at the level of year-zip code-firm-plan letter, for
1998-2004. For every zip code it is possible to see every plan offered and the prices charged
by each company. There is a fair amount of price dispersion within zip code, as Maestas
et al. (2009) show, but very little dispersion in mean price across zip codes, within a state
(and given plan letter). Although in principle, prices can differ by sex, in practice mean
prices for men and women are extremely highly correlated within zip code (ρ ≈ 0.99). Prices
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are also highly autocorrelated over time. Most of the variation in prices, therefore, is within
zipcode or across states, but not across zipcodes within state.
I take the price of Medigap insurance as the mean within-zip code price of an attained-age
plan Plan A policy, allowing prices to differ by sex. There is little lost by using mean plan
Plan A price rather than a different plan’s price, or some combination of plan prices, since
the prices are highly correlated. For example, the correlation between plan Plan A prices
and plan Plan F prices is 0.95. Since the age 65 price determines the path of future prices,
I use the mean price of plan A plans in an individual’s zip code when she turns 65. In 2001,
Plan A was the third most popular plan, with 11% market share, behind Plan F (37%) and
Plan C (23%); no other plan had more than 10% market share (Kaiser Family Foundation,
2005). I use Plan A prices, however, because the first stage is slightly stronger for Plan
A than for Plan F or Plan C. Using a combination of prices does not strengthen the first
stage, because the prices are so highly correlated.
I exclude Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin from the analysis because these states
have their own set of Medigap plans, so the prices and policies are not comparable to those
in other states. I exclude Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, and New York because they
lack age-issued policies in the Weiss data. I also lack data on Arizona and Vermont for
2002-2004, and on Washington for 1999 and 2002-2004, but when I do have data for those
states, I include them in the analysis.
3.2.2. Health and Retirement Study
I merge the Weiss pricing data with data from the Health and Retirement Study on annuity
holdings, demograpics, wealth, health, and preferences. The Health and Retirement Study
is a longitudinal survey following older Americans. It began in 1992, collecting detailed
information about work, health, and wealth for a representative sample of the cohort born
between 1931 and 1941; this is the original “HRS” cohort. In subsequent years, the study
added additional cohorts born later and earlier; my analysis here focuses only on heads of
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household from the original HRS cohort. The HRS offers a wider range of variables than
other longitudinal datasets like the PSID or NLS, and these extra variables are essential
to the present study. The HRS also is designed to cover older Americans, the group most
likely to have annuity income. The HRS asks detailed questions about pension and annuity
income. Pension and annuity income consists of all income from private annuities or em-
ployer provided pensions, including both defined-benefit and defined-contribution pensions.
These variables are the main outcomes of interest. I also make use of the HRS’s extensive
health and preference information as additional controls.
The analysis sample is restricted to heads of household age 65 or older with Medicare
coverage and not covered by employer provided health insurance. This sample definition
follows Fang et al. (2008), who study Medigap demand extensively; like them, I exclude
observations with employer provided health insurance because I expect Medigap coverage
to be superfluous for these people. Unlike Fang, Keane and Silverman, I include Medicaid
recipients in the sample. While Medicaid coverage is more generous than Medigap, I include
these observations because, for my sample, Medicaid coverage may reflect the realization
of a severe health expenditure shock that drives assets to very low levels; I do not want to
exclude from my sample individuals who realize this risk. Nonetheless in Section 3.5 I show
that my results are robust to excluding these dual eligibles. I also exclude observations with
imputed values for pension/annuity income, and people with missing values for any of the
outcomes or controls. The final sample has 3,162 observations of 1,322 people.
Table 1 shows summary statistics on the key variables for the full sample and for the analysis
sample. All dollar amounts are in 2010-constant dollars. I present summary statistics
separately by whether the respondent has Medigap coverage, defined as having supplemental
insurance and receiving Medicare (again following Fang et al. (2008)). Thirty percent
of the sample has purchased Medigap policies. Relative to the uncovered, people with
Medigap coverage generally face lower Medigap prices, as expected. Table 1 also shows large
differences in annuity income by Medigap status: people with Medigap are more likely to
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have annuity income and have more annuity income, on average; they are also more likely
to have “true” annuity income, i.e. income from an annuity that lasts exactly until death.
These differences do not necessarily reflect the causal impact of Medigap coverage, however.
Medigap beneficiaries have fewer children and much higher permanent income than non-
beneficiaries. Permanent income is defined as average income prior to age 65. (De Nardi
et al. (2010) and Carroll and Samwick (1997) use a similar permanent income concept.)
Medigap beneficiaries are also in better health than non-beneficiaries. They are more likely
to report having very good or excellent health, and they are less likely to have had diabetes
or cancer. They have lower risk tolerance and expect to live longer.5 These differences reflect
some of the advantageous selection discussed in Fang et al. (2008). Thus determining the
impact of Medigap on annuitization requires addressing observed and, likely, unobserved
confounding.
3.3. Empirical strategy and first stage results
3.3.1. Empirical strategy
To deal with this endogeneity, I use local price variation in Medigap policies as an instrument
for Medigap coverage, conditioning on the individual-level characteristics that may might
affect savings decisions and correlate with local prices. To see why this strategy is necessary,
and why it might be successful, let yit be the outcome of interest for individual i at age t
and let Medigapit indicate Medigap coverage at t. I assume these variables are related as
follows:
yit = αMedigapit +Xitβ + εit, (3.1)
Medigapit = γ ln pricei +Xitθ + ωit. (3.2)
5Although in fact they report slightly lower probabilities of living to 85, relative to non-beneficiaries.
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The object of interest is α, the impact of Medigap on annuitization. X is a vector of
controsl affecting both prices and annuity demand, including the pricing variables (age,
sex, year, and smoking status) as well as other potential confounders. Annuitization deci-
sions, however, depend not only on health insurance coverage, however, but also on wealth,
preferences (i.e. risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution), and health
and mortality expectations. But since individuals choose whether to purchase insurance,
Medigapit depends on these variables as well, creating an endogeneity problem.
Using local Medigap prices as an instrumental variable potentially overcomes this problem,
since identification comes from variation in insurance prices that is plausibly orthogonal to
individual’ wealth, preferences, or health. That is, insurance prices are a function of aggre-
gate (zip-code) level variables only. These variables likely include aggregate (determinants
of) demand for medical care (and also medical care costs, administrative costs, and market
structure in the Medigap industry). Because similar individuals—i.e. individuals with the
same underlying demand for savings products—can live in zip codes with very different de-
mands for medical care, there is a great deal of variation in the price of Medigap coverage,
even conditional on annuitization propensities. Local prices can therefore isolate variation
in Medigap coverage, independent of health, wealth, or preferences.
One concern in using cross zip-code variation in Medigap prices, however, is that these
prices may be systematically correlated with zip-code level characteristics that directly
affect annuity demand.6 For example, it may be that areas in which people have unusually
high medical expenses have both high Medigap prices and high savings. In principle, people
might decide to live in a given zip code because it has low Medigap prices. Here the control
variables are useful: the threat to identification comes from the correlation between prices
and individual health, wealth, and preferences. But using the rich HRS data, I can condition
on these variables. To the extent that the results are robust to these controls, it is unlikely
6Medigap prices can affect annuity demand through income effects alone. However the typical Medigap
plan costs about $1000, a small fraction of total income, suggesting that these income effects are unlikely to
be important.
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that additional unobserved determinants of savings or annuity demand are also correlated
with local prices. The instrumental variables estimator therefore relies on variation in prices
across people with similar characteristics to identify the impact of insurance on savings or
annuitization.
In what follows, I show that, conditional on the variables that prices depend on, Medigap
prices are uncorrelated with demographics, permanent health, risk tolerance, or mortality
expectations. These results provide some reassurance of the validity of the instrument, since
Medigap prices appear uncorrelated with many individual-level determinants of annuity
demand. One remaining concern, though, is that high Medigap prices could reflect high
administrative costs for insurance companies in that region, and therefore high prices might
also signal high annuity prices (i.e. low returns); if so, this could bias estimates towards
finding a positive impact of Medigap coverage on annuitization.
Three considerations cast doubt on this possibility. First, in their analysis of annuity
premiums from a single large UK insurer in the 1980s and 1990s, Finkelstein and Poterba
(2004) report that firms set geographically uniform prices, despite important variation in
mortality across regions. This fact suggests that annuity premiums are not likely to be
systematically higher in areas with high Medigap prices. It is not clear, however, whether
the experience of that firm generalizes to the United States in the 1990s and 2000s.7 State-
level data on annuity prices would let me address this concern directly, but I am unaware
of any such data. As a second piece of evidence, I use premium data for several annuity
providers collected in 1995 by A.M. Best (examined by Mitchell et al. (1999)). I match
this pricing information to the provider’s state (as listed by A.M. Best in its ratings) and
correlate annuity premiums with state average Medigap premiums (in 1998, the earliest
year for which I have data). This exercise reveals that the correlation between the price of
a $10/month annuity and state Medigap price is virtually nil (-0.04).8 This procedure is of
7Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) write, “...like other firms in the market, [the firm we study] varies the
annuity price on the basis of only age and gender, and not on the basis of the individual’s geographic
location,” suggesting that this pricing practice is common at least in the UK.
8A.M. Best reports the monthly payout for a $1000 premium as offered by many providers. I convert this
113
course far from perfect, but it suggests there is very little geographic correlation between
Medigap prices and annuity premiums.
As a final piece of evidence, in Table 18 below, I present evidence from placebo test that
examines retirees with employer provided health insurance. Because these people do not buy
Medigap, the price of Medigap should not be correlated with their annuity demand, unless
it is correlated with some unobservable (such as annuity price) that also affects annuity
demand. The placebo results show that people with employer provided health insurance
do not respond to Medigap prices, providing further evidence that Medigap prices are not
correlated with annuity prices.
3.3.2. First stage results
Table 13 presents the first stage estimates of equation (2). Each column presents the
estimate γ obtained from using a different set of controls, as well as the F-statistic on
ln price, which provides a test of instrument strength. Column (1) reports estimates of γ
obtained with a basic set of controls. The basic controls are: year fixed effects, a quartic in
age, and indicators for smoking status, sex, race, marital status, and educational attainment
(high school, some college, and college or more), and dummy variables for having one, two,
or three or more children. These controls serve two functions. First, year, age, smoking
status, and sex are directly correlated with Medigap prices, since prices are set yearly and
have increased over time. To the extent that there are differences in annuity demand by age,
year, or sex, it is therefore important to control for these variables. Second, the demographic
variables are closely related to lifetime earnings potential and annuity demand–because they
may pick up differences in health, life expectancy, and preferences–and this may have a large
impact on both savings and demand for medical care (through income effects). Controlling
for these variables helps control for the correlation between local demand for medical care
(which influences Medigap prices) and own demand for annuities.
payout into a price (i.e. premium) per $10/month). The correlation between monthly payout and Medigap
price is 0.06.
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The coefficient on ln price is -0.43 and, with a standard error of 0.07, it is precisely estimated
and highly statistically significant. Here and throughout, all standard errors are clustered
at the individual level since I pool multiple years of data for each individual. The F-statistic
on ln price is 41.4, alleviating any concerns about a possible weak instrument. The sample
mean of Medigap is 0.30, implying an average elasticity of about -1.4, somewhat larger than
Starc’s (2012) estimate of an own price elasticity of demand for Medigap plans of about
-1.1.
Figure 10 provides the graphical analog of the first stage relationship. The figure shows
the non-parametric relationship between Medigap coverage and Medigap price, both net of
controls. To construct the figure, I regress Medigap coverage and ln price (separately) on
the age, year, smoking status, and the demographic controls, form the residuals, and then
estimate a local linear regression of residual Medigap coverage on residual ln price; this is
exactly the variation underlying the first stage regression. As the figure shows, there is a
clear and negative relationship between Medigap coverage and its price. This relationship
is strong and roughly linear across the full residual variation in ln price.
The basic controls adjust for standard demographic differences across people, but they may
control inadequately for aspects of annuity demand that are also correlated with local prices.
In column (2) I add controls for permanent income: a cubic in the log of permanent income,
plus log permanent income interacted with age. One concern with the identification strategy
is that, because health care and annuities are normal goods, high-income areas will have
high annuity demand and high Medigap prices. Controlling for permanent income addresses
this concern, and since the estimate of γ hardly changes, indeed there is little evidence that
own permanent income is closely related to Medigap demand or prices. Permanent income is
perhaps an indirect measure of lifetime wealth, but controlling for liquid wealth directly, for
example, would be inappropriate since liquid wealth is directly related affected by annuity
purchases. Nonetheless, in the robustness section below, I also control for liquid wealth
prior to retirement, and the results are unaffected.
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The next two columns control for health and then preferences more directly. In column
(3), I add controls for health: a set of indicators for health status (excellent, very good,
good, fair, or poor), as well as indicators for ever having one of several chronic diseases
or medical conditions (high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease,
stroke, or arthritis). In column (4) I control explicitly for the HRS’s measures of risk
preferences and mortality expectancy. The risk preference measures are the average value of
risk tolerance implied by a person’s answer, over several survey rounds, to questions about
large hypothetical gambles. (See Barsky et al. (1997).) Controlling for risk preferences
can be important if area-level variation in risk preferences induces low Medigap prices
while simultaneously inducing high annuitization. Fang et al. (2008) demonstrate that
advantageous selection is an important feature of the Medigap market, hinting at this
possibility. To control for mortality expectations, I take advantage of a pair of questions in
the HRS that asks respondents the probability that they live until age 75 or until age 85.
To correct for measurement and for the mechanical differences in mortality probabilities by
age, I regress individuals’ answer to these questions on age and person fixed effects. I take
the estimated person fixed effects as the measure of mortality expectations. As columns
(3) and (4) show, the first stage results are virtually unchanged by introducing health or
preference controls.
The first stage results are therefore highly robust to controlling for individual-level factors
that might be correlated with insurance prices while directly affecting savings. The main
results are similarly robust, as I show below. However, to the extent that permanent area-
level differences in preferences or health may be driving differences in prices across areas, the
most direct control is simply to include state (or zip code) fixed effects. As Maestas et al.
(2009) show, however, most of the geographic variation in Medigap prices is between (rather
than within) states; controlling for state fixed effects eliminates almost all the variation in
prices. The results in column (5), which control for state fixed effects, shows this clearly:
the coefficient on log price falls and its standard error increases. These state fixed effects
eliminate the first stage relationship because there is no variation remaining to (precisely)
116
identify γ. Indeed, if I regress the instrument on the other controls, I obtain an R2 of 0.91,
but when I include state fixed effects, the R2 rises to 0.97, implying that the state fixed
effects absorb about two-thirds the remaining variation in the instrument. Since the first
stage F-statistics are so low, state fixed effects cannot be used.
State fixed effects are important to the extent that state-level variables drive both Medigap
prices and annuity demand. One such possible variable is state-level Medicaid generosity.
In Table 19, I show that my results are robust to the inclusion of these policies. I also show
that when I include average state-level Medicare spending, the first stage F-statistic falls
considerably, although the main results are largely unaffected. This result confirms that
much of the variation in Medigap prices is due to aggregate spending patterns, and that
these patterns do not have a direct effect on annuity demand, or at least not a large one.
3.3.3. Assessing instrument validity
The first stage results are essentially unchanged when additional controls are included for
permanent income, health status, and preferences. This robustness provides a first hint
that the instrument may be valid: since these controls do not affect the first stage estimate
of γ, either they are uncorrelated with Medigap coverage, or they are uncorrelated with
ln price. To the extent that observable determinants annuitization are uncorrelated with
the instrument, it is possible that the unobservables are also uncorrelated.
Table 14 presents direct evidence that the instrument is uncorrelated with these additional
controls. I construct the table by regression ln price increasingly detailed sets of controls.
The table shows F-statistics of the test that the coefficients on the indicated set of controls is
jointly equal to zero. Column (1) again has with only the basic controls. Year, age and sex
(not shown in the table) are all highly correlated with the instrument. This is expected since
prices depend directly on these variables. Smoking status (also not shown), however, is not
correlated with ln price in any specification. The other basic controls which might correlate
with insurance demand, health care utilization, or annuity demand are all uncorrelated with
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prices, however. They remain uncorrelated as I add successively more controls. Column (2)
adds controls for permanent income, a cubic in log permanent income and log permanent
income interacted with age. These controls are jointly uncorrelated with the instrument.
Column (3) adds controls for self-reported health status and for chronic diseases. Health
appears uncorrelated with prices. Finally, column (4) controls for self-assessed mortality
and risk tolerance. These preference variables are also uncorrelated with the instrument.
The instrument is therefore largely uncorrelated with health, or preferences, except for
those variables that directly affect pricing. These results may ease the concern that the
instrument is systematically correlated with unobserved determinants of annuitization.
3.4. Results: Medigap coverage increases annuitization
Given the strength of the first stage, and the indication that the instrument may be valid,
I now turn to estimating the impact of Medigap coverage on annuitization. I focus on three
outcomes. First I study total income from employer pensions and annuities. This covers all
permanent retirement income other than Social Security payments and therefore provides a
useful summary measure of annuity income. Annuity income is highly skewed and, as Table
12 shows, many people have no annuity income at all. As a second outcome, I therefore
focus on the probability of having any annuity or pension income. Finally, while the annuity
variable usefully captures the total response of retirement income to Medigap coverage, it
may be too broad. It includes pensions and annuities with limited payout horizons, for
example, and these are not true life annuities. As a final outcome, I take advantage of
the HRS’s detailed annuity questions to determine whether an individual reports having
any income from a “true” annuity, defined as an annuity that pays out until death and
stops then. As Table 1 shows, these annuities are more rare; about three percent of the
population has such income.
All these measures exclude income from Social Security. People can effectively buy an
annuity by delaying Social Security claiming, which increases their future Social Security
payments. In results not reported, I found some evidence that people do indeed earn more
118
Social Security income and claim later when they face lower Medigap prices, but these
results were imprecise and not robust across specifications, so I omit them.
Table 15 shows the impact of Medigap coverage on total income from employer pensions
or annuities. Panel A provides the reduced form result, where the coefficient on ln price
is obtained by regressing annuity income on ln price and the indicated controls. The co-
efficient on ln price is a statistically significant -8.46 indicating that increasing the price
of Medigap coverage by 10 percent would reduce annuity income by about $850. At the
mean level of annuity income, this works out to a cross price elasticity of -1.31. Figure 11
Panel A, constructed analogously to Figure 10, illustrates the reduced form relationship be-
tween annuitization coverage and prices: it shows the nonparametric fit between (residual)
annuitization probability and (residual) prices (net of controls). There is a clear negative
relationship, although it is not as precise as the first stage relationship. This figure shows
the exact variation underlying the reduced form results.
Panel B of Table 15 presents the instrumental variables estimate of α, the impact of Medigap
coverage on annuitization, estimated via two stage least squares with ln price as the excluded
instrument. The coefficient is 19.6. To interpret this number, it is helpful to calculate the
elasticity of (aggregate) total annuity income it implies. With mean Medigap coverage of
0.30 and mean annuity income of $6,510, the elasticity of total annuity income with respect
to Medigap coverage is about 0.9.
Columns (2), (3), and (4) include successively more controls. The basic results changes
very little with the inclusion of these extra controls. The point estimates fall slightly when
controlling for permanent income, and it falls more when controlling for the health variables.
Controlling for preferences, however, raises the point estimate almost back to the original.
Medigap coverage appears to have a large and robust positive impact on annuitization.
These results reflect the total impact of Medigap on annuity income. Many people have
zero annuity income, however, and much of the annuity puzzle is that many households do
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not annuitize at all, not that households have relatively low annuity income conditional on
having any annuity income. In Table 16, I investigate the extensive margin response, looking
at the impact of Medigap on the probability of having any annuity income, estimated using
linear probability models.9
The reduced form results in Panel A of Table 16 indicate a strong and negative relationship
between Medigap prices and the extensive margin of annuity demand, with a cross price
extensive margin elasticity of about 0.78. Figure 11, Panel B shows the visual reduced form.
Increasing Medigap prices by 10 percent decreases reduces the probability of having any
annuity income by about 2.8 percentage points. The instrumental variables estimate of γ in
panel B gives the impact of Medigap coverage on the extensive margin of annuity demand.
The point estimate of 0.65 implies an aggregate elasticity of about 0.53. Comparing this
to the extensive margin elasticity implies that about two-thirds of the impact of Medigap
coverage on annuitization comes from the extensive margin, and the remainder from the
extensive margin. Adding successive controls in columns (2), (3), and (4) changes the point
estimate only very slightly.
These results therefore show an important intensive and extensive margin response of overall
annuity income to Medigap coverage. This response reflects the overall change in retirement
income to health insurance coverage. To home in on the response from “true”, voluntarily
purchased annuities, I examine a final outcome in Table 17: whether respondents report
having income from an annuity that lasts until death and stops payment then, which I refer
to as true annuity income. Panel A of Table 17 shows the reduced form impact of ln price
on true annuity income. Figure 11, Panel C shows the visual reduced form. The point
estimate of -0.04 is large relative to the main of 0.03, but it is imprecisely estimated. The
cost of focussing on such a narrow measure of annuity income is that it likely introduces
considerable measurement error, as people may miscategorize their retirement income while
nonetheless recording the total amount correctly. While the point estimates remain roughly
9The reduced form estimate of ∂Pr(1{Has annuity income})
∂ ln price
btained from the linear probability models is very
similar to the marginal effect of ln price implied by estimated probit models.
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constant once I control for permanent income in column (2), it is no longer statistically
significant at traditional levels. Adding additional controls for health in column (3) and
preferences in column (4) has little effect on the point estimate, and raises the reduced
form coefficient to statistical significance. Across all specifications, the extensive margin
elasticity of true annuity income with respect to Medigap coverage is about 0.87.
The results show a clear impact of Medigap coverage on both the extensive and intensive
margin of annuity demand. While the instrument is uncorrelated with observed deter-
minants of annuity demand, it might nonetheless be correlated with unobserved factors,
including the price of annuities. To test for this possibility, Table 18 presents evidence from
a placebo test. This table shows the reduced form estimate of ln price on annuity demand,
but the sample is modified: it contains only retirees with employer provided health insur-
ance. If the isntrument is valid, then for this sample, ln price should have no effect on
medical expenditure risk, and hence the reduced form coefficient should be zero. If ln price
is correlated with annuity prices or other unobserved determinants of annuity demand, how-
ever, then even retirees with employer provided health insurance will appear to respond to
it. As the table shows, the coefficient on ln price is statistically insignificant, much smaller
in magnitude than in the analysis sample, and, for two outcomes, wrong signed. Unfortu-
nately the results are not precise enough for me to reject the hypothesis that the placebo
point estimates are significantly different from the main point estimates. Nonetheless the
results suggest that if ln price is correlated with unobserved determinants of annuity de-
mand, the correlation is not strong enough to generate the observed relationship between
Medigap coverage and annuity demand.
3.5. Robustness
3.5.1. Robustness to State-level confounders
The main threat to identification comes from the correlation between ln price and state-level
unobservables. In this section, I show that the main results are robust to the inclusion of
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two prominent state-level variables: Medicare spending, and the generosity of Medicaid’s
implicit long term care insurance.
Table 19 shows the result of controlling for Medicare spending. I measure Medicare spending
using 2004 data from the Dartmouth Atlas (Skinner et al. (2011)). In particular, the
regressions in Table 19 control for average Medicare payments per enrollee, adjusting for
sex and age. This is meant to control for the overall intensity of medical expenditures
across states. To the extent that this spending variation is driven by aggregate differences
in health across states, then it may be safely excluded from the demand for annuities. There
are two reasons, however, that it might be desirable to control for this spending. First, if
cross-state spending variation reflects differences in the price of obtaining medical care, then
it may actually reflect medical expenditure risk. While it would be interesting to know how
annuity demand responds to this risk, using it as an instrument for Medigap coverage would
be inappropriate, since it has a direct effect on annuity demand. Second, it may be that this
medical spending reflects individual as well as aggregate preferences, over and above the
controls I have. In that case controlling for Medicare spending helps control for variation
in preferences or health that may also affect annuity demand.
Medicare spending drives much of the variation in ln price, and so when I control for average
Medicare spending, the first stage becomes weaker, with the F-statistic falling to 14.5 when I
include only the basic controls, and 11.8 when I include the full controls. The results indicate
that Medicare spending is positively associated with annuity demand, although the point
estimates are generally imprecise, so including Medicare spending generally strengthens the
results, although never by a great deal.
I also examine the impact of an alternative program on my estimates, Medicaid. Medicaid is
particularly important because Medicaid covers long term care expenses, a major source of
risk for the elderly (Brown and Finkelstein (2007)). Medicaid provides imperfect insurance,
however. To qualify for Medicaid coverage, individuals must meet both an asset test and
an income test. In 1998, the asset test varied between $1000 and $4000, and the income
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test ranged between $500 and $1500 per month (Kasner and Shirey (2002)). Some states
have “medically needy” rules which allow individuals to spend all income in excess of the
allowed amount on their medical expenses in order to qualify.
In Table 20, I examine the robustness of my results to the inclusion of these Medicaid policy
variables as they were effect in 1998. The data were collected by AARP (Kasner and Shirey
(2002)), who contacted state Medicaid administrators to determine their program eligibility
rules.10 In the table, I control for the log asset test allowed amount, the log income test
allowed amount, an indicator for whether the state has “medically needy” rules, and an
interaction between this indicator and log income test allowed amount. As the table shows,
the main results are robust to the inclusion of the Medicaid policy variables. The table also
hints at a surprising impact of Medicaid’s long term care insurance on annuity demand,
although the point estimate are generally quite imprecise. In particular the table suggests
that increasing the allowed asset amount reduces annuity demand. The table also suggests
a very large impact of the income test on annuity demand, and this impact goes to zero
for states with “medically needy” rules. These point estimates, however, do not necessarily
reflect the causal effect of Medicaid parameters on annuity demand, because they may be
correlated with other state policy parameters that also affect annuity demand. The impact
of Medicaid rules on annuitization and, more generally, retirement savings is an interesting
avenue for future work.
3.5.2. Further robustness
I conducted several additional robustness tests, and I present in the appendix four additional
robustness tables. Table 33 shows the results of allowing for a more flexible functional form,
a complete polynomial of degree two in risk tolerance, permanent income, and mortality
expectations, fully interacted with an indicator for good or excellent health. Table 34
controls for average out-of-pocket medical spending and average liquid assets prior to age 65.
10Brown and Finkelstein (2008) use data from Kasner and Shirey (2002) to calibrate their model of demand
for long term care insurance.
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While these variables may be endogenous—because individuals may anticipate having more
generous health insurance after age 65, or because they may begin to purchase annuities
prior to age 65—they may also soak up some of the remaining heterogeneity in risk or
preferences. Table 35 controls for spousal risk and mortality preference as well as the
respondent’s preferences, as household annuity decisions likely reflect some combination of
these variables. The table controls for spouse preferences linearly and fully interacted with
responded preferences. Finally Table 36 excludes Medicaid recipients from the analysis
sample. Across all robustness tables, the results change little.
3.6. Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of Medigap coverage on annuitization, using local prices
of Medigap coverage as an instrument for coverage. Medigap coverage has a large impact
on annuitization, with an aggregate elasticity of annuity income with respect to Medigap
coverage of about 0.9, and an extensive margin elasticity of about 0.5. The results also
suggest a large response of “true” annuity income, with an elasticity of about 0.87, but this
result is less precise.
These results are robust to extensive individual-level controls for income, health, and pref-
erences, and to controls for aggregate Medicare spending and Medicaid generosity. Overall
the results suggest an important role for health insurance in determining annuity demand.
Part of the underannuitization puzzle, therefore, may be due to uninsured medical expen-
diture risk. This conclusion is important in part because recent research has explored the
importance of behavioral factors such as framing biases in explaining underannuitization
(Brown (2007); Brown et al. (2008), Brown et al. (2011)). That line of research implies
that mandatory annuitization may, by correcting these biases, enhance welfare. To the ex-
tent that underannuitization is a rational response to imperfections in the health insurance
market, however, mandatory annuitization is unlikely to produce welfare gains.
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Figure 10: Relationship between Medigap and ln price
Figure plots the nonparametric fit between log price of Medigap coverage and an indicator for
Medigap coverage, both net of of basic controls. Sample is defined in the text. The fit is obtained
as a local linear regression of residual Medigap coverage on residual log price. These residuals are
obtained from separate regressions of Medigap coverage or log price on year fixed effects, dummies
for smoking status, sex, race, and educational attainment, and a quartic in age.
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Figure 11: Relationship between endogenous variables and ln price
Notes: Figure plots the nonparametric fit between log price of Medigap coverage and the indicated
outcome, both net of of basic controls. See notes to Figure 10.
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Table 12: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Variable: All Medigap No Medigap
Has Medigap 0.30
(0.46)
Price ($ 1000) 1022 968 1045
(276) (261) (279)
Has Annuity income 0.36 0.40 0.35
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
Annuity income ($ 1000) 6.48 7.89 5.87
(45.4) (76.6) (21.0)
Has true annuity 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.18) (0.20) (0.17)
# Children 3.20 2.93 3.31
(2.11) (1.81) (2.21)
Permanent income ($ 1000) 68.1 86.1 60.5
(87.4) (99.2) (80.6)
High health 0.35 0.40 0.33
(0.48) (0.49) (0.47)
Ever had diabetes 0.22 0.20 0.23
(0.41) (0.40) (0.42)
Ever had cancer 0.16 0.14 0.16
(0.36) (0.35) (0.37)
Risk tolerance 0.39 0.37 0.40
(0.47) (0.46) (0.48)
Pr(live to 75) 63.71 65.14 63.10
(23.50) (21.98) (24.10)
# Observations 3163 868 2295
# People 1322
Note: Table shows mean and, in parentheses, the standard deviation of select variables, for the
analysis sample and by Medigap coverage status.
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Table 13: First stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Controls: Basic Permanent inc. Health Preferences State FEs
ln price −0.43∗∗∗ −0.41∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ −0.41∗∗∗ −0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
R2 0.151 0.176 0.187 0.191 0.279
F-statistic 41.4 38.8 40.3 38.2 0
# Obs 3163 3163 3163 3163 3163
# People 1322 1322 1322 1322 1322
Controls:
Basic X X X X X
Permanent inc. X X X X
Health X X X
Preferences X X
State FEs X
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the respondent has Medigap coverage.
The sample is described in the main text. Basic controls are a quartic in age, dummy variables for
smoking status, sex, race, marital status, and education dummies, and year fixed effects. Permanent
income controls for a cubic in log average yearly income, plus log average yearly income interacted
with age. Health controls include dummies for chronic conditions and self-reported health status.
Preference controls include subjective measures of risk tolerance and mortality. Standard errors
clustered on individual in parentheses. ∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.01.
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Table 14: Correlation between instrument and regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls: Basic Permanent inc. Health Preferences
Children 1.25 1.32 1.19 1.28
(0.29) (0.26) (0.31) (0.28)
Black 1.85 1.24 1.45 0.70
(0.17) (0.27) (0.23) (0.40)
Education 1.47 1.72 1.77 1.51
(0.22) (0.16) (0.15) (0.21)
Permanent income 1.22 1.38 1.46
(0.30) (0.24) (0.21)
Health status 1.36 1.36
(0.25) (0.25)
Chronic diseases 1.48 1.54
(0.13) (0.11)
Mortality expectations 2.09
(0.12)
Risk Tolerance 0.00
(0.96)
# Observations 3163 3163 3163 3163
# People 1322 1322 1322 1322
Notes: Table shows the F-statistics on the indicated sets of variables, obtained from a regression of
ln price on the indicated variables, as well as controls for year, age, smoking, and sex. The sample
is described in the main text. P-values are in parentheses and all standard errors are clustered on
the individual level.
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Table 15: Impact of Medigap coverage on annuity income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls: Basic Permanent inc. Health Preferences
Panel A: Reduced form
ln price −8.46∗∗ −8.04∗∗ −7.35∗∗ −7.93∗∗
(3.81) (3.79) (3.37) (3.79)
Panel B: IV
Has Medigap 19.61∗∗ 19.49∗∗ 17.54∗∗ 19.41∗∗
(9.44) (9.87) (8.65) (9.90)
Elasticity 0.90 0.89 0.80 0.89
# Obs 3163 3163 3163 3163
# People 1322 1322 1322 1322
Controls:
Basic X X X X
Permanent income X X X
Health X X
Preference X
Notes: The table shows the reduced form impact of Medigap price on total income from employer
pensions or annuities (measured in thousands of dollars), and the instrumental variable estimate of
Medigap coverage, with price as the excluded instrument. See notes to Table 13. Standard errors
clustered on individual in parentheses.∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01.
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Table 16: Impact of Medigap coverage on extensive margin of annuity demand
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls: Basic Permanent inc. Health Preferences
Panel A: Reduced form
ln price −0.28∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Panel B: IV
Has Medigap 0.65∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25)
Elasticity 0.53 0.55 0.53 0.53
# Obs 3163 3163 3163 3163
# People 1322 1322 1322 1322
Controls:
Basic X X X X
Permanent income X X X
Health X X
Preference X
Notes: The table shows the reduced form impact of Medigap price on the probability the respondent
has any income from employer pensions or annuities, and the instrumental variable estimate of
Medigap coverage, with price as the excluded instrument. See notes to Table 13. Elasticities are
calculated at sample means. Standard errors clustered on individual in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗
indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01.
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Table 17: Impact of Medigap coverage on “true” annuity demand, extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls: Basic Permanent inc. Health Preferences
Panel A: Reduced form
ln price −0.04∗ −0.04 −0.04∗ −0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Panel B: IV
Has Medigap 0.098∗ 0.094 0.096 0.101
(0.057) (0.060) (0.059) (0.061)
Elasticity 0.868 0.830 0.854 0.894
# Obs 3163 3163 3163 3163
# People 1322 1322 1322 1322
Controls:
Basic X X X X
Permanent income X X X
Health X X
Preference X
Notes: The table shows the reduced form impact of Medigap price on the probability of having
“true” annuity income, and the instrumental variable estimate of Medigap coverage, with price
as the excluded instrument. The sample is described in the main text. See notes to Table 13.
Standard errors clustered on individual in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05,
and p < 0.01.
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Table 18: Placebo test for impact on retirees with employer-sponsored health insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls: Basic Permanent inc. Health Preferences
Panel A: Outcome is annuity income (Mean: $15.9 thousand)
ln price 1.29 4.02 4.12 3.73
(5.56) (5.32) (5.22) (5.35)
Panel B: Outcome is 1 {Has annuity income} (Mean: 0.64)
ln price 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.07
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Panel C: Outcome is 1 {Has “true” annuity income} (Mean: 0.037)
ln price −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Controls:
Basic X X X X
Permanent income X X X
Health X X
Preference X
Notes: The table shows the coefficient on ln price, obtained by regressing the indicated outcome
on ln price and the indicated controls. The sample consists of 1769 observations of 750 people with
employer provided health insurance who otherwise meet the sample inclusion criteria described in
the main text. See notes to Table 13. Standard errors clustered on individual in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ ,
and ∗∗∗ indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01.
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Table 19: Include state-level Medicare expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Controls: Basic Full controls
Dep. var.: Annuity Has annuity Has “true” Annuity Has annuity Has “true”
income income annuity income income annuity
Panel A: Reduced form
ln price −7.81∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −7.72∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
(2.59) (0.09) (0.02) (2.90) (0.09) (0.02)
Panel B: IV
Has Medigap 25.02∗∗ 0.89∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 28.01∗∗ 1.01∗∗ 0.24∗∗
(11.17) (0.41) (0.10) (14.06) (0.49) (0.12)
Medicare spending (log) 6.83 0.30 0.14∗ 10.23 0.43 0.16∗
(8.88) (0.30) (0.08) (9.85) (0.35) (0.10)
F-stat 14.5 14.5 14.5 11.8 11.8 11.8
Controls:
Basic X X X X X X
Permanent inc. X X X
Health X X X
Preference X X X
Notes: The table shows the reduced form impact of Medigap price on the indicated outcomes, and the instrumental variable estimate
of Medigap coverage, with price as the excluded instrument. lnMedicare is log of per beneficiary state Medicare spending in 2004,
adjusted for age and sex of beneficiaries. The F-statistic is of the test that the first stage coefficient on ln price equals zero. The sample
is described in the main text. See notes to Table 13. Standard errors clustered on individual in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate
p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01.
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Table 20: Include Medicaid policy variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Controls: Basic Full controls
Dep. var.: Annuity Has annuity Has “true” Annuity Has annuity Has “true”
income income annuity income income annuity
Panel A: Reduced form
ln price −7.82∗∗ −0.22∗∗ −0.05∗ −7.42∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.05∗
(3.61) (0.09) (0.03) (3.84) (0.09) (0.03)
Panel B: IV
Has Medigap 16.19∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.10∗ 16.50∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.11∗
(8.05) (0.22) (0.06) (9.10) (0.23) (0.06)
Asset test (log) −1.21 −0.12∗∗ 0.01 −0.59 −0.11∗∗ 0.01
(1.25) (0.05) (0.01) (1.35) (0.05) (0.01)
Income test (log) 15.65 0.35 0.08 17.31 0.15 0.05
(28.93) (1.15) (0.15) (24.72) (1.07) (0.17)
Medically needy exemption 14.18 0.40 0.08 16.78 0.18 0.04
(31.95) (1.26) (0.16) (26.45) (1.18) (0.18)
Need× income test −15.41 −0.34 −0.09 −17.85 −0.14 −0.05
(29.05) (1.15) (0.15) (25.04) (1.08) (0.17)
# Obs 3163 3163 3163 3163 3163 3163
# People 1322 1322 1322 1322 1322 1322
Controls:
Basic X X X X X X
Permanent inc. X X X
Health X X X
Preference X X X
Notes: The table shows the reduced form impact of Medigap price on the indicated outcome, and the instrumental variable estimate
of Medigap coverage and Medicaid policy variables, with price as the excluded instrument. Standard errors clustered on individual in
parentheses. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Data appendix
A.1.1. Product definition
The claims data contain nearly 2000 unique anti-cholesterol drugs, defined by a National
Drug Code (NDC) number. Different NDC numbers correspond to different molecules,
different branded status, different generic manufacturers, different strengths, and different
formulations (for example, tablet for capsule) as well as other aspects of differentiation
(such as standard or extended release). To keep the analysis tractable, I define products at
the molecule level, with some further aggregation of uncommon molecules.1 This procedure
results in 11 products. I treat each of the six statins as distinct products. These are Lipitor
(atrovastatin), Zocor (simvastatin), Mevacor (lovastatin), Pravachol (pravastatin), Crestor
(rosuvastatin), and Lescol (fluvastatin).2 I aggregate the non-statin molecules by molecular
class, so that Fibric acids, Niacin, and Bile Acid Resins (BARs) are distinct products. Last I
create product categories for the two combination products available on the market, Advicor
(niacin-simvastatin and niacin-lovastatin) and Vytorin (ezetimibe-simvastatin). Because
ezetimibe is a unique molecule also available separately, I group it with Vytorin. Not all
of these products are available in all years; Zetia/Vytorin and Niacin-Combination became
available in 2002, and Crestor in 2003. Throughout the analysis, I limit the choice set to
available drugs only.
This aggregation implicitly assumes that branded and non-branded versions of the same
molecule are perfect substitutes.3 This assumption seems reasonable, at least for my sample
1Since the product is essentially a molecule, I use the terms “drug” and “molecule” interchangeably
throughout the paper.
2A seventh statin, Baycol (cerivastatin) was available in the first half of 2001, but was withdrawn from
the market after several patients died while taking it. I exclude from my sample any one who ever fills a
prescription for Baycol.
3In my sample, Fibrates, Niacin, and BARs are always off-patent. Lovastatin’s (Mevacor) patent ex-
pired in 2001, and simvastatin’s (Zocor) and pravastatin’s (Pravachol) in 2006, and all three drugs saw
considerable generic entry. Atorvastatin (Lipitor), rosuvastaitn (Crestor), ezetimibe (Zetia/Vytorin) and
simvastatin/niacin (Advicor) were under patent protection throughout the sample. Lescol’s patent expired
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period. Consider Zocor’s patent expiration. Zocor was under patent protection until June
2006, so its branded share was 100% prior to 2006. After patent expiration, the FDA
grants the first generic entrant a period of six months of exclusivity, so there was limited
intramolecular competition in 2006, and in that year Zocor’s branded fell to 64%. In
2007, the first year in which simvastatin was fully off-patent, Zocor’s branded share was
2%. At the same time, simvastatin’s market share, as a fraction of all cholesterol drug
sales, rose from 13.7% in 2005 and 2006 to 18% in 2007. The near complete elimination of
simvastatin’s branded market share, and the concomitant rise in simvastatin’s overall share,
suggests that doctors and patients view branded and generic statins as essentially perfect
substitutes. These patterns are also consistent with the overall prevalence of generic drugs:
in 2009, 74.5% of all prescriptions dispensed were for generics, and among molecules that
faced generic competition, the generic share was 93% (Berndt and Aitken, 2010). In my
empirical analysis, I therefore do not differentiate between generic and branded versions
of the same molecule. In effect, I assume that when a molecule faces generic competition,
doctors’ choice sets include only the generic version, and patients only have a prescription
for the generic version (if either).
A.1.2. Additional details on prices
Appendix Table A.5 shows one measure of imputation quality, by year, for formulary and
non-formulary plans. Since prices are imputed as the average price per days supplied, they
are mechanically correct on average but they understate true price dispersion. To measure
the imputation quality, I therefore calculate the R2 obtained from a regression of imputed
prices on actual prices; an R2 of one indicates that the imputed prices are perfect, whereas
a low R2 indicates that the imputation misses much of the price variation. As the table
shows, the imputation for out-of-pocket price in formulary plans is good, with an R2 above
0.75 in every year. In non-formulary plans quality is never this high. The imputation in
general is worse for plan prices, because these prices in the raw data are not as tight, even
during the sample period but generic entry did not begin until 2012.
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for formulary plans.
As an example of the imputation, Appendix Table 21 shows imputed prices and modal
prices, for two plans from 2003, and Figure A.5 shows the empirical price distribution for
those plans.4 The Figure shows clear evidence that both plans have a three tier formulary,
with a $10/$20/$40 structure for plan 1 and a $10/$20/$35 structure for plan 2.5 Each row
of the table shows the imputed price and mode price for 30 days supplied, for each molecule.
The imputed prices track the modal prices, suggesting that the imputation procedure is
able to reconstruct formularies reasonably. Imputed prices differ from their modes slightly,
primarily reflecting differences in days supplied.
A.1.3. More details on sample creation
Appendix Table A.5 shows the number of unique people in the data as I impose increasingly
strong sample selection criteria, and some of their characteristics. The first row begins
with all people for whom I ever observe enrolled with health insurance plan identifiers.
(Many more people appear in the data without identifiers.) On average people were born
in 1972.4, and the sample is 52.3% female. Over my sample period, 2001-2009, people
had $15,700 in medical expenditures (the sum of drug spending, outpatient spending, and
inpatient spending), of which $2,000 was out of pocket, $3,400 was spend on drugs, $8,500
on outpatient procedures (including office visits), and the remainder on inpatient procedure.
In the second row, I limit the sample to people who are ever at risk for heart disease. These
are people who either ever have a diagnosis of a cholesterol-disorder, diabetes, heart disease
or hypertension, or who are at risk because of their age (45 and older for men, 55 and older
for women, but younger than 65 at some point in my sample). This reduces the sample by
about three quarters. This sample, by construction, is sicker than average, and so medical
spending is much higher.
4These plans were selected because they were moderately large, moderately generous, and from two
different companies. Crestor is not in the table because it did not become available until August 2003, and
neither plan had any claims for it.
5These prices are nominal prices for 30 days supplied, to keep the numbers round.
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In the next several rows I exclude people based on their drug fills. First, I exclude people who
ever fill a prescription for Baycol (generic name cerivastatin), a statin which was withdrawn
from the market in 2001. Next I exclude people whose first fill occurs less than 6 months
after entering the sample, whose first fill occurs before their first heart disease risk factor
(including age risk), and whose first fill occurs after turning 64 (so that some fills occur at
age 65). These restrictions are intended to select a sample of people who are new to taking
cholesterol drugs, so that they do not change their insurance coverage to accommodate their
drug needs.
Next, I exclude people whose first fill occurs outside the years 2001-2005 and 2008-2009.6 I
only have advertising data for these years, and I impute advertising at the time of the first
fill, so I cannot study people fills outside these ranges. In order to calculate compliance and
switching, I require that people be continuously enrolled for 12 months from the first fill
date (including that date); this exclusion cuts the sample by almost half.
Finally I exclude people who belong to plans that have no drug spending information,
eliminating about 2% of people. These restrictions result in a sample of 945,459 people,
including both people not in copay plans and people who never fill a prescription for an
anti-cholesterol drugs. In comparison to the original sample, this sample is older and has
much higher medical spending, although most of the difference comes from selecting people
at risk of heart disease.
Essentially all of the analysis, except for two robustness tests, focuses on people who fill at
least one prescription for an anti-cholesterol drug and who belong to copay plans. Just over
a third of the sample ever fills a drug, and people who do are older, more likely to be male,
and have even higher medical spending (in part by construction, in part because they are
sicker). The copay plan sample is also older, sicker, and more likely to be male, although
none of these differences is enormous.
6For people who never fill a drug, I take the “month of first fill” as the month of the first diagnosis for
a heart disease risk factor. The people who never fill a drug are included only in the robustness test that
includes an outside option in the initial prescription choice set.
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A.1.4. Variable creation
The construction of the non-price variables used in the analysis is described here.
Initial prescription, quit, comply, switch, and second prescription I define each
patient’s initial prescription as the first drug I see prescribed. I say that a patient complies
with his initial prescription if he has at least 180 days supplied for that drug over the next
11 months, and has zero days supplied for other cholesterol drugs. I say that a patient
switches his prescription if he fills at least 180 days supplied of any drug, including at least
one fill of a drug other than his first. I say that patient quits if he fills fewer than 180 days
supplied. I focus on 180 days because this is more than half the possible months filled in
the first year (i.e. 6 of 11), but my results are robust to any other choice, as I show in
Appendix Table A.5. If the patient switches, his second prescription is the drug he fills
most, excluding the first.
Plan generosity Because average plan generosity is endogenous, in the sense that pa-
tients who are more risk averse or more likely to use health care may select more gener-
ous plans, I control for it in my analysis. Prescription drug insurance contracts are very
high-dimensional objects so there is no ideal measure of plan generosity. I proxy for plan
generosity using the average price paid in that plan and year for branded anti-cholesterol
drugs.
Health status In some robustness tests, I include controls for health status. I measure
health status using chronic heart disease indicators. In particular, from the full set of
outpatient and inpatient claims data, I create a set of indicators for whether the patient
has ever had a claim with a diagnosis for high cholesterol, diabetes, or heart disease, or
hypertension. I also include sex and age among the health status variables, since they
predict heart disease as well.
Physician detailing and direct to consumer advertising I use data collected by IMS
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Health for 2001-2005 and 2008-2009 on total expenditures on physician detailing (exclud-
ing retail value of free samples) and total expenditures on direct to consumer advertising
(DTCA). These variables are measured at the molecule-year level. Advertising expenditures
are highly skewed; for many drug-years there is zero spending, but for the blockbusters,
spending is over $100 million per year. In all the regressions, I normalize detailing and
DTCA spending by subtracting the mean of of total advertising spending, across all drugs
and years, and dividing by the standard deviation of total spending.7
A.2. Robustness appendix
In this Appendix, I present several additional robustness tests of the basic reduced form
specifications. In Tables A.5 and A.5 I consider alternative samples. Column (1) includes
the baseline sample. In column (2), I consider people in non-formulary plans. The basic
pattern of results remains, and most coefficients are similar to the baseline sample. I focus
on formulary plans in the main results because I want to ensure that out-of-pocket prices are
accurately imputed, but in some plans, not all drugs have many claims. In columns (3)-(5)
I apply increasingly stringent sample selection rules, requiring that each available drug have
at least 10, 25, or 50 claims. The smaller samples eliminate some price variation and lead
to larger standard errors, but otherwise have no important impact on the coefficients.
In Table A.5, I probe the sensitivity of the results to alternative definitions of compliance.
The main results all define compliance as filling prescriptions for 180 days supplied (over
the 330 days after the first 30). The table varies the definition in 30 day increments, from
90 days supplied to 330. Changing the definition of compliance has no impact on the basic
result that compliance responds to out-of-pocket prices but not plan prices or detailing.
In Table A.5, I consider an alternative imputation procedure for out-of-pocket prices. Be-
cause I require that patients fill an initial prescription, I observe the actual price paid for the
first prescription, so in the compliance regressions I can impute the price paid by the actual
7I normalize both variables by the same amount, the standard deviation of total advertising spending, so
that the coefficients on them are comparable.
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price faced. (A small number of people have missing prices despite filling a first prescription;
I drop these people from the regressions using actual prices.) I cannot do the analogous
imputation for the initial prescription because patients only receive a single drug, and so
the actual price is missing for drugs not chosen. Column (1) shows the baseline results
and column (2) shows the point estimates obtained by imputed prices with the actual price
paid. The point estimates are extremely similar, suggesting that the imputation procedure
does not introduce spurious price variation to drive the results.
In Table A.5, I expand the sample for the initial prescription estimates to include people
who never fill a prescription for any anti-cholesterol drug. (I cannot look at compliance
for these people, since they have no prescription to comply with.) I otherwise apply the
same sample selection criteria for this group. I impute prices and advertising at the time
of their first diagnosis with a heart disease risk factor, and require that they be enrolled for
at least six months before this diagnosis, and continuously enrolled for at least 12 months
after it. As the table shows, including the outside option changes the coefficients (and the
coefficient on detailing is now only marginally significant, p = 0.06), but detailing and plan
price continue to have an important impact on drug choice.
A.3. Clinical evidence on anti-cholesterol drugs
Anti-cholesterol drugs are evaluated in clinical trials, with a focus on two kinds of outcomes:
changes in cholesterol, and differences in mortality and major health events such as stroke
and heart disease. As part of its approval process, the FDA reviews evidence from clinical
trials on these outcomes. Once each drug is approved, the FDA also approves a label for
each drug; these labels report the typical health gains from taking the drug. For cholesterol
drugs, these labels always report the percent reduction in cholesterol caused by the drug,
for each strength (e.g. 10/20/40 mg). However, as I argue below, the clinically relevant
measure is the unit reduction in cholesterol. To obtain the unit reduction in cholesterol, I
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assume that for each drug the baseline cholesterol level is 1.8.8 Appendix Table A.5 shows
the cholesterol reduction caused by the 11 drugs in my sample. Where possible, I match
each drug to its modal strength in my data.9
Cholesterol reduction, however, is not necessarily a meaningful health outcome. Several
large clinical trials therefore studied the impact of statins on mortality, heart attack, and
stroke. These studies find clear evidence that statins improve health. They are underpow-
ered to study specific outcomes (e.g. stroke or heart attack separately) or subgroups (such
as people with different conditions or baseline cholesterol levels), however. Baigent et al.
(2005) provides a meta-analysis suitable for studying how statins affect specific outcomes
and particular subgroups. Pooling data from 14 clinical trials, Baigent et al. find that
statins reduce mortality by 12%, heart attack by 23%, and stroke by 17%. More impor-
tantly, they find that reductions in heart attack and stroke are roughly linear in the LDL
cholesterol reduction induced by the drug: each mmol/L reduction in LDL cholesterol re-
duces the risk of major coronary events or major vascular events by 20%. Baigent et al.
also find, moreover, that the impact of cholesterol reduction on health does not depend
on baseline characteristics, including baseline cholesterol.10 Thus I use the absolute gain
in cholesterol, across drugs, as a summary measure of the health benefit of taking that
medication.
This approach results in a precisely measured, clinically meaningful health outcome that
varies across drugs. A downside of this approach is that it is unlikely that Baigent et
al.’s results generalize to non-statins. There are two concerns. First, it is unclear whether
statins produce all their health benefits through LDL cholesterol reductions, or whether
LDL cholesterol reduction is highly correlated with the many mechanisms through which
8Cholesterol is measured in molarity, i.e. its concentration in the blood. I report all units as mmol/L.
Cholesterol is sometimes also reported as a density, in µg/mL; to convert between them, multiply µg/mL by
0.0245. The baseline cholesterol level is calibrated so that the percent reduction in LDL cholesterol reported
on Atorvastatin’s label, 39%, corresponds to a 1.3 mmol/L decrease, as reported in the ASCOT trial (Sever
et al., 2003).
9For some drugs and strengths, the labels do not report cholesterol reductions.
10But note that the outcome is percent reduction in heart attack or stroke risk; people with worse health
presumably also have worse baseline heart attack or stroke risk.
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statins affect health. Generalizing to a different drug class could overstate the gains from
LDL reduction if part of statins’ impact occurs through a different channel. For example, the
ENHANCE trial finds that ezetimibe reduces LDL cholesterol but fails to reduce thickness
of arterial walls, making it unlikely that it would improve health (Kastelein et al., 2008).
A second issue is that other non-statins are intended to target other forms of cholesterol.
Niacin, for example, increases HDL cholesterol. Focusing on LDL cholesterol reduction can
understate the gains from these drugs.
A natural alternative, therefore, would be to look at the clinical evidence for each drug,
and focus simply on meaningful outcomes such as mortality. Unfortunately for many drugs,
especially non-statins, this evidence is scant: it is much less expensive to study cholesterol
than mortality, since cholesterol improvement can be detected in a few hundred people
in as little as six weeks. Studying mortality requires thousands of people over several
years. Second, the extant studies of clinically meaningful outcomes focus on diverse groups,
making it hard to know if differences in treatment effects represent drug differences or
population differences. Thus I focus on cholesterol changes because it is available for each
drug, although given these concerns the results should be interpreted carefully.
A.4. Computational Notes
This section provides more detail about the numerical integration and the solver for the
Maximum Likelihood Estimator.
A.4.1. Numerical integration
I use sparse grid integration with Gauss-Hermite nodes (Heiss and Winschel, 2008), using
code provided by Heisss and Winscell. Sparse grid integration extends single dimensional
quadrature based on polynomial rules to multidimensional integration problems. A poly-
nomial rule of degree d is a set of N quadrature nodes qn and weights ωn such that if f is
a polynomial of degree d or less, then
∫
f(x)dx =
∑
n ωnf(qn); i.e. these rules are exact
for degree d and less. They are therefore highly accurate. One way to extend the polyno-
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mial rules to higher dimensions is to use the tensor product, but this suffers from a curse
of dimensionality, since the number of nodes required is Nd. Approximately, the tensor
product extension of a 3-degree rule to two dimensions is inefficient, however, because it
includes terms for x31x
3
2 as well as x
3
1 and x
3
2, but the higher order interactions drop out of a
Taylor series approximation and so are not needed. Sparse grid integration avoids the curse
of dimensionality by extending polynomial rules to higher dimensions without using all the
interaction terms.
Heiss and Winschel (2008), Skrainka and Judd (2011), and Skrainka (2012) present Monte
Carlo evidence suggesting that sparse grid integration out performs Monte Carlo or quasi-
Monte Carlo (e.g. Halton draws) integration by orders of magnitude. That is, obtaining
a given level of accuracy requires 10-100 times fewer function evaluations using SGI than
using crude Monte Carlo integration.
Although sparse grid integration is very helpful in the numerical integration, it leads to two
new problems. First, as Heiss and Winschel note, some of the weights for the sparse grid
are negative, and so it is possible to calculate negative probabilities for some observations;
as they argue, this reflects a poorly approximated integral, and in fact it also indicates a
very low probability. If a parameter vector generates very low probabilities, it is unlikely to
be the correct choice, so this is only a problem as the solver searches for an optimum. To
deal with this problem, I set the probability for any observation with a negative value at
1/10 the lowest non-negative probability in the dataset, and I verify that at my solution,
no observation has a negative probability. (This approach makes analytic derivatives inac-
curate, so in practice I use numerical derivatives until obtaining convergence with a loose
tolerance, and then use a tighter tolerance and analytic derivatives.)
A second problem arises because sparse grid integration samples accurately from the tails
of distributions. This guarantees that some observations will have very high and very
low match quality draws, and (especially at trial parameter values with high standard
deviations), this leads to overflow in the evaluation of the logit choice probabilities. That
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is, at some parameter guess and nodes, the patient’s utility from complying can be 1000 or
more, and
exp(1000)
X + exp(1000)
evaluates to not-a-number in double precision arithmetic, since exp(1000) evaluates to in-
finity from overflow. I addressed this problem by converting the overflow to underflow (by
normalizing by the utility of the highest-utility option). The cost of preventing overflow,
however, is underflow; shifting utility this way leads some choices to have very negative
utility, and exp(−1000) evaluates to 0. Zero probability, however, is not a problem here.
Quadrature nodes with extreme values have very small weight, so the zeros contribute very
little to the average choice probability (and since the true probability is on the order of
10−20, the error is very small).
A.4.2. Maximization and numerical difficulties
I use the open source program Octave for all computational work. Octave is an open-
source version of MATLAB with nearly identical syntax, but lacks some of MATLAB’s
more recent features, and does not have any parallelization implemented. I use Octave’s
fminunc command to maximize the likelihood L(θ). The solver uses Newton’s method with
line search, which means in each iteration t it uses Newton’s method to find a step direction,
−→
θt , constructs a low-order approximation to L(θ), and chooses a step size h to maximize
L(θ + h
−→
θt ).
I provide the solver with an analytic gradient, which is very expensive to compute because
it must be computed for each person and each SGI node. Using the gradient slows down
each iteration considerably but appears to reduce the total number of iterations needed.
The solver takes several days to converge to a solution; the exact time depends on the
starting guess. Octave and its implementation of fminunc are not the gold standard of
computational software. I used them because of legal limitations that I keep the data on
the NBER’s servers. Student licenses of state-of-the-art software such as KNITRO (or even
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MATLAB) are not available for use on a server.
The solver had difficulty finding an exact maximum of the likelihood. In all runs, it exited
with a flag that indicated that, although the gradient of the objective function was positive,
the function could not be decreased in the search direction, i.e. the step size h is close to
zero. This can occur if the low-order approximation of L is not very high quality.
These exit flags can mean that the solver has failed even to come close to a maximum.
To investigate this possibility further, I conducted several Monte Carlo studies. These
studies were intended to explore the computational properties of my estimator when the
data are generated according to the model, to see whether the computational problems are
properties of the model or the result of misspecification. When I simulated data according to
the model, and then estimated the model using MATLAB’s fminunc algorithm, I obtained
point estimates close to the truth, but with a positive gradient and an exit flag indicating
failure. When I estimated the model on the same data using KNITRO, I obtained nearly
identical point estimates (off by about 10−5), but a gradient of zero.
The Monte Carlo performance depends on the distribution of covariates used. For example,
more variation in the instruments (plan price and advertising) makes it easier to find a
solution, since they help identification and lead to a sharper optimum. To get the distribu-
tion of covariates correct, I conducted a large scale Monte Carlo in which the distribution
of all independent variables exactly matches their distribution in the estimation data. I
performed 50 replications. In each replication, I simulated data using the point estimates
reported in the text as the truth and as starting values. In each estimation I used Matlab’s
fminunc with line search, and each took about four hours on my desktop (a Dell Optiplex
9010 with 16 GB of RAM).
The results from the Monte Carlo, shown in Appendix Tables A.5 and A.5, were quite
encouraging. First, there is a small amount of bias, especially evident in the patient utility
functions and the match quality terms for Zocor, Lipitor, and Pravachol. Simulated Max-
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Table 21: Imputed and mode prices for two plans, 2003
Plan 1 Plan 2
Price:
OOP,
imputed
OOP,
mode
Plan,
imputed
OOP,
imputed
OOP,
mode
Plan,
imputed
Lipitor 19.6 20.0 75.9 19.7 20.0 81.6
Zocor 19.7 20.0 92.0 19.5 20.0 117.0
Mevacor 9.8 10.0 78.8 23.0 35.0 48.4
Pravachol 19.5 20.0 102.8 19.7 20.0 106.9
Lescol 40.2 40.0 57.4 34.9 35.0 61.0
Ezetimibe Combo 40.0 40.0 68.1 34.9 35.0 66.3
Niacin Combo 40.0 40.0 44.9 19.8 20.0 63.1
Fibrates 13.7 10.0 37.6 16.5 20.0 57.8
Niacin 19.8 20.0 52.6 19.4 20.0 54.3
BARs 22.2 10.0 73.1 26.2 35.0 99.8
Formulary: 10/20/40 10/20/35
Table shows, for two plans, the (nominal) imputed out-of-pocket price and plan
price for each molecule (defined as the average price per day supply, excluding
claims with zero prices), and the (nominal) mode out of pocket price for 30 days
supplied.
imum Likelihood is known to be biased, so it is reassuring that all of the point estimates
except the match quality terms for Zocor are close to the truth. The 90% confidence inter-
vals (again clustered on plan) also have about the correct coverage rate. This matters for
two reasons. First, it suggests that my inference is correct. Second, it rules out an alter-
native interpretation of the unbiased point estimates. It could be that the point estimates
are unbiased because I use the truth at the starting value, and the solver just doesn’t move
very much. But if this were true, the coverage rate would be too high. Since I cover only
90% of the time, I am more confident that starting values have not falsely reduced the bias.
Finally, I note that in every replication the solver exited with a flag indicating that the
step size was too small. Taken together, these Monte Carlo results suggest that, despite the
worrisome exit flags, my estimates are close to the likelihood maximizing parameters.
A.5. Appendix tables and figures
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Table 22: Predictive power of imputed prices
Year: 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2008 2009
Panel A: Formulary Plans
OOP price 0.775 0.837 0.857 0.823 0.759 0.788 0.819
Plan price 0.582 0.626 0.638 0.661 0.688 0.853 0.881
# Claims 597,146 1,405,862 1,530,874 1,962,384 1,891,554 1,181,447 1,277,102
Panel B: Non-Formulary Plans
OOP price 0.317 0.577 0.728 0.511 0.545 0.737 0.74
Plan price 0.527 0.628 0.621 0.620 0.617 0.804 0.869
# Claims 15,9576 98,807 116,847 193,551 328,233 768,561 845,182
Table shows the R2 obtained from a regression of actual prices, as recorded on
each claim, on the imputed prices, as defined in the text. The correlation is
calculated for the indicated years, using the full set of claims, separately for
formulary and non-formulary plans.
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Table 23: Sample sizes and composition
Total medical spending, 2001-2009 ($1000s)
# People Birth Year % Female All Drug Outpatient
Total OOP Total OOP Total OOP
Full sample 15,765,277 1972 52 15.7 2.0 3.4 0.7 8.5 1.1
At risk for heart disease 4,846,140 1956 52 34.7 4.0 8.3 1.6 17.7 2.2
Drop Baycol 4,829,739 1956 52 34.6 4.0 8.3 1.6 17.7 2.1
First fill 6+ months after entering sample 4,077,343 1958 54 32.6 3.8 7.2 1.4 17.2 2.1
First fill occurs while at risk 3,995,770 1957 53 32.5 3.8 7.2 1.4 17.2 2.1
First fill occurs before age 65 3,968,298 1958 53 32.6 3.8 7.2 1.4 17.2 2.1
First fill in 2001-2005, 2008-2009 2,675,765 1958 53 33.9 3.9 7.6 1.5 17.7 2.2
Continuously enrolled for 12 months 2,004,991 1957 53 38.1 4.4 8.8 1.7 19.9 2.4
Not missing plan information 965,265 1957 53 38.4 4.4 8.9 1.7 19.9 2.4
Plan is in drug data 945,549 1957 53 38.6 4.4 8.9 1.7 20.0 2.4
Has drug 348,160 1951 47 55.1 6.1 14.5 2.8 26.4 3.0
Has formulary plan 296,760 1951 47 56.2 6.0 15.0 2.7 26.8 2.9
The table shows the sample size and average values of indicated variables as I impose increasingly stringent selection criteria. The continuous enrollment
and non-missing plan information criteria must be met at the time of the initial fill (or initial risk factor, for people who never fill a prescription). The
initial sample is the full Marketscan sample of people for whom I ever observe a non-missing value for insurance plan identifier.
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Table 24: Patient summary statistics
Variable: Mean Standard Deviation
Demographics and health:
Age 51.9 7.9
Female (%) 47.4 49.9
Cholesterol (%) 68.0 46.7
Diabetes (%) 24.2 42.8
Heart disease (%) 22.2 41.6
Hypertension (%) 51.7 50.0
Health spending and drug utilization:
Cholesterol drug spending ($) 139.8 133.7
Other drug spending ($) 424.6 477.1
Health spending ($) 601.6 1318.3
Insurance:
Total claims (1000s) 92.8 78.3
% of claims among 4 modes 97.8 2.9
Average branded price ($ /30 DS) 17.0 9.6
Capitated (%) 24.7 43.2
Uncapitated, restricts provider choice (%) 61.8 48.6
Other plan (%) 13.4 34.1
Prescribed drug:
Out of pocket price ($/DS) 16.1 11.3
Statin 81.4 38.9
Comply (%) 51.5 50.0
Switch (%) 11.6 32.0
# People 296,760
# Plans 383
The sample consists of people with a diagnosis of cholesterol-related disorders
and a prescription for a cholesterol drug, first prescribed at least six months after
entering the sample, continuously enrolled for at least 12 months after their first
prescription, and enrolled in formulary-based drug insurance plans.
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Table 25: Robustness of initial prescription estimates to alternative samples
Sample: Baseline Non-formulary plans 10+ claims 25+ claims 50+ claims 100+ claims
OOP Price −1.382 −0.816 −1.568 −1.622 −1.600 −1.690
(0.245) (0.114) (0.274) (0.297) (0.321) (0.373)
Plan Price −0.590 −0.302 −0.516 −0.518 −0.518 −0.515
(0.085) (0.055) (0.089) (0.094) (0.108) (0.121)
DTCA 0.359 0.089 0.290 0.292 0.268 0.173
(0.128) (0.075) (0.164) (0.175) (0.201) (0.243)
Detailing 0.761 0.455 0.983 1.004 0.942 0.961
(0.226) (0.097) (0.350) (0.379) (0.457) (0.556)
N Plans 383 273 177 128 87 69
N People 296, 760 51, 400 202, 721 195, 705 171, 050 144, 187
Table shows the coefficients obtained from a multinomial logit regression of initial prescription against the indicated
variables, as well as molecule fixed effects, and an indicator for imputed price. The sample always consists of people
with a diagnosis of a cholesterol-related disorder and a prescription for a cholesterol drug, first prescribed at least six
months after entering the sample, continuously enrolled for at least 12 months after their first prescription. Column
(1) includes only people enrolled in formulary-based drug insurance plans, and column (2) instead limits the sample
to people not in such plans. Columns (3)-(5) include only formulary plans in which each available drug has at least
the indicated number of claims. Robust standard errors, clustered on plan, are in parentheses.
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Table 26: Robustness of compliance estimates to alternative samples
Sample: Baseline Non-formulary plans 10+ claims 25+ claims 50+ claims 100+ claims
OOP Price −0.498 −0.581 −0.485 −0.470 −0.490 −0.764
(0.125) (0.095) (0.154) (0.163) (0.181) (0.095)
Plan Price −0.046 0.045 −0.005 −0.006 −0.058 −0.119
(0.037) (0.038) (0.052) (0.055) (0.065) (0.047)
DTCA 0.047 0.253 0.082 0.094 0.011 −0.148
(0.099) (0.104) (0.127) (0.135) (0.156) (0.102)
Detailing 0.057 −0.210 −0.053 −0.064 0.092 0.460
(0.171) (0.153) (0.260) (0.280) (0.351) (0.208)
# Plans 383 273 177 128 87 69
# People 296, 760 51, 400 202, 721 195, 705 171, 050 144, 187
Table shows the coefficients obtained from a logit regression of compliance against the indicated variables, as well as
controls for plan generosity (as measured by the average price per day supply of branded drugs), molecule fixed effects,
an indicator for imputed price, and a capitation indicator. The sample always consists of people with a diagnosis
of a cholesterol-related disorder and a prescription for a cholesterol drug, first prescribed at least six months after
entering the sample, continuously enrolled for at least 12 months after their first prescription. Column (1) includes
only people enrolled in formulary-based drug insurance plans, and column (2) instead limits the sample to people not
in such plans. Columns (3)-(5) include only formulary plans in which each available drug has at least the indicated
number of claims. Robust standard errors, clustered on plan, are in parentheses.
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Table 27: Compliance regression: robustness to alternative definitions of compliance
# Of days supplied
for compliance:
90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330
OOP Price −0.56 −0.55 −0.53 −0.50 −0.49 −0.46 −0.39 −0.34 −0.27
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)
Plan Price −0.08 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
DTCA 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 −0.00 0.01 −0.02
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Detailing 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.12
(0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.27)
Mean DV 63.6 59.2 56.0 51.5 47.7 43.1 37.0 28.7 15.3
εp,oop −0.12 −0.13 −0.14 −0.14 −0.15 −0.15 −0.14 −0.14 −0.13
εp,plan −0.07 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.06 −0.06 −0.06 −0.08 −0.09
# People 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 383
#Plans 296, 760 296, 760 296, 760 296, 760 296, 760 296, 760 296, 760 296, 760 296, 760
Table shows the coefficients obtained from a logit regression of compliance against the indicated variables, where compliance is defined as never switching
and filling prescriptions for at least the indicated number of days supplied. All columns include the same set of additional controls: plan generosity
(as measured by the average price per day supply of branded drugs), molecule fixed effects, an indicator for imputed price, and a capitation indicator.
εOOP and εplan are the average elasticities of compliance probability with respect to out-of-pocket and plan price. The sample consists of people with
a diagnosis of cholesterol-related disorders and a prescription for a cholesterol drug, first prescribed at least six months after entering the sample,
continuously enrolled for at least 12 months after their first prescription, and enrolled in formulary-based drug insurance plans. Robust standard errors,
clustered on plan, are in parentheses.
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Table 28: Relationship between compliance and actual prices
Price variable:
(1)
Imputed
(2)
Actual
OOP Price −0.498 −0.517
(0.125) (0.052)
Plan Price −0.046 −0.008
(0.037) (0.010)
DTCA 0.047 0.039
(0.099) (0.085)
Detailing −0.057 −0.011
(0.171) (0.078)
# Plans 383 383
# People 296, 760 294, 123
Table shows the coefficients obtained from a logit regression of compliance against
the indicated variables, as well as controls for plan generosity (as measured by
the average price per day supply of branded drugs), molecule fixed effects, an
indicator for imputed price, and a capitation indicator. In column (1), out-of-
pocket price is imputed as described in the text, while in column (2) price is
imputed as the actual price paid for the initial prescription.
Table 29: Robustness to including outside option
Sample:
(1)
Main
(2)
Include
Outside option
Out of pocket price −1.382 −1.025
(0.245) (0.221)
Plan price −0.590 −0.368
(0.085) (0.073)
DTCA 0.359 0.538
(0.128) (0.105)
Detailing 0.761 0.356
(0.226) (0.190)
εOOP −0.757 −0.572
εplan −1.189 −0.718
# Plans 383 403
# People 296, 760 787, 798
Table shows the coefficients obtained from a multinomial logit regression of ini-
tial prescription against the indicated variables, as well as molecule fixed effects,
and an indicator for imputed price. The main sample consists of people with
a diagnosis of cholesterol-related disorders and a prescription for a cholesterol
drug, first prescribed at least six months after entering the sample, continuously
enrolled for at least 12 months after their first prescription. The “include outside
option” sample further includes people who never received a prescription for an
anti-cholesterol drug but otherwise meet the inclusion criteria. Robust standard
errors, clustered on plan, are in parentheses.
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Table 30: LDL cholesterol reduction, by drug
Generic name Brand name Modal strength LDL cholesterol reduction
atorvastatin Lipitor 10 mg 1.30
simvastatin Zocor 20 mg 1.23
lovastatin Mevacor 40 mg 0.87
pravastatin Pravachol 40 mg 0.92
rosuvastatin Crestor 10 mg 1.53
fluvastatin Lescol 80 mg 1.17
ezetimibe/combo Zetia/Vytorin 10 mg 0.60
niacin and lovastatin Advicor, others 500 mg - 20 mg 1.00
fibrates Many 145 mg 0.61
niacin Many 500 mg 0.07
BARs Many 625 mg 0.50
Modal strength is the modal strength, by days supplied, in my data. LDL cholesterol reduction is reported
on FDA labels; see drugs FDA. See Appendix A.3 for more detail.
Table 31: Results from the Monte Carlo Experiment: Utility Function Estimates
Parameter: Truth E[β] SD[β] Coverage
Patient utility function:
OOP Price 1.130 0.919 0.088 0.30
OOP Price× capitated −1.258 −0.911 0.100 0.14
Capitated 0.552 0.364 0.070 0.18
Average price of branded drugs 0.597 0.502 0.114 0.74
Imputed price 0.244 0.260 0.074 1.00
Visit utility −1.075 −1.138 0.039 0.90
Doctor utility function:
Weight on patient utility 0.568 0.580 0.032 0.78
Plan price −0.399 −0.372 0.022 0.66
Plan price× capitated −0.595 −0.599 0.021 0.92
Detailing 0.903 0.861 0.051 0.86
Table shows the results from a Monte Carlo experiment in which the data were simulated 50 times and the
model estimated in each simulated data set. The first column gives the parameter value in the simulation.
The column labelled E[β] gives the average point estimate and SD[β] gives their standard deviation across
data sets. The final column gives the coverage rate for 90% confidence intervals. These confidence intervals
are constructed from robust standard errors that allow for arbitrary within-plan correlation.
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Table 32: Results from the Monte Carlo Experiment: Match Quality Distribution
Molecule: Doctor mean Patient mean Patient SD
Truth E[β] SD[β] Coverage Truth E[β] SD[β] Coverage Truth E[β] SD[β] Coverage
Lipitor 0 0.605 0.513 0.056 0.42 1
Zocor 0.31 0.016 0.044 0 −0.26 0.416 0.08 0 0.947 0.592 0.059 0
Mevacor −1.811 −1.817 0.077 0.86 0.831 0.891 0.091 0.98 −2.526 −2.548 0.021 1
Pravachol 2.067 1.738 0.085 0.56 −8.97 −9.13 0.085 1 1.676 1.649 0.014 1
Crestor −1.268 −1.314 0.059 1 −0.825 −0.781 0.062 1 0.667 0.569 0.063 1
Lescol −2.305 −2.338 0.077 0.98 0.807 0.704 0.131 1 −2.033 −2.047 0.011 1
Zetia/Vytorin −1.158 −1.089 0.076 1 −2.299 −2.209 0.056 1 0.886 0.727 0.043 1
Niacin Combo −2.518 −2.587 0.095 1 −0.465 −0.496 0.043 1 0.387 0.317 0.104 1
Fibrates 0.849 0.901 0.074 1 −4.567 −4.386 0.105 1 1.127 0.962 0.029 0.62
Niacin −0.226 −0.234 0.094 1 −3.44 −3.402 0.056 1 0.794 0.703 0.039 1
BARs −0.767 −0.842 0.087 1 −0.69 −0.763 0.117 1 −1.614 −1.639 0.018 1
Table shows the results from a Monte Carlo experiment in which the data were simulated 50 times and the model estimated in each simulated data set.
The first column gives the parameter value in the simulation. The column labelled E[β] gives the average point estimate and SD[β] gives their standard
deviation across data sets. The final column gives the coverage rate for 90% confidence intervals. These confidence intervals are constructed from robust
standard errors that allow for arbitrary within-plan correlation.
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Figure 12: Distribution of prices in two plans, 2003
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Figure shows the empirical distribution of prices paid for 30 days supplied of anti-
cholesterol drugs, in two plans from 2003.
A.6. Appendix tables for Chapter 3
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Figure 13: Empirical distribution of prices in 2001
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Figure shows the empirical distribution of out-of-pocket prices for 30 days supplied of anti-cholesterol drugs,
for the 24 largest plans in 2001. These plains contained 90.6% of all claims for 30 days supplied in 2001.
The plotted distributions are left censored at zero and right censored at the 99.5th percentile of prices paid.
Each panel shows the distribution for a separate plan, and reports the number of claims for that plan, the
percent of claims at one of the top four modes, and the percent of claims that are censored. The dashed and
solid lines show the generic and branded price reported by the plan documentation.
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Table 33: Robustness to CP(2) in permanent income and preferences
Dependent var.iable: Annuity Has annuity Has “true”
income income annuity income
Panel A: Reduced form
ln price −8.55∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.04∗
(3.81) (0.08) (0.02)
Panel B: IV results
Has Medigap 20.09∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.10∗
(9.57) (0.24) (0.06)
Elasticity .92 .54 .86
# Obs 3163 3163 3163
# People 1322 1322 1322
Notes: The table shows the reduced form impact of Medigap price on the indicated outcome, and
the instrumental variable estimate of Medigap coverage and Medicaid policy variables, with price
as the excluded instrument. The sample is described in the main text. Additional controls are
a quartic in age; sex, race, marital status, and education dummies; year fixed effects; a cubic
in log average yearly income, plus log average yearly income interacted with age; dummies for
chronic conditions and self-reported health status, plus a complete polynomial of degree two in log
permanent income, subjective risk tolerance, subjective mortality, interacted with an indicator for
good or excellent health. Elasticities are calculated at sample means. Standard errors clustered on
individual in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01.
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Table 34: Control for pre-age 65 endogenous variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Controls: Basic Full controls
Dependent variable: Annuity Has annuity Has “true” Annuity Has annuity Has “true”
income income annuity income income annuity
Panel A: Reduced form
ln price −9.14∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −0.04∗ −8.32∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.04∗
(3.91) (0.09) (0.02) (4.00) (0.08) (0.02)
Panel B: IV
Has Medigap 21.52∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.10∗ 20.89∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.10
(9.96) (0.25) (0.06) (10.58) (0.25) (0.06)
# Obs 3138 3138 3138 3138 3138 3138
# People 1312 1312 1312 1312 1312 1312
Controls:
Basic X X X X X X
Permanent inc. X X X
Health X X X
Preference X X X
Notes: The table shows the reduced form impact of Medigap price on the indicated outcome, and the instrumental variable estimate
of Medigap coverage, with price as the excluded instrument. The sample is described in the main text. Basic controls are a quartic in
age, sex, race, marital status, and education dummies, and year fixed effects. The sample is described in the main text. Basic controls
are a quartic in age, sex, race, marital status, and education dummies, and year fixed effects. Full controls add controls for a cubic in
log average yearly income, plus log average yearly income interacted with age; dummies for chronic conditions and self-reported health
status; and subjective measures of risk tolerance and mortality. Standard errors clustered on individual in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗
indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01.
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Table 35: Control for spouse’s preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Controls: Spouse preferences Spouse preferences, interactions
Dependent variable: Annuity Has annuity Has “true” Annuity Has annuity Has “true”
income income annuity income income annuity
Panel A: Reduced form
ln price −10.07∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −0.05∗ −9.89∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.05∗
(5.21) (0.09) (0.03) (5.35) (0.09) (0.02)
Panel B: IV
Has Medigap 27.02∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.13∗ 26.60∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.12∗
(14.85) (0.29) (0.07) (15.18) (0.29) (0.07)
Elasticity 1.21 .62 1.15 1.2 .61 1.09
# Obs 2949 2949 2949 2949 2949 2949
# People 1231 1231 1231 1231 1231 1231
Notes: The table shows the reduced form impact of Medigap price on the indicated outcome, and the instrumental variable estimate of
Medigap coverage, with price as the excluded instrument. Spouse preferences are spouse’s subjective risk tolerance and mortality. The
interactions are a complete polynomial of degree 2 in spouse risk tolerance, spouse mortality, own risk tolerance, and own mortality.
The sample is described in the main text. Basic controls are a quartic in age, sex, race, marital status, and education dummies, and
year fixed effects. The sample is described in the main text. Basic controls are a quartic in age, sex, race, marital status, and education
dummies, and year fixed effects. Full controls add controls for a cubic in log average yearly income, plus log average yearly income
interacted with age; dummies for chronic conditions and self-reported health status; and subjective measures of risk tolerance and
mortality. Standard errors clustered on individual in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01.
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Table 36: Exclude Medicaid recipients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Controls: Basic Full controls
Dependent variable: Annuity Has annuity Has “true” Annuity Has annuity Has “true”
income income annuity income income annuity
Panel A: Reduced form
ln price −9.36∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.05 −8.61∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.05
(4.62) (0.10) (0.03) (4.37) (0.09) (0.03)
Panel B: IV
Has Medigap 21.50∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.10 20.10∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.11
(11.44) (0.27) (0.07) (10.91) (0.27) (0.07)
Elasticity 0.97 0.54 0.90 0.90 0.53 0.91
# Obs 2705 2705 2705 2705 2705 2705
# People 1179 1179 1179 1179 1179 1179
Controls:
Basic X X X X X X
Permanent inc. X X X
Health X X X
Preference X X X
Notes: The table shows the reduced form impact of Medigap price on the indicated outcome, and the instrumental variable estimate
of Medigap coverage, with price as the excluded instrument. The sample is described in the main text, except dropping people with
Medicaid coverage. The sample is described in the main text. Basic controls are a quartic in age, sex, race, marital status, and
education dummies, and year fixed effects. Full controls add controls for a cubic in log average yearly income, plus log average yearly
income interacted with age; dummies for chronic conditions and self-reported health status; and subjective measures of risk tolerance
and mortality. Standard errors clustered on individual in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01.
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A.7. Appendix: Additional Features of Annual Earnings Test11
When current benefits are lost to the AET, future scheduled benefits are increased in some
circumstances. This is sometimes called ”benefit enhancement.” As we describe, for workers
NRA or older in the pre-2000 period (when they faced the AET), benefit enhancement
attenuates the effective AET BRR for individuals considering earning enough to trigger the
benefit enhancement, but it does not attenuate the effective AET BRR for those considering
earning less than this amount.
The benefit enhancement rules have varied over time, and they depend on whether the
beneficiary is above or below NRA. Prior to 1972, there was no benefit enhancement for
people aged NRA and older. In these years, the AET represented a pure loss in benefits
for those NRA and above (equivalent to a pure tax). For beneficiaries NRA and older,
a one percent Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) was introduced in 1972. The DRC was
intended to compensate beneficiaries who delayed claiming beyond age 65, but they also
apply to earnings lost to the AET. For individuals above NRA, benefits are increased 1/12
of 1 percent for each month between ages 65 and 72 for which no benefits received after
1972 (Social Security, 2012, Table 2.A.20).12
This language indicates that each month’s worth of foregone benefits—either because of
delayed claiming or because of the AET—results in increased future benefits. A beneficiary
has to forego an entire month of benefits in order to receive the DRC; if, for example,
she earns slightly over the exempt amount and loses only a small amount of benefits to
the AET, then her future benefits are not adjusted. Thus, the DRC provides no marginal
relief from the AET for a claimant who is considering earning near the exempt amount: no
benefit enhancement occurs when she earns a marginal dollar at or near the AET earnings
threshold. Meanwhile, if she earns enough to forego an entire month’s worth of benefits
11This section is based on table 2.A.20 of the Annual Statistical Supplement of the Social Security bulletin,
as well as extensive email correspondence with numerous officials at the Social Security Administration.
12The size of the DRC was increased to three percent per year in 1982, and then increased steadily
throughout the 1990s, reaching eight percent for each year of foregone benefits in 2008. Starting in 1983,
benefit enhancement only applied through age 69.
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(but not when a smaller amount of benefits is lost due to the AET), future benefits are
increased by 1/12 of 1 percent.
As a result of these rules, future benefits are enhanced when the individual’s yearly earnings
are over z∗ +(MB/τ), where z∗ is the exempt amount, MB is the monthly benefit, and τ is
the AET benefit reduction rate.13 For example, with a typical monthly benefit of $1,000 and
a benefit reduction rate of 33.33 percent, benefit enhancement occurs when the individual’s
yearly earnings are $3,000 (=$1000/0.3333) above the exempt amount. Benefit enhancement
corresponding to one more month of reduced earnings occurs once annual earnings reaches
$6,000 above the exempt amount, and so forth. Thus, benefit enhancement is only relevant
to an individual considering earning substantially in excess of the exempt amount and is
therefore not relevant to marginal earnings decisions at the exempt amount. Indeed, this
theoretical presumption is consistent with suggestive evidence we describe that indicates
little systematic bunching reaction to changes in the DRC and that mean age at death is
smooth near the exempt amount.
The AET is implemented in a number of stages. First, SSA must determine that a claimant
is expected to exceed the exempt amount, or that she has already done so. Claimaints can
notify SSA in advance if they expect to exceed the exempt amount, or they can report their
earnings ex post facto at any point in the year. In addition, SSA uses W-2 records at the
end of the year to determine if the AET threshold has been crossed (for those who have a
W-2). Second, SSA withholds OASI benefits in monthly increments, until enough benefits
have been withheld to cover the AET penalty amount. For example, assume an individual
aged 66 with a monthly benefit of $1,200 earns $1,800 dollars beyond the AET exempt
amount in 1992, when the benefit reduction rate was 0.3333. This individual should receive
a yearly benefit reduction of $1,800 × 0.3333 = $600. SSA withholds an entire month’s
check, $1,200, in order to collect the $600. Finally, at the end of the year, SSA refunds any
13Another month’s benefit enhancement would occur if the individual earns more than z∗ +(2MB/τ); a
third month’s benefit enhancement would occur if she earns more than z∗ +(3MB/τ); and so on. Note that
this creates 12 notches in the budget set, the final one at z∗ +(12MB/τ).
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overwithheld benefits. In the same example, at the end of the year SSA would return $600
in overwithheld benefits. Importantly, the DRC is not applied to future benefits in this
case—less than a month’s worth of benefits, $600, was ultimately collected by SSA, after
factoring overwithholding and refunds. After considering both withholding and refunds, the
AET is ultimately applied at a yearly level—much in the same way that the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) is applied at the annual level but the receipt of the credit depends on
one’s withholding patterns and when the income tax return is filed.
In sum, for people NRA and older, the AET effectively acts as a kink for those earning close
enough to the exempt amount, and benefit enhancement does not attenuate the marginal
work disincentives associated with the AET in this range of earnings. However, the DRC
is relevant to an individual considering earning enough to reduce her OASI benefit by at
least a month’s worth (i.e. at least z∗ +(MB/τ)). Empirically, we find that limiting the
sample to those with substantial OASI benefits—for whom this earnings level is several
thousand dollars above the AET exempt amount, and for whom the notch created by the
DRC is therefore less relevant—yields very similar results to those we have shown. Our
empirical specification alternatively assumes that benefit enhancement does not affect the
AET implicit marginal tax rate (or does), and we find similar patterns in both specifications.
Note that in our empirical estimation, the region we ”dummy out” near the kink z∗ is [z∗−
2800, z∗+2800]. Thus, if all of the ”bunchers” arrived at the kink from initial earnings levels
between z∗ and z∗+ 2800, we could find zero bunching despite substantial actual bunching.
However, the earnings densities clearly show that the polynomial does not substantially
overpredict bunching in the region above the exempt amount. Moreover, the densities also
show no evidence of bunching near notches in the budget set created by the DRC. We
alternatively use a bandwidth of $500 and find similar results.
Individuals younger than NRA are subject to different rules for benefit adjustment, called
”actuarial adjustment.” The rule for this younger group was introduced in the legislation
allowing people younger than 65 to claim early benefits (in 1956 for women and in 1961 for
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men). For those younger than NRA, future benefits are reduced 5/9 of 1 percent for each
month under age 65 in which an individual claims benefits (Social Security, 2012, Table
2.A.20). This implies that if a beneficiary has any income withheld under the AET in a
given month, then she receives a full benefit enhancement for that month. On the other
hand, if a beneficiary does not have any income withheld under the AET in a given month,
then she receives no benefit enhancement for that month. This creates a notch at the
exempt amount—a discontinuous increase in future benefits when moving from just under
the exempt amount to just over it—creating incentives to bunch just above the exempt
amount in order to receive the monthly (or yearly) benefit adjustment. We find no evidence
for this kind of behavior; in fact, as we document in Gelber, Jones, and Sacks (2013),
people tend to have earnings just below the exempt amount, exactly opposite the behavior
we would expect if people were responding to the notch just described. Because benefit
enhancement occurs at exactly the same earnings level that the AET begins to apply for
those under NRA, we focus on the group NRA and above.
Formally, the number of months’ worth of benefit enhancement enjoyed by OASI recipients
is therefore floor(τ ·(z−z∗)/MB) for those NRA and above, and ceiling(τ ·(z−z∗)/MB) for
those below NRA.
Benefit enhancement is actuarially fair if the net present value of the benefit enhancement
equals the benefits lost due to the AET. The actuarial adjustment is approximately actuari-
ally fair in the sense that delaying OASI claiming an extra year is approximately actuarially
fair ; however, this does not imply that benefit enhancement is actuarially fair when an
additional dollar of benefits is withheld due to the AET. For example, actuarial adjustment
is not actuarially fair for (among others) those with positive OASI benefits considering
earning an additional amount above the AET exempt amount, because this does not result
in additional benefit enhancement. Similar considerations apply to the DRC: additional
marginal increments of earnings are not compensated through benefit enhancement (except
in the case when an individual goes from earning just under to just over z∗ +(MB/τ) (or
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one of the other 12 thresholds)).
The AET applies to an individual’s earnings; spouses’ earnings do not count in the earnings
total to which the AET is applied. For a retired worker (i.e. primary) beneficiary whose
spouse collects spousal benefits, the AET reduces the family’s OASI benefit by the amounts
we have described. The family benefit is also reduced when the spouse (separately) earns
more than the AET threshold. For a retired worker beneficiary whose spouse is collecting
benefits on his or her own earnings record, the AET reduces the retired worker beneficiary’s
benefits by the amounts described while not affecting the spouse’s benefits. Thus, following
previous literature (e.g. Friedberg 1998, 2000), we model the AET as creating the MTRs
associated with the BRRs described, because the AET reduces family benefits by these
amounts (all else equal). Our data do not contain the information necessary to link spouses
(except when one spouse is claiming OASI benefits on the other spouse’s record).
It is also worth noting how the actuarial adjustment and DRC interact with incentives for
claiming OASI. Under the actuarial adjustment, the full benefit enhancement occurs when
the individual earnings over the threshold level. Thus, the individual could in principle
claim OASI; earn just over this threshold level; collect nearly her entire OASI benefit in
this year (since the AET only reduces current OASI benefits at the margin); and later
enjoy full benefit enhancement. This illustrates the more general point that it can be in an
individual’s interest to claim OASI even if the individual faces the AET. More generally,
for individuals for whom the AET reduces OASI benefits sufficiently little, and for whom
current OASI benefits are sufficiently important, it can be in their interest to claim OASI
even if they face the AET. Appendix Figure 35 shows that among the sample of individuals
who have not claimed by year t, the hazard of claiming at year t + 1 is smooth near the
kink, indicating no evidence that claimants come disproportionately from close to or far
from the kink.
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A.8. Appendix: Procedure for Estimating Normalized Excess Bunching (for online
publication)
In order to estimate excess normalized bunching, we use the following procedure. For each
centered-earnings bin zi, we calculate pi, the proportion of all people with earnings in the
range [zi − k/2, zi + k/2) (in a given time period and for a given age group). For example,
underlying the first panel in Figure 5 is the probability pi of earning in various bins zi for
62 year-olds in the 1990-1999 period. The earnings bins are normalized by distance-to-kink,
so that for zi = 0, pi is the fraction of people with earnings in the range [−k/2, k/2). To
estimate bunching, we assume that pi can be written as
pi =
D∑
d=0
βd(zi)
d +
k∑
n=−k
γk1{zi = kδ}+ εi (A.1)
and run this regression. This equation expresses the earnings distribution as a degree D
polynomial, plus a set of indicators for each bin within kδ of the kink, where δ is the
binwidth. In our empirical application, we choose D = 7, δ = 800 and k = 3 (so that seven
bins are excluded from the polynomial estimation, including the bin centered at the kink).
We show that our results to alternative choices of D, δ, and k.
Our measure of excess mass is ˆEM =
∑k
n=−k γˆk, the estimated excess probability of locating
at the kink (relative to the polynomial term). This measure depends on the counterfactual
density near the kink, so to obtain a measure of excess mass that is comparable at the kink,
we scale by the predicted density that would obtain if there were no bunching. This is just
the constant term in the polynomial, since the zi is distance to zero. So our estimate of
normalized excess mass is
Bˆ =
ˆEM
βˆ0
. (A.2)
We consider two approaches for constructing standard errors. First, from Equation (A.2), it
is straightforward to apply the Delta method. Second, we employ the parametric bootstrap
procedure of Chetty, Friedman, Olsen and Pistaferri (2011). This bootstrap draws with
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replacement from the estimated distribution of errors εi from Equation (A.1). For each set
of draws, we get a new value of pi and use these new values to re-estimate B. The standard
deviation across draws of B is our measure of the standard error Bˆ. In practice these two
procedures produced extremely similar results, so we only report standard errors from the
bootstrap.
A.9. Appendix: Social Security Data
Our data come from the Social Security Master Earnings File (MEF), which is described
more extensively in Song and Manchester (2007). The MEF is a longitudinal history of
Social Security taxable earnings for all Social Security Numbers (SSNs) in the U.S. Our data
are a one percent random sample of SSNs; we randomly extract SSNs from the database and
follow each of these individuals over the full time period. The AET is based on earnings
as measured in this dataset. Prior to 1978, the data have information on annual FICA
earnings; since 1978, the data have information on uncapped wage compensation. Before
1978, the data do not clearly distinguish between earnings from self-employment and non-
self-employment earnings, but we are able to distinguish them in the data starting in 1978.
The data also contain information on date of birth, date of death, and sex.
We supplement the MEF with information from the Master Beneficiary Record (MBR) file,
which contains data on the day, month, and year that people began to claim Social Security
(and other variables). The majority of workers excluded from OASDI coverage are in four
main categories: (1) federal civilian employees hired before January 1, 1984; (2) agricultural
workers and domestic workers whose earnings do not meet certain minimum requirements;
(3) individuals with very low net earnings from self-employment (generally less than $400
per year); and (4) employees of several state and local governments. However, civil service
and other government workers are covered by Medicare and are therefore present in the
MBR.
In choosing our main sample, we take into account a number of considerations. It is desirable
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to show a constant sample in making comparisons of earnings densities. Meanwhile, the
AET only affects people who claim OASI, and thus we wish to focus on claimants. However,
many individuals claim OASI at ages over the Early Entitlement Age (62), implying that
they have not claimed at younger ages but have claimed by older ages. This implies that to
investigate a constant sample, we cannot simply limit the sample to claimants at each age
(because many people move from not claiming to claiming). To balance these considerations,
our main sample at each age and year consists of individuals who ultimately claim in
the year they turn 65 or earlier. We show that the results are robust to other sample
definitions. Because we focus on the intensive margin response (consistent with Saez (2010)
and subsequent papers on bunching), we further limit the sample to observations with
positive earnings in our main analysis.
Information on AET parameters is from table 2.A.20 and 2.A.29 of the Annual Statistical
Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin. Friedberg (1998, 2000) provides a thorough
description of these rules. All dollar amounts are deflated to 2010 dollars using the CPI-U.
The standard deviation is large because of very rare abberrant large values of earnings (as
documented in Utendorf 2001/2); these do not affect our estimates in the figures or tables
because they are far above the AET exempt amount, and they affect mean earnings far less
than they affect the standard deviation. The results are robust to winsorizing.
In 1983-1999, the AET is assessed on earnings until the month in which the individual
turns age 70. For simplicity, in our baseline sample we measure age as calendar year minus
year of birth. Thus, if an individual turns age 70 later in the year—in the extreme case,
on December 31—she will have had an incentive to bunch at the kink during nearly the
entire year when she is classified as age 70 in our data. As a result, her yearly earnings
may appear to be located at or near the kink even though she is bunching at the kink
applicable to 69-year-olds through almost all of the calendar year over which her earnings
are observed. However, the figure shows that significant bunching occurs at age 71, which
cannot be due to this coarse measure of birth dates. Thus, the results do show a delay in
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complete adjustment. We have also found substantial and significant (p < 0.01) bunching at
age 70 among those born in January, who no longer face the AET immediately in January
of the year they turn 70 and therefore should not show excess bunching at this age in the
absence of adjustment frictions. Likewise, we find a spike in mean earnings growth from
age 70 to age 71 among those born in January. In our sample period, the AET applied
to ages 62-71 before 1983, and it applied to ages under NRA in 2000 and after. In these
time periods, examining only those born in January also shows a delay in responding to the
removal of the AET.
Since 1978, the earnings test has been assessed on yearly earnings, implying that we analyze
the appropriate time period, i.e. earnings in a calendar year. Prior to 1978, the earnings
test was assessed on quarterly earnings. While there is likely some error in measuring the
amount of bunching pre-1978, we believe that this is not a major issue: the patterns of
bunching in the pre-1978 period are visually clear and appear unlikely to be changed in
a qualitative sense by an examination of quarterly data. Moreover, Figure 8 shows that
the amount of excess bunching falls from 1977 to 1978 and subsequent years, rather than
rising as we might expect if we hypothetically measured bunching more accurately starting
in 1978.
A.10. Appendix: Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics
We use the Longitudinal Employer Household Dyanmics (LEHD) dataset, which contains
wage data available from state-level unemployment insurance (UI) programs. These data
measure uncapped quarterly earnings for employees covered by state unemployment insur-
ance systems, estimated to cover over 95 percent of private sector employment. Although
coverage laws vary slightly from state to state, UI programs do not cover federal employees,
the self-employed, and many agricultural workers, domestic workers, churches, nonprofits,
and state and local government employees. We examine a 20 percent random sample of the
original LEHD file, as this was the largest amount of data that our available server space
could handle.
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These administrative earnings records are linked across quarters to create individual work
histories. In addition to earnings, information on gender and date of birth are available.
The data on employees are linked to data on firms. Each firm at which an individual
works in a given quarter is identified through a firm identifier. We consider an employee
to have changed employers from year t to year t+ 1 if at least one of the federal employer
IDs at which the employee works in year t is different in year t + 1. However, when the
individual works at one or more employer in year t and does not work at any employer in
year t+ 1, we drop this individual from the sample. The results are similar when we treat
these individuals as if they changed employers.
We select data from 1990-1999. During this period, the AET explicit benefit reduction rate
was constant. 1990-1999 also represent natural years to investigate because large sample
sizes are not available in the LEHD prior to 1990. When we include other years and age
groups in the LEHD sample, we find similar results to those reported here. Note that the
population we investigate is not constant over this period, because (among other reasons)
an increasingly broad set of states is included in the LEHD over time. Data are available
on 13 states in 1990, climbing to 28 states by 1999. In a given quarter, we include in our
sample all states whose data are available. Holding the sample constant yields very similar
results.
A.11. Appendix: Model of Earnings Response
A.11.1. Baseline Model
We start with a baseline, frictionless model of earnings, following Saez (2010). We briefly
sketch the key features of this model for comparison to our model with a fixed cost of
adjustment. In Saez (2010), individuals maximize utility over consumption, c, and costly
earnings, z:
u (c, z;n)
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Heterogeneity is parameterized by an ”ability” parameter n, which is distributed accord-
ing to the smooth cdf F (·). Individuals maximize utility subject to the following budget
constraint:
c = (1− τ) z +R
where R is virtual income. This leads to the first order condition:
−uz (c, z;n)
uc (c, z;n)
= (1− τ) ,
which implicitly defines an earnings supply function: z (1− τ,R, n).
When necessary, we will use a quasi-linear and iso-elastic utility function:
u (c, z;n) = c− n
1 + 1/ε
( z
n
)1+1/ε
Under this assumption, the first order condition simplifies to:
(1− τ)−
( z
n
) 1
ε
= 0,
which implies this earnings supply function:
z = n (1− τ)ε .
A.11.2. Linear Tax Schedule
Consider first a linear tax schedule with a constant marginal tax rate τ0. Observe that
with a smooth distribution of skills n, we have a smooth distribution of earnings that is
monotonic in skill, provided we make the typical Spence-Mirlees assumption. Let H0 (·)
denote the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of earnings under the constant marginal
tax rate, and let h0 (·) = H ′0 (·) denote the density of this distribution. Under quasilinear
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utility, we have:
H0 (z) = F
(
z
(1− τ0)ε
)
.
Define H1 (·) and h1 (·) as the smooth CDF and density of earnings under a higher, constant
marginal tax rate τ1; H1 is defined similarly as a function of τ1.
A.11.3. Kinked Tax Schedule
Now consider a piecewise linear tax schedule with a convex kink: the marginal tax rate
below earnings level z∗ is τ0, and the marginal tax rate above z∗ is τ1 > τ0. Given the tax
schedule, individuals bunch at the kink point z∗; as explained in Saez (2010), the realized
density in earnings has an excess mass at z∗. Denote the realized distribution of earnings
once the kink has been introduced at z∗ as H (·):
H (z) =
 H0 (z) if z < z
∗
H1 (z) if z ≥ z∗
Denote the density of this realized distribution as h (·) = H ′ (·). In general there is now a
discrete jump in the earnings density at z∗:
h (z) =
 h0 (z) if z < z
∗
h1 (z) if z > z
∗
The share of people who relocate to the kink is:
B =
∫ z∗+4z∗
z∗
h0 (ζ) dζ
These ”bunchers” are those whose ex ante earnings lie in the range [z∗, z∗ +4z∗], who are
induced to locate at the kink by the rise in the MTR above the kink point. For relatively
small changes in the tax rate, we can relate the elasticity of earnings with respect to the net-
of-tax rate to the earnings change 4z∗ for the individual with the highest ex ante earnings
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who bunches ex post :
ε =
4z∗/z∗
dτ1/ (1− τ0)
where dτ1 = τ1 − τ0.14
A.11.4. Graphical Exposition
Appendix Figure 14 depicts a setting in which a kinked budget set is introduced. In Panels
A and B, the x-axis shows before-tax-and-transfer income, z, and the y-axis shows after-
tax-and-transfer consumption, z − T (z). Consider first a linear tax (Panel A) at a rate
of τ . An individual optimally locates at a point of tangency, where the marginal rate of
substitution (MRS) between earnings and consumption equals the net-of-tax rate, 1 − τ .
The figure shows indifference curves and earnings levels for low- and high-earning agents
(labeled L and H, respectively). The low earner has an earnings level of z∗, while the high
earner receives z∗ +4z.
Suppose the AET is introduced (on top of pre-existing taxes), so that the marginal net-of-
tax rate decreases to 1− τ −dτ for earnings above a threshold z∗. For small dτ , individuals
earning in the neighborhood above z∗ will reduce their earnings. If ability is smoothly
distributed, a range of individuals will locate exactly at z∗, due to the discontinuous jump
in the marginal net-of-tax rate at z∗. In Panels A and B, individual L has the lowest ex
ante earnings among those who bunch at z∗, individual H has the highest ex ante earnings
in this group, and all others previously earning between z∗ and z∗ +4z also bunch at z∗.
Those with ex ante earnings higher than z∗ +4z reduce their earnings to a level greater
than z∗.
Panels C and D of Figure 14 depict densities of earnings we would expect to observe in the
absence and presence of the AET, respectively. The x-axis shows before-tax earnings, z,
and the y-axis measures the density of earnings. In Panel C, the density is continuous at z∗,
14This formula holds if there is a single elasticity ε in the population. Under heterogeneity, the method
returns ε¯, the average elasticity among bunchers. We investigate cases with heterogeneity below.
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reflecting a smooth distribution of ability. The blue region represents the set of individuals
who bunch at z∗ in the presence of the AET, i.e. those earning in [z∗, z∗ +4z] in the
absence of the AET. Panel D shows that once the AET is introduced, these individuals
locate in the neighborhood of z∗. However, rather than depicting a mass point exactly at
z∗, we have shown bunching in the region at and surrounding z∗, reflecting the fact that
individuals often cannot bunch exactly at the kink point (as discussed, for example, in Saez,
2010).
A.11.5. Fixed Adjustment Costs
We now extend the model to include a fixed cost of adjusting earnings. We assume that the
adjustment cost reflects a disutility of φ∗ of increasing or decreasing earnings from some
initial earnings level. We begin by analyzing the response to a change in the marginal tax
rate from τ0 to τ1, where the tax schedule is linear in both cases, in order to build intuition
for the case with a kinked budget set. We assume that following a change in tax rates from
τ0 to τ1, the gain (absent adjustment costs) to reoptimizing is increasing in n. In general,
this requires that the size of the optimal earnings adjustment increases in n at a rate faster
than the decrease in the marginal utility of consumption.15 This is true, for example, if
utility is quasilinear.
If the gain in utility is monotonically increasing in initial earnings, and the cost of adjust-
ment is fixed, there exists a unique level of initial earnings at which the agent is indifferent
between adjusting and staying at the initial earnings level. We formally state the implica-
tions in the following result:
Remark 1 (Linear Tax Change and Adjustment Costs).
15To see this, note that the utility gain from reoptimizing is u ((1− τ1) z1 +R1, z1;n) −
u ((1− τ1) z0 +R1, z0;n) ≈ uc · (1− τ1) [z1 − z0] + uz · [z1 − z0] = uc · (τ1 − τ0) [z0 − z1], where in the first
expression, we have used a first-order approximation for utility at ((1− τ0) z0 +R0, z0) and in the second
expression we have used the first order condtion uz = −uc (1− τ0). The gain in utility is approximately
equal to an expression that depends on the marginal utility of consumption, the change in tax rates, and
the size of the earnings adjustment. The first term, uc, is decreasing as n (and therefore initial earnings z0)
increases. Thus, in order for the gain in utility to be increasing in n, we need the size of earnings adjustment
[z0 − z1] to increase at a rate that dominates.
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After a change in linear tax rates from τ0 to τ1, if there is a constant adjustment cost of
φ∗ and the size of the optimal earnings adjustment increases in n at a rate faster than the
decrease in the marginal utility of consumption, then:
1. There is a unique threshold of initial earnings, z0,φ, above which all individuals will
adjust their earnings in response to the tax change. Those initially locating below the
threshold will not adjust.
2. The threshold level of earnings satisfies the following identity:
u ((1− τ1) z1,φ +R1, z1,φ)− u ((1− τ1) z0,φ +R1, z0,φ) ≡ φ∗
where z1,φ is the ex post earnings level of the individual who initially locates at z0,φ.
In other words, at the threshold level, the gain in u from adjusting earnings is exactly
equal to the adjustment cost φ∗.
3. In the case of quasilinear utility, the threshold level of earnings is:
z0,φ =
φ∗
α (ε, τ0, τ1)
where
α (ε, τ0, τ1) ≡ 1− τ1
1 + ε
[(
1− τ1
1− τ0
)ε
− 1 + ε
(
τ1 − τ0
1− τ1
)]
.
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4. The ex post distribution of earnings is:
H (z) =

H0 (z) if z < z1,φ
H0 (z) +H1 (z)−H0 (z0,φ) if z ∈ [z1,φ, z0,φ]
H1 (z) if z > z0,φ
h (z) =

h0 (z) if z < z1,φ
h0 (z) + h1 (z) if z ∈ [z1,φ, z0,φ]
h1 (z) if z > z0,φ
where H0 (·) and H1 (·) are the CDFs of earnings in the presence of linear tax rates
τ0 and τ1, respectively.
Next, consider choices in the presence of adjustment costs on a budget set with a convex
kink. Consider again an initial linear tax schedule with marginal tax rate τ0. Now, introduce
a higher MTR τ1 > τ0 for earnings above z
∗. We again assume that the gain to reoptimizing
is increasing in initial earnings over the range [z∗, z∗ +4z∗]. Using the same logic as above—
the gain in utility is monotonically increasing in initial earnings, and the cost of adjustment
is fixed—there exists a unique level of initial earnings at which the agent is indifferent
between adjusting and staying at the initial earnings level. Thus, we have the following
result:
Remark 2 (Non-Linear Tax and Adjustment Costs).
When a kink is introduced in the budget set (i.e. a jump in marginal tax rates from τ0 below
z∗ to τ1 above z∗), there is a fixed adjustment cost of φ∗, and z∗ ≥ z1,φ,16 then:
1. Individuals with initial earnings below a unique threshold z do not adjust their earn-
ings.
16z1,φ is again the ex post level of earnings for the individual who initially locates at z0,φ – where z0,φ
is the initial earnings level over which individuals adjust their earnings defined above in Remark (1). Note
that z denotes this threshold in the non-linear budget set case, whereas z0,φ denotes this threshold in the
linear budget set case.
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2. The threshold level of earnings is implicitly defined by the following:
u ((1− τ1) z∗ +R1, z∗)− u ((1− τ1) z +R1, z) ≡ φ∗ (A.3)
z∗ ≤ z ≤ z∗ +4z∗.
3. Individuals with intial earnings in [z, z∗ +4z∗] bunch at the kink point z∗.
4. Individuals with initial earnings above z∗ +4z∗ reduce their earnings to a new level
of earnings higher than z∗.
5. The ex post distribution of earnings is:
H (z) =

H0 (z) if z < z
∗
H0 (z) +H1 (z)−H0 (z) if z ∈ [z∗, z]
H1 (z) if z > z
h (z) =

h0 (z) if z < z
∗
h0 (z) + h1 (z) if z ∈ [z∗, z]
h1 (z) if z > z
6. Excess bunching at z∗ is given by:
B =
∫ z∗+4z∗
z
h0 (ζ) dζ
If the kink point z∗ is lower than z1,φ, then:
1. Individuals only adjust their earnings if their initial earnings level is above the thresh-
old z0,φ.
2. There is no bunching at z∗.
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3. The ex post distribution of earnings is the same as in the case of a change in a linear
tax rate from τ0 to τ1 described in Remark (1).
A.11.6. Derivation of Closed-Form Solution for Elasticity and Adjustment Cost (Compar-
ative Static Approach)
As we discuss in Remark (2) above and in Section 2.7 in the text, the amount of bunching
in the presence of a fixed adjustment cost is equal to the integral of the initial earnings
density over the range [z, z∗ + ∆z∗]:
B(τ , z∗; ε, φ∗) =
∫ z∗+∆z∗
z
h (ζ) dζ, (A.4)
where τ ≡ (τ0, τ1). If the density is locally uniform, the integral in (A.4) is:
B(τ , z∗; ε, φ∗) ≈ h(z)(z∗ + ∆z∗ − z) (A.5)
Taking a first-order Taylor approximation of u ((1− τ1)z +R1, z, n) and u ((1− τ1)z∗ +R1, z∗, n)
at ((1− τ0)z +R0, z, n), and using the first order condition for initial earnings, (1−τ0)uc =
−uz, we have from (A.3):
φ∗ ≈ uc · (1− τ1) [z∗ − z] + uz · (z∗ − z)
⇒ z ≈ z∗ + φ
∗/uc
(τ1 − τ0)
= z∗ +
φ
dτ1
,
where dτ1 = τ1 − τ0 and φ = φ∗/uc is the dollar equivalent of the disutility associated with
adjusting earnings. Substituting this expression for z into (A.5), we have
B(τ , z∗; ε, φ) = h(z)(∆z − φ/dτ1),
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where bunching now depends on the dollar-denominated cost of adjusting, rather than
the utility cost. Finally, for small dτ , ∆z is small and h(z) ≈ h(z∗ + ∆z) ≈ h(z∗). Let
b ≡ B/h(z∗), and note that ∆z∗ = z∗ (dτ1/ (1− τ0)) ε. The excess mass at the kink can
now be expressed as a linear function of the parameters:
b(τ , z∗; ε, φ) = ε
(
z∗
dτ1
1− τ0
)
− φ
(
1
dτ1
)
. (A.6)
Derivation of Formula for Bunching with Heterogeneity
We derive the formula for bunching B in the presence of heterogeneity under the Compar-
ative Static approach as follows:
B =
∫∫∫ z∗+∆z∗
z
h˜ (ζ, , ϕ) dζddϕ
≈
∫∫
[z∗ + ∆z∗ − z] h˜ (z∗, , ϕ) ddϕ
≈
∫∫ [

(
z∗
dτ1
1− τ0
)
− ϕ
(
1
dτ1
)]
h˜ (z∗, , ϕ) ddϕ
= h (z∗) ·
[(∫∫

h˜ (z∗, , ϕ)
h (z∗)
ddϕ
)(
z∗
dτ1
1− τ0
)
−
(∫∫
ϕ
h˜ (z∗, , ϕ)
h (z∗)
ddϕ
)(
1
dτ1
)]
= h (z∗) ·
[
ε¯
(
z∗
dτ1
1− τ0
)
− φ¯
(
1
dτ1
)]
,
where we have used the assumption of constant h˜ (·) and the approximations for ∆z∗ and
z in Section 2.7. Here h (z∗) =
∫∫
h˜ (z∗, , ϕ) ddϕ, and ε¯ and φ¯ are the average elasticity
and adjustment cost, respectively.
Linear Adjustment Costs
We now introduce an adjustment cost that increases linearly in the size of the adjustment.
Assume that given an initial level of earnings z0, agents must pay a cost of φ
∗ · |z − z0|
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when they change their earnings to a new level z. Utility u˜ at the new earnings level can
be represented as:
u˜ (c, z;n, z0) = u (c, z;n)− φ∗ · |z − z0| .
The first order condition for earnings can be characterized as:
−uz (c, z;n)
uc (c, z;n)
= (1− τ − φ∗/λ∗ · sgn (z − z0))
=
 (1− τ − φ) if z > z0(1− τ + φ) if z < z0 ,
where λ∗ = uc (c∗, z∗;n) is the Lagrange multiplier and φ = φ∗/λ∗ is the dollar equivalent
of the linear adjustment cost φ∗.
The individual chooses earnings as if he faces an effective marginal tax rate of τ˜ = τ +
φ·sgn(z − z0). It follows that our predictions about earnings adjustment are similar to our
previous predictions, except that the effective marginal tax rate τ˜ appears, rather than τ .
Thus, we can solve for the elasticity of earnings as a function of the change in earnings 4z∗
due to introduction of a kink in the tax schedule and the jump in marginal tax rate dτ1:
ε =
4z∗/z∗
dτ˜1/ (1− τ˜0)
=
4z∗/z∗
(dτ1 − 2φ) / (1− τ0 − φ) .
Since the right-hand side is increasing in φ, the estimate of the elasticity increases as the
linear adjustment cost increases. This makes intuitive sense: the adjustment cost attenuates
bunching, so holding constant the level of bunching, the elasticity must be higher as the
adjustment cost increases.
Now assume that when an individual adjusts his earnings, he incurs a linear adjustment
cost φ∗L for every unit of change in earnings, as well as a fixed cost φ∗F associated with any
change in earnings. Consider again bunching at z∗, with a tax rate jump of dτ1 = τ1 − τ0
183
at earnings level z∗. We have the following set of expressions for excess mass:
B =
∫ z∗+4z∗
z
h (ζ) dζ
ε =
4z∗/z∗
(dτ1 − 2φL) / (1− τ0 − φL)
φ∗F + φ∗L · (z − z∗) = u
(
(1− τ1) z∗ +R′ , z∗;n
)
− u
(
(1− τ1) z +R′ , z;n
)
.
Using a left rectangle approximation for the integral, we have:
b ≡ B/h (z∗)
= z∗ +4z∗ − z
= z∗
(
dτ1 − 2φL
1− τ0 − φL ε+ 1
)
− z.
We can further apply an approximation for z similar to the approximation we used in Section
2.7, i.e. z = z∗ + φF /
(
dτ1 − 2φL
)
. Thus, the expression for bunching can be simplified to:
b = ε
(
z∗
dτ1 − 2φL
1− τ0 − φL
)
− φ
F
(dτ1 − φL) ,
where
(
φF , φL
)
=
(
φ∗F /λ∗, φ∗L/λ∗
)
. In this case, we need at least three kinks to separately
identify
(
ε, φF , φL
)
. Because we do not examine a setting in which one can compare bunch-
ing under three different positive tax rates, we are not able to estimate these parameters
using data (or to fruitfully estimate the parameters in the non-linear case since we do not
have a credible source of variation to identify them).
A.11.7. Derivation of Formula for Bunching with a Pre-Existing Kink (Sharp Change Ap-
proach)
The Comparative Static approach abstracts from a key feature of our empirical setting. In
particular, the Comparative Static approach models the transition from a budget set with
no kink to one with a kink. This approach facilitates our basic intution and provides a
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transparent bridge between our approach and existing bunching methods in the presence
of a kink. However, in our context, we conduct analysis using data just before and just
after the benefit reduction rate was decreased (in 1990 from 50 percent to 33.33 percent for
66-69 year olds; or from 33.33 percent to zero for this group in 2000; or from 33.33 percent
for 69-year-olds to zero for 70-year-olds in 1990-1999). These changes involve moving from
an initial state with a kink to a new state with a smaller kink. In a frictionless model,
the distinction is immaterial. However, as we show, this matters in the presence of a fixed
adjustment cost. In particular, when the kink becomes more muted, the change in bunching
will be attenuated due to the fixed adjustment cost.
We will assume that in the initial state, bunching is characterized as in Remark (2). Let
the initial kink, K1, be characterized by a lower marginal tax rate, τ0, to the left of z
∗, and
a higher marginal tax rate, τ1, to the right of z
∗. The initial level of bunching is:
B1 =
∫ z∗+∆z∗1
z1
h (ζ) dζ
Now, consider a change in the kink to K2, which retains the lower marginal tax rate τ0 to
the left of z∗ but reduces the marginal tax rate to the right of z∗ to τ2 < τ1. Had we begun
with no kink and introduced K2, bunching would have been:
B2 =
∫ z∗+∆z∗2
z2
h (ζ) dζ
Note that relative to K1, K2 provides a weaker incentive to bunch, when starting from a
baseline tax schedule with no kink. Formally, we have z2 ≥ z1, ∆z∗2 < ∆z∗1 and B2 ≤ B1.
Characterizing Bunching
In characterizing bunching when moving from K1 to K2, individuals may be separated into
several groups based on their optimal level of earnings z0 in the absence of a kink. First,
there are individuals with z0 < z
∗. They will locate to the left of the kink under both K1
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and K2.
Second, we have individuals with z∗ < z0 ≤ z1 (area i in Figure 9). These individuals would
optimize in the presence of K1 by moving to z
∗, were it not for the adjustment cost. Now,
with a smaller kink K2, these individuals continue to remain at the initial earnings level
z0 > z
∗, as the utility gain to reoptimizing to z∗ is even smaller than it was under K1.
Third, we have those with z1 < z0 ≤ z2 (area ii in Figure 9). When moving from no
kink to K1, these individuals locate at the kink, z
∗. If the budget set had hypothetically
transitioned from no kink to K2, these individuals would have chosen to remain at z0, due
to the fixed adjustment cost. However, when moving from K1 to K2, these agents remain
at the kink z∗. The reason is that the frictionless optimum under K2 is z∗ for everyone
initially earning in the range [z∗, z∗ + ∆z2].
Fourth, we have agents with z2 < z0 ≤ z∗ + ∆z2 (area iii in Figure 9). These individuals
bunch at z∗ when moving from no kink to either K1 or K2. Thus, they remain bunching at
z∗ when moving from K1 to K2.
Fifth, we have agents with z∗ + ∆z2 < z0 ≤ z∗ + ∆z1 (areas iv and v in Figure 9). When
starting from a budget set with no kink, these agents bunch under K1, but not under K2.
Starting instead from K1, they must choose between remaining at the kink z
∗ or moving to
the frictionless optimum under K2, z2 > z
∗. We know that at least some of these individuals
will remain bunching. To see this, consider an individual with earnings under no kink z0 =
z∗ + ∆z2 + δ0. For small enough δ0 optimal earnings under K1 is z∗, and optimal earnings
under K2 tends to z
∗ as δ0 tends to zero. Likewise, the net utility gain from relocating
from z∗ to z2 under K2 tends to zero as δ0 tends to zero. However, the fixed adjustment
cost remains strictly positive. Therefore, this individual will remain at z∗ when moving
from K1 to K2 for small enough δ0. In Figure 9, area iv shows those with initial earnings
z∗ + ∆z2 < z0 < z¯0 who remain bunching at the kink when transitioning from K1 to K2.
Area v shows those with initial earnings z¯0 < z0 < z
∗+ ∆z1, who ”debunch” from the kink
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when moving from K1 to K2.
When reoptimizing is beneficial for at least some agents in this final group, we will have a
reduction in bunching when transitioning from K1 to K2.
17 Empirically, we observe such a
reduction over time, so this is the case relevant to our setting. In this case, the marginal
”de-buncher” will be defined by the following conditions:
−uz (c2, z¯2; n¯2)
uc (c2, z¯2; n¯2)
= (1− τ2)
u ((1− τ2) z¯2 +R2, z¯2; n¯2)− u ((1− τ2) z∗ +R2, z∗; n¯2) ≡ φ∗
−uz (c0, z¯0; n¯2)
uc (c0, z¯0; n¯2)
= (1− τ0)
z¯0 ≤ z∗ + ∆z∗1
In words, the first line indicates that z¯2 > z
∗ is the optimal, frictionless level of earnings
chosen by the top buncher in the presence of K2. The second line requires that when facing
K2, this agent is indifferent between remaining at z
∗ and moving to z¯2 through paying the
adjustment cost. The third line defines z¯0 as the initial level of earnings that this individual
chooses when facing a constant marginal tax rate of τ0 and no kink. The fourth line requires
that this individual is initially bunching at z∗ in response to K1. If this last inequality is
binding, then when moving from K1 to K2, none of the bunchers ”debunch” and the fraction
bunching is unchanged. In that case, we have no variation available to identify both ε and
φ. As noted above, empirically we do observe that excess bunching falls around 1990 when
the BRR falls from 50 percent to 33.33 percent (as well as in the other cases we examine
empirically, in which the BRR falls from a positive level to zero). Thus, we restrict attention
to the case in which z¯0 < z
∗ + ∆z1.
17In certain cases, it is possible that reoptimizing away from the kink is not optimal for anyone in the
initial earnings range [z∗ + ∆z2, z∗ + ∆z1]. In that case, there is no change in bunching when moving from
K1 to K2.
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Bunching at K2 following K1, when z¯0 < z
∗ + ∆z1, can therefore be expressed as:
B˜2 =
∫ z¯0
z1
h (ζ) dζ
We can again solve this system of equations for φ∗ and ε. Note that ε is still identified by
the potential adjustment of the top-most buncher:
ε =
z¯0 − z¯2
z¯2
(1− τ0)
dτ2
Note that when moving from K1 to K2, the change in bunching is smaller than it would be
if we had started with steady state bunching at K1 following no kink (B1) and then moved
to steady state bunching K2 following no kink (B2). That is:
B1 − B˜2 =
∫ z∗+∆z∗1
z1
h (ζ) dζ −
∫ z¯0
z1
h (ζ) dζ
≤
∫ z∗+∆z∗1
z1
h (ζ) dζ −
∫ z∗+∆z∗2
z2
h (ζ) dζ
= B1 −B2,
where the second line follows from the fact that z¯0 ≥ z∗ + ∆z∗2 and z1 ≤ z2.
Simplified Approximation
We can again build intuition for this result by simplifying the formula for bunching in the
second period. Assuming the density is constant over the range [z∗, z∗ +4z∗1 ], we have:
b˜2 = z¯0 − z1
= (z¯0 − z¯2) + z¯2 − z1
= ε
(
z¯2
dτ2
1− τ0
)
+ z¯2 − z1
= ε
(
z¯2
dτ2
1− τ0
)
+ (z¯2 − z∗)− φ
dτ1
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where b˜2 ≡ B˜2/h (z∗). On the third line, we have used the definition of the elasticity
and on the fourth line, we used a first-order approximation to solve for z1 as before in
Section (A.11.6). Thus, we can see why bunching when moving from a larger to smaller
kink is greater than would be predicted by the Comparative Static method. First, the term
multiplying ε has a z¯2 instead of a z
∗ and there is an additional term z¯2 − z∗ – both of
which increase bunching, since z¯2 > z
∗. Both of these capture of the excess bunching from
above, due to inertia. Finally, the third term has a dτ1 in the denominator instead of a dτ2.
The larger denominator increases bunching – dτ1 > dτ2 – and captures the fact that there
is less attenuation in bunching from below, also due to inertia.
Elasticities Under Frictionless (Saez 2010) Formula
We investigate the results when applying the Saez (2010) formula for estimating elasticities—
applicable to a frictionless setting—in a setting in which there are in fact adjustment costs.
In other words, we answer the question: if there are adjustment costs and we mis-specify our
estimate of the elasticity by assuming that we are in a frictionless setting, in what way do
we mis-estimate the elasticity? As we show, if we face an adjustment cost as in the Sharp
Change model, but we estimate the elasticity using the Saez (2010) formula applicable to a
frictionless setting, we will see the elasticity estimate increase when we move from a larger
kink to a smaller kink (as in our empirical application, and as we observe empirically in
Figure 34). Thus, an increase in the Saez (2010) estimate of the elasticity—of the sort
that we observe empirically—is a telltale sign that we are operating under a Sharp Change
model.
We first present the formula for the elasticity in a frictionless model, as in Saez (2010).
Next, we present the formulas for the elasticities we would estimate if we mis-specified the
model as the frictionless (Saez 2010) model, even though we in fact face the Sharp Change
model.
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Saez (2010) model We assume that tax changes are relatively small and that we can
therefore treat the density is constant. (We derive analogous results if we instead use exact
formulas under quasilinearity.) Assume that we begin with a more pronounced kink K1
and then move to a less pronounced kink K2, by lowering the jump in marginal tax rates
at exempt amount from dτ1 to dτ2. Assume in each year, we can estimate normalized
bunching: b ≡ B/h (z∗). In a frictionless (Saez 2010) model, we have:
b1 = 4z∗1 = εz∗
dτ1
1− τ0
b2 = 4z∗2 = εz∗
dτ2
1− τ0
where we have used the fact that: 4z∗ = εz∗dτ/ (1− τ0). A natural estimator of the
elasticity is the Saez estimator eS :
eS =
b
z∗
(1− τ0)
dτ
=
b
a · dτ
where a ≡ z∗/ (1− τ0).
In each period (denoted by the subscript), we have the following for the Saez estimator
when there are no frictions:
eS1 =
b1
a · dτ1 = ε
eS2 =
b2
a · dτ2 = ε
Thus, eS1 = e
S
2 . Here e
S
1 denotes the Saez (2010) estimate of the elasticity in period 1 (under
K1), and e
S
2 denotes this elasticity in period 2 (under K2).
Sharp Change Model By contrast, in the Sharp Change model, we start at kink K1
and then move straight to K2, once again estimating normalized bunching. We have the
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following results here:
b1 = 4z∗1 + z∗ − z1
b2 = z¯0 − z1
Rewrite b1 and b2 as follows:
b1 = 4z∗1 − (z1 − z∗)
b2 = 4z∗2 + (z¯0 −4z∗2 − z1)
The Saez estimators now return:
eS1 =
b1
a · dτ1 = ε−
(z1 − z∗)
a · dτ1
eS2 =
b2
a · dτ2 = ε+
(z¯0 −4z∗2 − z1)
a · dτ2
The change in Saez estimators is:
eS2 − eS1 =
(z¯0 −4z∗2 − z1)
a · dτ2 +
(z1 − z∗)
a · dτ1
≥ (z¯0 −4z
∗
2 − z1)
a · dτ1 +
(z1 − z∗)
a · dτ1
=
z¯0 −4z∗2 − z1 + z1 − z∗
a · dτ1
=
z¯0 −4z∗2 − z∗
a · dτ1
≥ 4z
∗
2 + z
∗ −4z∗2 − z∗
a · dτ1
= 0
where in the second line, we use the fact that dτ1 > dτ2 and in the second-to-last line, we
use the fact that z¯0 ≥ 4z∗2 + z∗.
Thus, eS2 − eS1 is weakly greater than zero: the Saez (2010) frictionless elasticity estimate
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weakly increases (as we observe empirically). The pattern we observe empirically—an up-
ward jump in the Saez (2010) estimate of the elasticity when the policy change occurs in
1990, as shown in Figure 34—is a telltale sign that we are operating in the Sharp Change
model.
Sharp Change Approach with Linear Adjustment Cost
Note that under the Sharp Change approach, with a linear adjustment cost we can derive
an approximation for bunching (analogously to Section A.11.6) to show that:
b˜2 = ε
(
z¯2
dτ2 − 2φL
1− τ0 − φL
)
− (z¯2 − z∗)− φ
F
dτ1 − φL .
In our empirical application, we apply the Sharp Change approach in estimating elasticities
and adjustment costs using data on individuals in different years (in the baseline specifica-
tion, 1989 and 1990). Our empirical approach is applicable in the case in which individuals
make year-by-year static earnings decisions; in the baseline, this effectively assumes that
individuals weigh the cost of adjustment against the benefits in 1990. If instead individuals
compare the costs of adjustment in 1990 to the benefits of adjustment in 1990 and subse-
quent years, then the benefits and therefore the estimated cost of adjustment would likely
be larger. In this case, our estimated cost of adjustment could be considered a lower bound.
Our estimates demonstrate the applicability of the methodology, including in settings in
which the benefits may be realized over more years (as these discounted benefits would
then be weighed against the costs). As we discuss, we view our static approach as a natural
first step toward estimating elasticities and adjustment costs, but developing a dynamic
model of adjustment frictions represents an important next step.
A.11.8. Estimating the Elasticity and Adjustment Cost
In this section, we describe in more detail how we use data on the amount of bunching
to estimate the elasticity and adjustment cost. Let b = (b1, b2, . . . , bK) be a vector of
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(estimated) bunching amounts normalized by the density at the kink, using the method
described in Section (2.3). Let τ = (τ1, . . . , τK) be the tax schedule at each kink. The
triplet τk = (τ
k
0 , τ
k
1 , τ
k
2 ) denotes the tax rate below (τ
k
0 ) and above (τ
k
1 ) the kink k; when
using the Sharp Change method, τk2 denotes the ex post marginal tax rate above the kink
after it has been reduced, as in Section (A.11.7). Let z∗ = (z∗1 , . . . , z∗K) be the earnings
levels associated with each kink. To estimate (ε, φ), we seek the values of the parameters
that make predicted bunching bˆ and actual (estimated) bunching b as close as possible on
average.
Letting bˆ(ε, φ) = (bˆ(τ1, z
∗
1 , ε, φ), . . . , bˆ(τK , z
∗
K , ε, φ)), our estimator is:
(
εˆ, φˆ
)
= argmin(ε,φ)
(
bˆ(ε, φ)− b
)′
W
(
bˆ(ε, φ)− b
)
, (A.7)
where W is a K×K diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are the inverse of the variances
of the estimates of the bk.
We obtain our estimates by minimizing equation (A.7) numerically. Solving this problem
requires evaluating bˆ at each trial guess of (ε, φ).18 Recall that in general bunching takes
the form:
Bk(τ k, z
∗
k; ε, φ
∗) =
∫ zubk
zlbk
h (ζ) dζ,
where
(
zlbk , z
ub
k
)
are the ex-ante earnings levels of the lowest and highest earning bunchers,
in the presence of linear tax at the lower tax rate, τk0 . Define z
∗
k + ∆z
k
1 as the ex ante
earnings level for the highest earning buncher – in the absence of frictions – when the size
of the kink is dτk1 = τ
k
1 −τk0 . As in the main text, we continue to assume that h(·) is uniform
in [z∗k, z
∗ + ∆zk1 ], so that
bk(τ k, z
∗
k; ε, φ
∗) = zubk − zlbk ,
where b = B/h (z∗k). The definitions of
(
zlbk , z
ub
k
)
vary depending on the setting and are
18In solving problem (A.7), we impose that φ ≥ 0. When φ < 0, every individual adjusts her earnings by
at least some arbitrarily small amount, regardless of the size of φ. This implies that φ is not identified if it
is less than zero.
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defined as follows. In the frictionless case (Saez 2010), we have:
zlbk = z
∗
k
zubk = z
∗
k + ∆z
k
1 .
In the presence of a fixed adjustment cost, we have under the Comparative Static approach:
zlbk = z
k
1
zubk = z
∗
k + ∆z
k
1 ,
where zk1 is the ex-ante earnings of the marginal buncher from below given a fixed cost of
adjustment. This is defined in the indifference condition above in equation (A.3). Finally,
under the Sharp Change method, we have:
zlbk = z
k
1
zubk = z¯
k
0 ,
where zk1 is similarly the ex ante earnings of the marginal buncher from below (calculated
using a kink with dτk1 = τ
k
1 −τk0 ). The ex ante earnings of the marginal buncher from above,
z¯k0 , is defined in Section (A.11.7) where dτ
k
1 = τ
k
1 − τk0 and dτk2 = τk2 − τk0 .
Our estimator assumes a quasilinear utility function, u(c, z;n) = c − n1+1/ε
(
z
n
)1+1/ε
, fol-
lowing Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven and Waseem (forthcoming). (In
order to relax this assumption empirically, we would have to observe wealth, which is
not available in the data.) Note that because we have assumed quasilinearity, φ∗ = φ,
∆zk1 = z
∗
k
((
1−τk1
1−τk0
)ε
− 1
)
and n = z (τ) / (1− τ)ε, where z (τ) are the optimal, interior
earnings under a linear tax of τ . However, there typically is not a closed form solution for
the
(
zlbk , z
ub
k
)
in other cases. Instead, given ε and φ, we find
(
zlbk , z
ub
k
)
numerically as the
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solution to relevant indifference condition. For example, zk1 is defined implicitly by:
u((1− τk1 )z∗k +Rk1 , z∗k; zk1/(1− τk0 )ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility from adjusting to kink
− u((1− τk1 )zk1 +Rk1 , zk1; zk1/(1− τk0 )e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility from not adjusting
= φ,
The equation is continuously differentiable and has a unique solution for zk1. As such,
Newton-type solvers are able to find zk1 accurately. Note that some combinations of τk, z
∗
k, ε,
and φ imply zlbk > z
ub
k . In this case, the lowest-earning adjuster does not adjust to the kink,
and whenever this happens we set bˆk = 0. The predicted amount of bunching is therefore:
bˆk(τ k, z
∗
k; ε, φ) = max(z
ub
k − zlbk , 0).
We have also shown a robustness check in our Tables in which we assume that the earnings
distribution is lognormal, rather than assuming that that h(·) is uniform in [z∗k, z∗k + ∆zk1 ].
Specifically, we use the distribution of earnings at age 61 over 1986-1988 and 1992-1994
to estimate the parameters of a lognormal earnings distribution, (µz, σz), using maximum
likelihood. (Individuals age 61 are not subject to the AET but are not far removed in age
from those at retirement age, making this a reasonable counterfactual earnings density for
those subject to the AET). We then solve for bunching using:
Bk(τ k, z
∗
k; ε, φ
∗) = Φ
(
log zubk − µz
σz
)
− Φ
(
log zlbk − µz
σz
)
where Φ (·) is the standard normal CDF.
We estimate bootstrapped standard errors. Observe that the estimated vector of parameters
(εˆ, φˆ) is a function of the estimated amount of bunching; call this function θ(b). To compute
bootstraped standard errors, we use the bootstrap procedure of Chetty et al. (2011) to
obtain 200 bootstrap samples of b. For each bootstrap sample, we compute εˆ and φˆ as
the solution to (A.7). The standard deviation of εˆ and φˆ across bootstrap samples is the
bootstrap standard error, and we compute confidence intervals analogously. We estimate
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whether an estimate is significantly different from zero by assessing how frequently the
constraint φ ≥ 0 binds in our estimation. Given this constraint, p-values are from a one-
sided test of equality with zero. We have also estimated the standard errors using the delta
method and obtained similar results.
A.12. Appendix: Additional Figures
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Figure 14: Bunching Response to a Convex Kink (Frictionless Case)
Note: When we move from a linear budget constraint (Panel A) to a convex kink (B), individuals with
initial earnings between z∗ and z∗ + ∆ z∗ relocate to the kink. As we move from a linear budget
constraint (Panel C) to a convex kink (Panel D), a spike in the earnings density appears at the kink,
corresponding to the density that was initially located between z∗ and z∗+ ∆ z∗. The spike is spread out
in the vicinity of the kink in Panel D; this may result from several factors discussed in Saez (2010), such as
inability to control earnings precisely.
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Figure 15: Bunching Estimation Methodology
Note: Panel A decomposes the ex-post earnings distribution shown in Appendix Figure 14 Panel D into
two groups. The bunchers, group X , are those who bunch at the kink in the presence of the higher
marginal tax rate τ + dτ but not at the lower marginal tax rate τ . The non-bunchers, group Y , are
comprised of those who locate to the left of the kink under the initial lower marginal tax rate τ , and those
who locate to the right of the kink under the higher marginal tax rate τ + dτ . Panel B demonstrates how
the distribution of earnings in the absence of the kink is estimated to recover the share of bunchers, by
excluding data in a neighborhood of z∗.
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Figure 16: Mean Percentage Change in Earnings from Age 70 to 71, by Earnings at 70,
1990-1998
Note: The figure shows the mean percentage change in earnings from age 70 to age 71 (y-axis), against
earnings at age 70 (x-axis). Earnings are measured relative to the kink, shown at zero on the x-axis. The
data are a 20 percent random sample of 70-year-olds in the LEHD in 1990-1998. We exclude 1999 as a base
year in this and similar graphs because the AET is eliminated for those over NRA in 2000. Higher earnings
growth far below the kink reflects mean reversion visible in this part of the earnings distribution at all
ages. We also find a spike in mean earnings growth from age 70 to age 71 among those born in January.
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Figure 17: Adjustment Across Ages: Histograms of Earnings and Normalized Excess Mass,
59-73-year-old OASI Claimants, 1990-1999
Panel A: Earnings histograms, by age
Panel B: Normalized excess mass, by age
See notes to Figures 5 and 6. This figure differs from Figures 5 and 6 only because the sample in year t
consists only of people who have claimed OASI in year t or before (whereas in Figures 5 and 6 it consists
of all those who claimed by age 65).
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Figure 18: Adjustment Across Ages: Histograms of Earnings and Normalized Excess Mass,
59-73-year-olds Claiming OASI by Age 65, 1972-1982
Panel A: Earnings histograms, by age
Panel B: Normalized excess mass, by age
See notes to Figures 5 and 6. This figure differs from Figures 5 and 6 only because the years examined are
1972-1982 (whereas in Figures 5 and 6 the years examined are 1990-1999).
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Figure 19: Adjustment Across Ages: Histograms of Earnings and Normalized Excess Mass,
59-73-year-olds Claiming OASI by Age 65, 1983-1989
Panel A: Earnings histograms, by age
Panel B: Normalized excess mass, by age
See notes to Figures 5 and 6. This figure differs from Figures 5 and 6 only because the years examined are
1983-1989 (whereas in Figures 5 and 6 the years examined are 1990-1999).
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Figure 20: Adjustment Across Ages: Histograms of Earnings and Normalized Excess Mass,
59-73-year-olds Claiming OASI by Age 65, 2000-2006
Panel A: Earnings histograms, by age
Panel B: Normalized excess mass, by age
See notes to Figures 5 and 6. This figure differs from Figures 5 and 6 only because the years examined are
2000-2006 (whereas in Figures 5 and 6 the years examined are 1990-1999). As explained in the main text,
the NRA slowly rose from 65 for cohorts that reached age 62 during this period; the results are extremely
similar when the sample is restricted to those who claimed by 66, instead of 65. In the year of attaining
NRA, the AET applies for months prior to such attainment.
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Figure 21: Comparison of Normalized Excess Bunching Among 62-64 Year-Olds and 66-69
Year-Olds, 1982-2004
Note: the figure shows excess normalized bunching among 62-64 year-olds and 66-69 year-olds in each year
from 1982 to 2004. Note the caveat that the 62-64 year-old group faces a notch at the exempt amount, as
opposed to the kink faced by those 66-69.
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Figure 22: Adjustment Across Ages: Histograms of Earnings, 66-69 Year-Olds, 1999-2001
Panel A: Earnings histogram, 66-69 year-olds, 1999
Panel B: Earnings histogram, 66-69 year-olds, 2000
Panel C: Earnings histogram, 66-69 year-olds, 2001
Note: the figure shows a histogram of earnings in 1999, 2000, and 2001, using LEHD data on 66-69
year-olds. Earnings are measured relative to the kink, shown at zero.
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Figure 23: Adjustment Across Ages: Histograms of Earnings and Normalized Excess Mass,
59-73-year-olds Claiming OASI by Age 65, 1990-1999
Panel A: Earnings histograms, by age
Panel B: Normalized excess mass, by age
See notes to Figures 5 and 6. This figure differs from Figures 5 and 6 only because the bandwidth is $500
(whereas in Figures 5 and 6 it is $800).
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Figure 24: Robustness to Polynomial Degree: Normalized Excess Mass by Age and Year,
OASI Claimants by 65
Panel A: Normalized Excess Mass by Age, 1990-1999
Panel B: Normalized Excess Mass by Year, Ages 66-69
Notes: The figure shows the difference in estimates of normalized excess bunching as we vary the degree of
the polynomial used. For additional notes on the samples see Figure 6 for Panel A and Figure 7 for Panel
B.
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Figure 25: Robustness to the Excluded Region: Normalized Excess Mass by Age and Year,
OASI Claimants by 65
Panel A: Normalized Excess Mass by Age, 1990-1999
Panel B: Normalized Excess Mass by Year, Ages 66-69
Notes: The figure shows the difference in estimates of normalized excess bunching as we vary the region
about the kink that is ”dummied out” in the polynomial estimation. For additional notes on the samples
see Figure 6 for Panel A and Figure 7 for Panel B.
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Figure 26: Adjustment by Sex: Histograms of Earnings, 59-73-year-olds Claiming OASI by
Age 65, 1990-1999
See notes to Figure 5. The sample examined is the same as in Figure 5 but examines men and women
separately.
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Figure 27: Adjustment Across Ages: Histograms of Earnings, 59-73-year-olds Claiming
OASI by Age 65 with Self-Employment Income, 1990-1999
See notes to Figure 5. The figure differs from Figure 5 only because the sample consists of those with
positive self-employment income (whereas in Figure 5 those with positive self-employment income are
excluded).
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Figure 28: Mean Percentage Change in Earnings from Age 69 to 70, by Earnings at 69,
1990-1998
Note: The figure shows the mean percentage change in earnings from age 69 to age 70 (y-axis), against
earnings at age 69 (x-axis). Earnings are measured relative to the kink, shown at zero on the x-axis. The
data are a 20 percent random sample of 69-year-olds in the LEHD in 1990-1998. We exclude 1999 as a
base year in this and similar graphs because the AET is eliminated for those over NRA in 2000.
211
Figure 29: Probability that Earnings Move with Kink, 1990-1998
Note: The figure shows the probabiliy that individual earnings move with the kink from year to year (i.e.
the probability that an individual locates at the kink in year t+ 1, conditional on locating at the kink in
year t), for age groups 58 to 60, 62 to 63, and 65 to 68. (Each of these ages refers to age in year t.) Results
are similar when considering similar age bins. The kink is defined as the region within $2800 of the exempt
amount. We exclude the year 1999 because the AET is eliminated for those over NRA in 2000. See other
notes to Figure 5.
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Figure 30: Earnings Distributions by Age, OASI Claimants by Age 65, 1990-1999
Panel A: Earnings Distributions by Age, 60-62
Panel B: Earnings Distributions by Age, 69-71
Notes: The figure shows earnings distributions at ages 60, 61, and 62 (Panel A) and at ages 69, 70, and 71
(Panel B).
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Figure 31: Mortality Analysis: Mean Age at Death, 62-69-year-olds Claiming OASI by Age
65, 1966-1971 and 1990-1999
Note: The figure shows mean age at death from a one percent random sample of SSA administrative data
on individuals aged 59-73, claiming OASI by age 65, between 1966 and 1971 (inclusive) in the top panel,
and between 1990 and 1999 (inclusive) in the bottom panel. The figure shows no clearly noticeable
patterns at the kink that are different from those away from the kink. This holds true for those 62-64 and
66-69, in a period prior to the introduction of the Delayed Retirement Credit (i.e. 1966-1971) and
subsequent to its introduction (i.e. 1990-1999). Results are similar for other time periods.
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Figure 32: Normalized Excess Mass at Kink by Age, 1966-1971
Note: The figure shows normalized excess bunching, ages 18 to 75, 1966-1971. We group ages into
three-year bins. See other notes to Figure 6.
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Figure 33: Fraction of Workers Changing Employers from Age t to Age t+1, by Age t
Earnings, 1990-1998
Note: The figure shows the fraction of workers who change employers from age t to age t+ 1 (y-axis),
plotted against earnings at age 69 (x-axis). For example, 0.16 on the y-axis implies that 16 percent of
workers change employers from age t to age t+ 1. Earnings are measured relative to the kink, shown at
zero on the x-axis. The data are a 20 percent random sample of the LEHD in 1990-1998. The bin width is
$800. Solid (dotted) lines show show point estimates (95 percent confidence intervals).
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Figure 34: Elasticity Estimates by Year, Saez (2010) Method, 1982-1994
Note: The figure shows elasticities estimated using the Saez (2010) method, by year from 1982 to 1994,
among 67-68 year-old OASI claimants. We use our methods for estimating normalized excess bunching but
use Saez’ (2010) formula to calculate elasticities, under a constant density. This method yields the
following formula:
ε =
[
log
(
b
z∗
+ 1
)]/[
log
(
1− τ0
1− τ1
)]
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Figure 35: Probability of claiming OASI in year t+1 among 61-68 year-olds in year t who
are not claiming, 1990-1998
Note: The figure shows the probabiliy that an individual claims OASI in year t+ 1, conditional on not
claiming OASI in year t, for those ages 61-68 in year t from 1990-1998.
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Table 37: Estimates of Elasticity and Adjustment Cost Using Sharp Change Method and
Disappearance of Kink at Age 70
(1) (2) (3)
ε φ ε|φ = 0, Age 69
Basic 0.28 89.93 0.25
[0.25, 0.34]*** [25.51, 240.00]*** [0.22, 0.30]***
Lognormal 0.30 $87.19 0.27
[0.26, 0.36]*** [31.88, 256.39]*** [0.23, 0.32]***
Benefit Enhancement 0.42 $58.01 0.38
[0.37, 0.50]*** [16.70, 146.86]*** [0.33, 0.45]***
Excluding FICA 0.36 $83.01 0.33
[0.31, 0.43]*** [23.79, 213.17]*** [0.28, 0.38]***
Bandwidth = $500 0.20 $17.05 0.26
[0.22, 0.32]*** [0.69, 76.00]*** [0.16, 0.23]***
68-70 year-olds 0.30 $79.10 0.28
[0.27, 0.35]*** [24.61, 189.34]*** [0.25, 0.32]***
Note: The table estimates elasticities and adjustment costs using the removal of the AET at age 70, using
data on 69-71 year-olds. We cannot estimate the constrained elasticity using only data on age 70 because
the benefit reduction rate is zero at that age. We show these results in the Appendix, rather than the main
text, because the estimates of excess bunching at age 70 are potentially affected by the coarse measure of
age that we use, as explained above in the Appendix. To address this issue, we use both age 70 and age 71
in estimating these results. Using only age 70—or alternatively using only age 71—both show very similar
results, which is unsurprising because Figure 6 shows that normalized excess bunching is similar at ages 70
and 71. The row labeled ”68-70 year-olds” uses data from ages within this range. See also notes to Table
11.
A.13. Appendix: Additional Estimates of ε and φ
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Table 38: Estimates of Elasticity and Adjustment Cost Using Sharp Change Method and
1990 Policy Change, Assuming no Pre-Period Bunching Attenuation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ε φ ε|φ = 0
1990 1989
Baseline 0.22 $139.53 0.39 0.22
[0.18, 0.26]*** [46.25, 359.40]*** [0.33, 0.48]*** [0.18, 0.26]***
Lognormal density 0.24 $149.87 0.43 0.24
[0.19, 0.29]*** [42.55, 426.32]*** [0.35, 0.54]*** [0.19, 0.29]***
Benefit Enhancement 0.37 $76.24 0.59 0.37
[0.30, 0.43]*** [17.28, 237.63]*** [0.49, 0.73]*** [0.30, 0.43]***
Excluding FICA 0.30 $119.84 0.50 0.30
[0.25, 0.35]*** [32.33, 344.45]*** [0.42, 0.62]*** [0.25, 0.35]***
Bandwidth = $500 0.24 $83.80 0.38 0.24
[0.19, 0.30]*** [5.86, 296.54]*** [0.30, 0.50]*** [0.19, 0.30]***
68-70 year-olds 0.31 $106.32 0.50 0.31
[0.27, 0.34]*** [25.21, 291.94]*** [0.42, 0.62]*** [0.27, 0.34]***
Note: The table applies the Sharp Change method to the 1990 policy change, using data from 1989 and
1990, but assumes that bunching in 1989 is not attenuated by adjustment frictions. The constrained
estimate of bunching using data only from 1989 is mechanically the same as the unconstrained estimate, as
both rely on the Saez (2010) formula for bunching. See also notes to Appendix Table 37.
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Table 39: Estimates of Elasticity and Adjustment Cost Using Sharp Change Method and
Elimination of Earnings Test in 2000 for 66-69 Year-Olds
(1) (2) (3)
ε φ ε|φ = 0, 1999
Baseline 0.10 $23.23 0.09
[0.03, 0.19]*** [0.00, 331.52]* [0.04, 0.14]***
Lognormal density 0.10 $20.17 0.09
[0.03, 0.21]*** [0.00, 346.90]* [0.04, 0.14]***
Benefit Enhancement 0.15 $14.93 0.14
[0.04, 0.36]*** [0.00, 350.46]* [0.07, 0.21]***
Excluding FICA 0.13 $21.31 0.12
[0.03, 0.28]*** [0.00, 402.69]* [0.06, 0.18]***
Bandwidth = $500 0.10 $56.48 0.09
[0.07, 0.21]*** [0.03, 367.05]** [0.05, 0.13]***
1998 to 2000 0.12 $23.09 0.11
[0.08, 0.55]*** [0.00, 957.13]* [0.07, 0]***
Note: The table applies the Sharp Change method to the 2000 policy change, using data on 1999 and
2000. It is not possible to perform the constrained estimate using a cross-section from the year 2000
because the marginal tax rate is zero in this year, implying that the elasticity is undefined. The final row
uses data from 1998 and 2000, rather than 1999 and 2000. Note that the left endpoint of the confidence
interval is sometimes at 0.00 even though the p-value indicates significance at the 5 percent level; this is
because a few of the bootstrap replications show point estimates that are positive and very small so round
to 0.00. See also notes to Appendix Table 37.
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Table 40: Estimates of Elasticity and Adjustment Cost Using Comparative Static Method
and 1990 Policy Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ε φ ε|φ = 0
1993 1989
Baseline 0.21 $0.00 0.21 0.21
[0.18, 0.34]*** [0.00, 902.56] [0.14, 0.31]*** [0.17, 0.26]***
Lognormal density 0.24 $33.35 0.22 0.23
[0.20, 0.36]*** [0.00, 577.01] [0.15, 0.34]*** [0.19, 0.29]***
Benefit Enhancement 0.37 $78.09 0.32 0.36
[0.30, 0.50]*** [0.00, 352.03] [0.21, 0.47]*** [0.29, 0.43]***
Excluding FICA 0.30 $58.54 0.27 0.29
[0.25, 0.42]*** [0.00, 492.47] [0.18, 0.40]*** [0.24, 0.35]***
Bandwidth = $500 0.25 $0.00 0.25 0.25
[0.21, 0.80]*** [0.00, 4188.55] [0.20, 0.35]*** [0.19, 0.32]***
1988 and 1993 0.26 $146.33 0.21 0.25
[0.23, 0.33]*** [0.00, 408.86] [0.14, 0.31]*** [0.22, 0.28]***
Linear Approximation 0.46 $379.10 0.30 0.39
[0.58, 0.60]*** [351.27, 406.93]*** [0.19, 0.41]*** [0.31, 0.47]***
Note: The table applies the Comparative Static method to the 1990 policy change, using data from 1989
and 1993. ”Linear approximation” refers to estimates based on the linearized formulas presented in the
text. See also notes to Appendix Table 37.
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